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RETAIL COMPETITION IN THE ELECTRIC
UTILITY INDUSTRY
DAVID

C.

HJELMFELT*

Retail competition among electric utilities has long been recognized as
not being in the public interest.' There is reason to believe that today retail
competition may in fact be in the public interest. Regulatory practices,
however, often prevent or restrict such competition.
I.

THE NATURE OF RETAIL COMPETITION

Retail competition-that is, competition for sales to ultimate consumers
of electricity-may take a variety of forms. First, distribution facilities may
be duplicated, permitting door-to-door competition. 2 Second, utilities may
compete for customers along the fringes of their service territories. 3 Third,
interfuel competition may exist between an electric utility and an alternative
fuel supply, such as natural gas. Fourth, electric utilities may compete for a
franchise to serve a block of customers at retail. Fifth, utilities may compete
to attract new industries to their service territories. 4 Sixth, performance
comparisons between electric utilities may provide a form of yardstick
5
competition.
The focus of this article is on the first two forms of retail competitiondoor-to-door or direct and fringe area-for these are the competitive forms
most often discouraged by regulation. Of these forms, fringe area competition requires some elaboration.
*

B.A., Kansas State University; J.D., Duke University; Member, Bar Associations of

Colorado, District of Columbia, and Kansas.
1. Watson & Brunner, Monopolization by RegulatedMonopolies: The Searchfor Substantive Standards, 22 ANTITRUST BULL. 559, 566 (1977); compare Kellman & Marino, City of Cleveland v.
CEI: A Case Study In Attempts To Monopolize By Regulated Utlities, 30 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 5 (1981)
(claiming advantages of retail competition).
2. Although this form of competition is considered unusual in the electric utility industry,
no reliable statistics quantify the extent of the competition. Notable examples of door-to-door
competition are found in the cities of Cleveland, Ohio, and Lubbock, Texas.
3. Meeks, Concentration in the Electric Power Indust: The Impact ofAntitrust Poliy, 72 COLUM.
L. REV. 64, 94 (1972).
4. Most investor-owned utilities engage in efforts to attract new industry to their service
area. Some economists have argued that electric rates have little impact in attracting customers
to a utility's service area. But see Pace, Relevant Markets and the Nature of Competition in the Electric
Util'ty Indust, 16 ANTrrRUST BULL. 725 (1971). However, the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) staff took the opposite approach in testimony filed in Minnesota Power &
Light Co. in Docket No. ER78-425 (FERC 1978).
5. Even critics of yardstick competition recognize that performance comparisons may
provide an effective means of applying pressure on electric utilities to improve performance.
Pace, supra note 4, at 764-65; Stelzer, Testimony before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Consumers Power Co. (Midland Plant, Units 1 and 2) in Docket Nos. 50-329A and 50-330A
(NRC), cited at 6 NRC 892, 982 (1977).
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Fringe Area Competition

Fringe area competition generally occurs between a municipal system
and an investor-owned system, a municipal system and a rural electric cooperative, or a rural electric cooperative and an investor-owned utility. Many
investor-owned utilities have refrained from competing for fringe-area customers, even when free to do so. Ohio Edison Company, Toledo Edison
Company, and the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company agreed in the
early 1960's not to compete. 6 In one instance a municipal system engages in
fringe-area competition with both a cooperative and an investor-owned utility, 7 and in at least one situation, two municipal systems compete. 8
No matter what the identity of the competing entities, most will likely
compete to provide service to suburban residential areas, shopping centers,
strip commercial areas, and industrial areas. The latter two categories are
usually the most hotly contested. 9 These areas tend to provide high revenue
per customer and high revenue per dollar of plant investment because of the
large load per customer. Such areas are considered valuable additions to a
utility's service area.
1.

Restraints on Fringe Area Competition

Fringe area competition may be restrained through the exercise of a
municipality's franchise power, by state statute, 10 by agreements between
the parties, or by restraints imposed by a wholesaler on the area in which
power can be sold at retail (usually an area of competition in which the
wholesale supplier also sells at retail).'I Recent changes occurring in the
relationship between electric utilities and their customers, largely as a result
of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA),' 2 may further reduce retail competition. For example, there is a renewed emphasis on
co-generation, in which an industry that requires heat in its manufacturing
process can utilize waste process heat to generate electricity both for its own
use and for sale to an electric utility. Former Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) Chairman Curtis stated that he would favor policies
encouraging utility ownership of up to fifty percent of the co-generation facility.' 3 The resulting close relationship between the utility and the industrial user makes it unlikely that the industrial user would respond to
competitive overtures from another electric utility.
However, it has also been argued that co-generation could force increased competition in the form of generation cost comparisons, potential
6. Toledo Edison Co., 10 N.R.C. 265 (1979).
7. Dothan, Ala.
8. City of Fairhope, Ala., and Riviera Utilities Co., owned by the City of Foley, Ala.
9. W.R. Mayben, Legal, Engineering and Economic Aspects of Service Area Disputes
(Oct. 29, 1973) (paper presented to American Public Power Ass'n Legal Seminar).
10. Meeks, supra note 3, at 95.
11. For example, the wholesale contracts of Ohio Edison as they existed in the early and
mid-1960's employed such restraints. See Toledo Edison Co., 10 N.R.C. 265 (1979).
12. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 16,
30, 42, 43 U.S.C.).
13. Inside FERC, Nov. 3, 1980, at 2.
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loss of major retail industrial customers, and competition from co-generators
4
for sales at wholesale to existing distribution systems.'
The potential for new co-generation facilities may be large. According
to the Edison Electric Institute, co-generators in 1900 produced half the nation's electricity-a figure that had declined to five percent by 1974.15 Cogeneration provides a great increase in fuel efficiency. A typical electric utility is thirty-two percent efficient, while a co-generator may be eighty percent
efficient. 16
Also, as a result of PURPA, utilities are inserting remotely controlled
load management devices in houses and commercial buildings. Utilities are
also investing in energy conservation features in individual homes, such as
attic insulation or thermal storage heaters, for which customers pay a
monthly fee.1 7 The resulting blurring of the distinction between consumer
and seller will further reduce opportunities for retail competition between
electric utilities.
II.

REGULATION Is NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR COMPETITION

Economists who favor competition believe it will produce the most efficient allocation of resources over long periods of time.' 8 Presumably, management faced with competition will be forced to adopt the best technology
and provide the best service at the lowest cost. On the other hand, when no
competition exists output will be reduced as management maximizes profits.
Service may be reduced because sales are assured even when consumers are
not treated well.
Historically economists identified certain utility firms as local monopolies; in a very restricted geographic area, one utility could most efficiently
serve the demand. Over time, and with no real factual support, this concept
was expanded until utilities were considered natural monopolies regardless
of where they provided services. 19 Under the natural monopoly concept,
economists, regulators, and legislators concluded that it was inefficient to
have two utilities serving the same area. Thus, to insure the most efficient
allocation of resources and at the same time prevent exploitation by the utility, utilities were allowed to maintain a monopoly status, but were subjected
20
to regulation.
Two factors draw in question the premise that retail competition between electric utilities should be discouraged. The first is the recognition
that regulation is an inadequate substitute for competition; the second is
that traditional natural monopoly theories have been inappropriately ap14. Jones, The National Energy Act and State Commission Regulation, 30 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
324 (1980).
15. The Wall St. J., Feb. 19, 1981, at 33, col. 4.
16. Id

17. Public Power Weekly, Oct. 6, 1980, at 2.
18. Hamilton, Forward to Pubhk Utilit
Law Symposium, 30 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 220
(1980).
19. Dr. Wein, testimony in City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., No.
C75-560, Tr. 18, 819-30 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
20. W. SHEPHERD & W. CLAIR, PUBLIC POLICIES TOWARD BUSINESS 348 (1979).
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plied. This section deals with the adequacy of regulation as a surrogate for
competition.
A.

Current Regulatoqv Practices

Former Federal Power Commission (FPC) Chairman Lee White has
been very critical of regulation. White states that: "The game is not Company A trying to provide better service at lower prices than all other companies, but rather Company A attempting to secure the highest rate the
regulatory bodies will permit. ' 21 In general, state commissions "operate
with inadequate budgets and are no match for the power companies with
22
great sums of money at stake."1
Even when administered well, rate regulation does not insure that rates
charged by electric utilities will be the same as rates in a competitive atmosphere. 23 Reasonable rates fall within a zone rather than at a discrete point.
A rate may not be so high as to warrant rejection by the regulatory commission, and yet the same rate may be higher than the rate the electric utility
would accept under the pressure of competition. 24 When rate regulation is
not administered well, utility rates may be even higher. The principal rate
engineer for the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company has stated that as
late as 1976 an electric utility could get as high a return as it wanted on
equity under Ohio rate regulation. Competition from natural gas utilities
25
provided the only check on rates.
Not only does regulation fail to control rates adequately, it cannot insure efficient management or efficient allocation of resources. A tendency
26
toward over-capitalization clearly exists under present regulatory schemes.
Moreover, a regulated company's right to recover cost increases by raising
rates has had a tendency to lessen utility resistance to unreasonable wage
demands.2 7 The current use of automatic rate increases to pass on fuel cost
increases eliminates incentive to shop for the best fuel prices. 28 Other observers have noted that private utility companies often are managed poorly
because of their freedom from competition. 29 Absent competition, inef21. Lee White, The Right to Federally GeneratedPower 21 (Public Power Ass'n June 11, 1979).
22. d
23. Moore, The Ekctiveness of Regulation of Electric Utility Prices, 36 S. ECON. J. 365 (1970).
24. Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatog Poliies, 82 HARV. L. REV.
1207, 1235 (1969).
25. Bingham, testimony in City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., No.
C75-560, Tr. 2905 (N.D. Ohio 1980). For example, the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. has
received 92.2% of the rate increases it has requested from 1970 through 1979. Cleveland Press,
July 10, 1980, at 4A, col. 3.
26. Averch and Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, AM. ECON. REV.
1052 (1962); Hughes, Scale Frontiers in Electric Power, in TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN REGULATED INDUSTRIES 44 (W. Capron ed. 1971).
27. Turner, supra note 24, at 1232.
28. Interestingly, it has also been argued that fuel adjustment clauses may encourage utilities to use fuel intensive technologies rather than making capital investments that might save
fuel in the long run. Whether current regulation leads to over-capitalization or under-capitalization, the end result remains a misallocation of resources. Leaffer, Automatic Fuel Adjustment
Clauses. Tne For a Hearing, 30 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 228 (1980).
29. C. ELLIS, A GIANT STEP 90-91 (1966). In the past the electric utility industry grew and
prospered in spite of management. Fraser, Utility Bond and Commercial Ratings, PUB. UTILITY
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ficient firms and inefficient management have been recognized as being
under little or no pressure to minimize costs, and are unlikely to be displaced
by those who can do better. 30 For example, in February 1980, the White
House Office of Consumer Affairs joined the state of North Carolina in asking FERC to initiate an unprecedented investigation of the management of
Virginia Electric and Power Company. 3 ' They alleged that the company's
plants were "extremely unreliable" and that the company "may have failed
to pursue conversion of oil-fired generating facilities to coal-fired as expedi' 32
tiously as possible."
Under the present system of utility regulation, many important matters
are left to the utility manager's discretion with little or no regulatory review.
Among the areas receiving little regulatory attention are: 1) reserve levels,
2) reliability criteria, 3) depreciation rates, 4) type, size, and mix of generating resources, 5) new product development, 6) research expenditures, 7) aggressiveness in dealing with suppliers, and 8) salvage of obsolete plants. In
most instances these matters would be more responsive to competition than
33
to regulation.
If utility regulation is not performing the tasks assigned within an acceptable margin of error, the commonly accepted justification for substituting regulation for competition must be examined. Although not the only
rationale for economic regulation, the concept of natural monopoly is the
traditional and most persuasive argument supporting regulation. 34 In large
measure then, the substitution of state regulation for competition in electric
utilities must stand or fall on the application of natural monopoly theories to
the distribution of electricity at the retail level.
III.

IS THE RETAIL DISTRIBUTION OF ELECTRICITY CHARACTERIZED By
NATURAL MONOPOLY TENDENCIES?

In general terms, a natural monopoly may be said to exist when one
firm can satisfy the demand in a market at a lower cost than if two or more
FORTNIGHTLY, Sept. 27, 1973, at 42, 44. Other observers have concluded that the public power
sector which is subject to less formal regulation attracts a more competent management. Newberg, Two Issues in the Municipal Ownership of Electric Power Distrtbution Systems, 8 BELL J. ECON.
303 (1977). The overall cost of management is less with publicly owned systems. Hamilton,
supra note 18, at 223.
30. Denison, Explanations of Declining Productitv'ty Growth, SURV. CURRENT Bus., Pt. II, Aug.
1979, at 14-15.
31. White House Seeks Probe of Vepco, PUB. POWER WEEKLY, Mar. 17, 1980, at 6.
32. Id
33. The Alabama Public Service Commission concluded that the Alabama Power Co. had
not conducted its business in the most efficient manner, saying that:
We are of the opinion and believe that this record shows that the proper exercise of
"efficient and economical management" dictates that the Company take advantage of
opportunities to divest itself of 25% of the Farley nuclear plant, either to company
affiliates or to the rural Electric Cooperatives and municipal utilities. Such an action
by the Company would make its rates more reasonable to the public.
The Commission, however, was without authority to compel the company to operate more efficiently. Alabama Power Co., No. 17094 at 5-6, (APSC July 12, 1976), aj'd in pertinent part,
Alabama Power Co. v. Alabama Public Serv. Comm'n (Montgomery County Civ. Ct., Aug. 11,
1976).
34. Fanara, Suelflow and Draba, Energy and Competition: The Saga ofElectrc Power, 25 ANTITRUST BULL. 125, 126 (1980).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:1

firms serve the market. 35 At the outset, it is important to note that the general definition is in terms of providing a service, rather than a product, i.e.
the retail distribution of electricity. Also, the focus is on cost to the firm
rather than on price to the consumer. Thus, even if a firm serving a retail
market were to achieve lower costs as a monopoly, it does not follow that the
resulting price to the consumer would be lower than if two firms competed
to serve the market.
Economic literature presents no standard definition of natural monopoly theory, and different economists specify different sets of conditions necessary for natural monopoly.3 6 One commentator, Primeaux, has identified
various attributes of natural monopoly and has categorized those which are
or are not dependent on economies of scale 37 -for their implementation or
existence. The attributes dependent upon economies of scale include:
1) economies of scale in production, 2) relatively high fixed costs, 3) a single
producer able to operate at lower costs than if two or more firms serve the
market, 4) the impossibility of a large number of competing plants, 5) higher
customer prices if more than one firm serves the market, and 6) a high degree of price elasticity. Attributes not dependent on economies of scale include: 1) the necessity for the product or services supplied, 2) inconvenience
to customers caused by duplication of facilities, 3) use of products or services
at the place of production, 4) the existence of special limitations on raw
38
materials, and 5) an industry characterized by secrecy.
The characteristics of a natural monopoly identified by Primeaux outnumber the characteristics that most economists would attribute to a natural
monopoly. However, other economists would add the elements of time and
a stable technology. 39 Power production technology is presently undergoing
changes. Generating unit sizes advanced rapidly during the period from
1965 to 1980, with typical units increasing from around 250 megawatts (mw
or 1,000 kilowatts) to as large as 1300 megawatts (mw) for nuclear units. A
very real possibility exists that a long-term trend toward the use of alternative energy sources such as solar power, wind generation, and the development of small hydrogenerating stations will reverse the trend of central
station service. 4°
35. A natural monopoly is one "resulting from economies of scale ...
such that one firm
of efficient size can produce all or more than the market can take at a remunerative price, and
can continually expand its capacity at less cost than that of a new firm entering the business."
Northern Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 399 F.2d 953, 965 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (quoting C. KAYSEN
& D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 191 (1959)).
36. Primeaux, Some Problems With Natural Monopoy, 24 ANTrrRUST BULL. 63 (1979).

37. Primeaux defines economies of scale as existing when unit price declines as the scale of
production increases. Id at 64.
38. Id at 64-65.
39. Dr. Wein, testimony in City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., No.
C75-560, Tr. 18,819-30 (N.D. Ohio 1981).
40. See Feldman and Giordano, Fthantng Dispersed Generation Projects, 37 PUB. POWER
MONTHLY, Mar.-Apr. 1979 at 31. P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, 3 ANTITRUST LAW I 621a at 48

states that "[d]emand may total millions of dollars annually and yet be 'too thin' relative to the
minimum efficient scale of ... a hydroelectric power generator ....
" (emphasis in original).
Changes in production costs and technology have lead to a flurry of applications for development of small hydro projects.
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Because the natural monopoly theory is concerned with the firm rather
than the function, production and transmission costs must be considered, as
well as costs of retail distribution. In considering the impact of economies of
scale, long-run decreased costs resulting from expansion of plants must be
distinguished from short-run decreased costs resulting from better utilization
of existing plants. Only the former is relevant to natural monopoly theory.
41
The latter condition is not necessarily related to increasing returns of scale.
A.

Economies of Scale

Although economies of scale do exist in the production of electricity,
such economies do not continue indefinitely. A study examining economies
of scale in 114 firms revealed that in 1970 a larger share of electrical energy
was generated by firms that had grown beyond the size at which they experienced economies of scale. 4 2 A study of direct competition among electric
utilities found that competition forced firms reaching levels of production up
to 222 million kilowatt-hour (kwh) to produce at a lower average cost than
they would in a non-competitive environment. 43 Primeaux suggests that
monopoly structure generates x-inefficiency, which raises costs of production.
Any cost benefits from economies of scale are more than countered by the xinefficiency. 44 Thus, even where economies of scale do exist, they are unimportant as an attribute of natural monopoly. 45 Studies demonstrating the
exhaustion of economies of scale and the effects of x-inefficiency have led
some commentators to conclude that no natural monopoly results from econ46
omies of scale at the generation level.
Related to economies of scale is the fact that electric utilities have a
high fixed-cost investment in relation to the revenue generated. The ratio of
capital investments to revenue in the electric utility industry is about 4 to 1;
for the steel industry, 1.7 to 1; and for retail stores, .3 to 1. The high fixedcost ratio of electric utilities by itself has been argued as making utilities
natural monopolies. 4 7 The capital employment in various industries is long
lasting in some and short-lived in others. To allow for the differences in life
of capital employed, Primeaux argues that if high fixed capital is relevant,
the measurement should be in terms of output to depreciation of the capital
41. Primeaux, supra note 36, at 66.
42. Christensen & Greene, Economies of Scale in US Electric Power Generation, 84 J. POL.
ECON. 655, 656 (1976). Heuttner & Landon found the long run average cost curve to be Ushaped, with the lowest cost for firms ranging in size from 1600 mw to 3100 mw. Heuttner &
Landon, Electric Utilities: Scale Economies and Diseconomies, 44 S. EcON. J. 883, 903, 907 (1978).
43. Primeaux, A Reexamination of the Monopoly Market Structurefor Electric Utilities, in PROMOTING COMPETITION IN REGULATED MARKETS 175 (A. Phillips ed. 1975).
44. Primeaux, supra note 36, at 68.
45. Id
46. Fanara, Suelflow and Draba, supra note 34, at 137; see Jarrell, The Demand For State
Regulation of the Electric Utlity Indust, J.L. & ECONOMIES 269 (1978); Meeks, supra note 3; Weis,

Antitrust In The Electric Power Indust,

in

PROMOTING COMPETITION IN REGULATED MARKETS

(A. Phillips ed. 1975); W. SHEPHERD & W. CLAIR, supra note 20.
47. R. CAYWOOD, ELECTRIC UTILITY RATE ECONOMICS 2 (1956). However, it must be
kept in mind that regulation of the electric utility industry produces a tendency to overcapitalize.
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employed. 48 Application of the output-to-depreciation measurement shows
different
that capital requirements of electric utilities are not significantly
49
from those in industries not considered natural monopolies.
B.

Customer Pr'ces

Another attribute of natural monopolies is that higher customer prices
result when competitors enter the market. As shown above, even if lower
costs resulted from having one producer in a market, there is no assurance
that consumer prices will be lower. Conversely, with reference to the electric
utility industry, it cannot be readily demonstrated that the presence of more
than one firm in the retail market will produce higher consumer costs. Empirical evidence for this proposition is difficult to obtain because of the intervention of rate regulation. Primeaux relies on a comparison of rates between
all cities served by the Missouri Utilities Company and the rates charged by
the company in cities in which it faced competition. In all but two instances
the rates were the same, regardless of whether competition existed. In two
remaining cities, the rate was lower in Poplar Bluff, Missouri, where the
company competed with a municipally-owned utility, and higher in Eldon,
Missouri, where no competition existed. 50 The trouble with this type of
analysis is that most horizontally integrated electric utilities use postage
stamp rates, or rates based upon the company's cost of service to its entire
service area. Thus, the rate to any individual city represents company-wide
costs of service, rather than the actual cost of service to that particular city.
The actual cost to serve customers in a particular city would equal companywide costs only by coincidence. Substantial subsidization between groups of
customers served by a utility may occur. Accordingly, the presence of competition could lead to higher consumer prices but for the company's policy of
imposing postage stamp rates. As a result, the focus should be on the cost of
serving a particular market.
Theoretically, it can be shown that the cost of service may be higher
5
If
when one firm serves the market than where two firms serve the market.
one assumes that the market considered is one city and that two firms exist
in the market, only a detailed study of the location of the firms on their
respective cost curves can reveal whether costs will be reduced if one firm
serves the entire market. In the typical competitive situation, one firm
would be a relatively small municipally-owned system and the other firm
would be a much larger horizontally and vertically integrated investorowned utility. Applying the results of one study, 52 the average total cost
curve for the large utility will at some point begin to rise. Similarly, the
average cost curve for the small firm's existing plant will first decline and
then rise. However, the small firm, unlike the large firm, may yet obtain
economies of scale by installing additional capacity to capture a larger share
48. Primeaux, supra note 36, at 70.
49. Id
50. Id at 78-79.
51. Dr. Wein so demonstrated as part of his testimony in City of Cleveland v. Cleveland
Elec. Illuminating Co., No. C75-560, Tr. 18, 819-30 (N.D. Ohio 1981).
52. See supra authority cited in note 43 and accompanying text.
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53

The calculations of cost to serve the market based upon the assumptions
contained in Figure 1 demonstrate that it is quite possible for the cost of
serving the market to be substantially higher if only one firm serves the market. In fact, it is apparent that total costs would be further reduced if a third
firm serving 300 kwh entered the market at a time when Utility A served 300
kwh. The question then becomes one of whether Figure 1 sufficiently comports with reality to be of any analytical value. It is reasonable to conclude
that it does.
1.

Distribution and Design

Power production costs are by far the greatest portion of the cost of
providing electric service. The incremental cost of providing service is generally rising. Distribution costs are generally not more than twenty percent of
the cost of providing service. At least some evidence exists that distribution
53. All of the killowat hour (kwh) figures shown on Figure 1 are unrealistically low but
serve to illustrate the theoretical concept.
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54
costs may be lower in areas of competition than in areas of no competition.

Moreover, there are no significant economies of scale in the distribution
of electricity. In 1970, trends toward lower unit costs of distribution were
noted to be approaching the point of diminishing returns. Overhead conductors were approaching practical limitations, and power factors had been
raised to near unity. As primary circuit voltages increase to serve greater
loads, the unit costs of line transformers, line switching, and protective
equipment also increase, limiting overall potential savings. 55 In 1979, distribution economies were said to accrue from increased density of the service
56
area but not necessarily from increased scale.
The percent of the total cost of supplying retail power that is attributable to the operating cost of electric distribution has declined steadily. This
result has largely been due to the tremendous increase in power production
costs. Capital costs of distribution systems depend on a variety of managerial decisions that are not subject to regulatory scrutiny. The managerial
decisions regarding distribution system design are not necessarily dictated by
outside economic forces. To the extent that regulation promotes over-capitalization, the response may be to design a system of less than optimum
efficiency.
The two major classes of distribution system design are: radial and network. At least a dozen common variations of the major classes exist, with the
choice depending largely on the quality of service desired. The greatest
problem may be in selecting the equipment components in various parts of a
system that will provide the most economical design within the limits set.
For example, certain types of systems may have inherently better means of
regulating voltage than do others. Thus, when voltage regulation is provided at the distribution substation bus, auxiliary voltage regulation may be
needed on primary distribution lines having different loading cycles, e.g., a
57
residential feeder and an industrial feeder.
Similarly, large distribution substations having many primary feeders of
different lengths may require separate voltage regulation for each feeder.
However, it may be less expensive to regulate voltage at the substation bus
supplemented by pole-mounted regulators some distance from the substation
58
as needed.
A distribution system is cost sensitive to voltage because voltage must be
maintained between fairly definite limits at the point of delivery to permit
proper operation of equipment. 59 Maintaining closer limits than necessary
will result in higher system costs. Therefore, automatic regulating devices
60
must be carefully sized and located to insure economic system design.
54.
560, Tr.
55.
56.
57.

Kemper, testimony in City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., No. C7518, 385-89 (N.D. Ohio 1981).
FPC, Nattonal Power Survey (1970); Newberg, supra note 29, at 321.
U.S. Department of Energy, 2 THE NATIONAL POWER GRID STUDY 376 (1979).
Westinghouse Electric Corp., 3 ELECTRIC UTILITY ENGINEERING REFERENCE BOOK:

DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS 5 (1965).

58. Id at 48.
59. Id at 14.
60. Id.
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Distribution engineering is, to a large extent, a matter of obtaining the
most economic combination of system components. Many different sizes
and ratings of equipment must be considered. This is particularly true in
designing a system to serve areas of varying load densities with uncertain
and different rates of load growth. Regulation cannot and does not provide
significant oversight of the utility's efficiency in designing its system. The
mere existence of regulation cannot be said to insure an optimal distribution
system design.
More important to considerations of natural monopoly is the constantly
changing nature of the area served. Thus, even if one assumed that a particular substation and feeder system were initially optimally designed, the design cannot be expected to remain optimal over the forty- to fifty-year life of
the facilities. For example, if the substation initially served a residential
neighborhood, with time the neighborhood may decay. Abandoned homes
lead to excess capacity, and homes converted to businesses and apartments
lead to a need to increase capacity. Some feeders from the substation may
begin to serve industrial loads. As a result, additional less optimal voltage
regulation may be required. If the firm no longer employs the lowest cost
method in supplying service, its claim to natural monopoly is questionable.
The primary effect of retail competition is reduction of the density of
the load served. Economically, the effect may be the same as holding the
load constant and expanding the area served. An extensive area can be
served by many distribution substations, each of relatively low kilovolt
amphere (kva) rating, or by a smaller number of larger substations. As the
system expands, transformer capacity, switching equipment, subtransmission
lines, and primary feeder circuits must be added in practicable and economic increments. 6i However, a change in load resulting from competition
does not always result in a substantial reduction of facilities required. For
example, it is instructive to compare the facilities required to serve an area of
twelve square miles with a 23 kilovolt (kv) primary feeder system in which
the load density is 4000 kva per square mile with the facilities required to
serve the same total load spread over a twenty-four-square-mile area. The
load density for the twenty-four-square-mile area is 2000 kva per square mile
or half the load density of the twelve-square-mile area. In each situation,
one substation with a capacity of 4800 kva is required and five primary feeders are required. 62 Thus even economies claimed to be attributable to load
density may prove to be ephemeral.
Other evidence also exists to demonstrate that the theoretical construct
of Figure 1 is relevant for analysis of the natural monopoly status of electric
utility firms. Primeaux's study of the cost of service in cities with competition is consistent with Figure 1.63 Similarly, the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company has made studies showing that its costs for service inside
the city of Cleveland, where it faces vigorous competition, are comparable to
61. Westinghouse, supra note 57, at 72.
62. Id at 84.
63. See Primeaux, supra note 36.
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64
Additionally,
its costs for service in areas where no competition exists.
65
economies of scale in management are probably smaller.

IV.

THE EFFECT OF COMPETITION

If indeed the electric utility industry is a natural monopoly, economic
forces should dictate the disappearance of competition in the cities in which
it exists. Evidence of long-term competition can be found. For example,
competition has existed in the city of Cleveland, Ohio, for nearly seventy
years. Competition has existed in Sikeston, Missouri, for approximately fifty
years. 66 A study of competition in Cleveland concluded:
After 20 years of rate regulation in Cleveland by means of competition, it is difficult to find any basis of fact in the contention that
this means regulation is wasteful because of duplicate investment
and thereby an ultimate burden on the consumers. The records
show that the citizens of Cleveland have received the lowest rates
in the entire country over a 20-year period, yet the competing utili67
ties have both made enormous profits even at these low rates.
When examining a situation in which competition exists, additional factors must be considered that will not be significant when the question is
simply one of whether competition should be initiated. If two utilities are
already competing, the costs of installing duplicating facilities are sunk costs.
The sale of either utility is unlikely to occur unless the selling utility is able to
recover in the sales price an amount equal to the cost of the facilities used to
provide the service. Moreover, the sales price is frequently based upon the
cost of replacing all facilities at current prices minus depreciation. Whereas
the rates are usually based upon original cost of plant minus depreciation.
Poles used in distribution construction are long-lived. Thus, reproduction
cost new will be substantially greater than the actual cost of the plant used
to provide the service. The purchasing utility will enter the cost of the plant
at the cost paid, e.g. reproduction cost new. The stepped-up cost of the plant
claimed to be used may affect rates charged by increasing the rate base of
the competing utility.
Moreover, it is unlikely that the purchasing utility would immediately
remove the duplicate facilities. More likely, the duplicate facilities will be
left in place and used by the purchasing utility for a number of years. Duplicate facilities would be removed only when new construction causes relocation of pole lines to accommodate street widening or the like. This is
particularly true of mature service areas where additional load growth is not
of a magnitude to require a change in service.
The presumption that the electric utility industry is a natural monopoly
and that competition is to be discouraged in favor of regulation is outmoded
64. Bingham, testimony in City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., No.
C75-560, Tr. 2905-07 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
65.

F. MACHLUP, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MONOPOLY 52 (1952).

66.
67.

Primeaux, supra note 36, at 78.
E. KENEALY, THE CLEVELAND MUNICIPAL LIGHT PLANT 109 (1935).
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and does not comport with economic realities. To the extent that regulation
rests upon natural monopoly assumptions, it must be reexamined.
V.

ADMINISTRATIVE, JUDICIAL, AND LEGISLATIVE TREATMENT OF
COMPETITION BETWEEN ELECTRIC UTILITIES

The general trend of legislative, administrative, and judicial treatment
of competition between electric utilities has followed the old economic assumption of natural monopoly. Frequently, legislative policies have been
influenced by industry lobbying. The underlying presumption has been that
duplication of facilities to permit competition is wasteful. Deciding what is
waste presupposes a number of value judgments as to the long-term good of
society and presents difficult questions for philosophers and welfare economists. Courts are not well equipped to make such determinations. Moreover, a significant lag exists between the recognition of new "truths" by
academicians and the acceptance of those "truths" by the courts. Judges
tend to apply the law in accordance with economic theories prevalent when
they were in college. Thus, the tendency is to freeze economic thought at
given points until a new generation of jurists is seated.
Many court and administrative decisions have held, without critical
analysis, that the electric utility industry is a natural monopoly. In Cantor v.
Detroit Edison Co. ,68 the United States Supreme Court stated: "The very
reason for the regulation of private [electric] utility rates-by state bodies
and by the [Federal Power] commission-is the inevitability of
,,69
monopoly ....
InJackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. ,70 the Court referred to electric utilities as natural monopolies created by the economic forces of high threshold
capital requirements and virtually unlimited economies of scale. The Court
said in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States 71 that each town is "a natural
72
monopoly market for the distribution and sale of electric power at retail."
In Gulf States Utilities Co. v. FPC,73 the Court spoke of the "basic natural
monopoly structure" of the electric power industry.
Other courts have also relied upon or referred to the presumed natural
monopoly status of utilities. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has referred
to the natural monopoly possessed by a utility company in a city as a "classic
case" of a lawful monopoly. 74 In Lamb Enterprises,Inc. v. Toledo Blade Co. ,7 a
case involving competitors for community antenna television business, the
68. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
69. Id at 596 n.33 (quoting Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 389
(1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
70. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
71. 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
72. Id at 369.
73. 411 U.S. 747, 759 (1973). In a broader context, the court has said that in "those areas,
loosely spoken of as natural monopolies or-more broadly-public utilities . . . active regulation has been found necessary to compensate for the inability of competition to provide adequate regulation." FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 92 (1953).
74. Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 853 (6th Cir. 1979).
75. 461 F.2d 506 (6th Cir.), cer. dened, 409 U.S. 1001 (1972).
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same court gratuitously stated that house-to-house competition for customers
is not feasible for electric utilities.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has stated that competition between two electric suppliers would mean duplication and wasteful
investment. 76 That court has also said that in natural monopoly markets,
competition is sacrificed to avoid wasteful duplication of services and
investment.

77

In large part the above references to the natural monopoly status of the
electric utility industry are dicta and based either upon conclusory testimony
that merely parrotted traditional concepts or had no support in the record.
Such statements are picked up and repeated in other decisions without further analysis, thereby perpetuating an assumption, the validity of which is
doubtful. In what may be the only carefully litigated proceeding reaching a
final decision as to the natural monopoly status of public utilities, the
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
7
found that a natural monopoly did not exist.
The mistaken belief that competition by electric utilities is detrimental
to the public interest has resulted in the enactment by at least forty states of
legislation creating exclusive service territories. 79 However, where territorial
divisions have not been mandated by legislation, voluntary territorial allocations between electric utilities have been condemned asperse antitrust viola80
tions despite the assumed natural monopoly character of the industry.
A mistaken belief that electric utilities are natural monopolies has a tendency to make regulators and courts insensitive to anti-competitive acts of
electric utilities. Further, antitrust standards more stringent than would be
applied if no natural monopoly were assumed may be imposed. Thus, a
court may conclude that market share is not evidence of monopoly power or
that predatory acts must be shown in addition to monopoly power. 8 '
It has been shown that competition is possible at both the production
and distribution levels of the electric utility industry, and that competition
may be expected to provide substantial benefits which cannot be provided
by regulation. Without a conclusive showing that a particular utility is a
natural monopoly in a specific market, there is no reason to anticipate that
economic benefits will accrue from permitting a monopoly. Furthermore,
even upon a showing of natural monopoly, changes in technology may remove the natural monopoly situation.
76. Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. FPC, 193 F.2d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
77. Northern Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 399 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
78. Toledo Edison Co., 5 NRC 133, aJ'd 10 NRC 265 (1979).
79. Hjelmfelt, Exclusive Service Ternlories, Power Pooling, and Elecnc Utility Regulations, 38
FED. B.J. 21 (1979). Certification of service territories does not always end all competition. For
example, Utah Power & Light Co. was permitted to serve a mine located in Empire Electric
Assbiation's certified territory because the mine was located closer to existing facilities of Utah
Power & Light Co. Empire Elec. Ass'n v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 604 P.2d 930 (Utah 1979).
Contra Sende Vista Water Co. v. City of Phoenix, 127 Ariz. 42, 617 P.2d 1158 (1980).
80. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); Pennsylvania Water &
Power Co. v. Consolidated Gas, Elec., Light & Power Co., 184 F.2d 552 (4th Cir. 1950).
81. Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 284 F.2d 582 (Ist Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 365 U.S. 833 (1961).
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VI.

PROPOSALS FOR REGULATORY CHANGES

The first and most obvious regulatory change necessary, once electric
utilities are recognized not to be natural monopolies, is the repeal of territorial legislation. The disappearance of territorial legislation will not bring
about an explosion of retail competition, given the industry's deep-seated
bias against direct competition. Rather, competition can be anticipated to
continue to be impeded by unspoken gentlemen's agreements between
neighboring utilities. Nevertheless, even without a substantial increase in
direct competition, the elimination of territorial laws will create a potential
for competition, which may produce many of the benefits that could be expected from direct competition.
Second, utilities owning transmission facilities should be compelled to
make them available at reasonable cost on a space-available basis to any
utility desiring to use them. For a number of economic and environmental
reasons, the duplication of transmission facilities at present is frequently unfeasible. At the same time, competition at wholesale for bulk power supplies
is not possible without the ability to "wheel" the power over a third party's
transmission system. 8 2 Long-term, all-requirements contracts should be
carefully reviewed to determine whether the alleged benefits of assured bulk
power supply and greater ease of financing large generating facilities actually exist and outweigh the impediment to competition.
A third and more fundamental need is for legislators, regulators, and
courts to recognize that regulation is not a substitute for competition, but
rather is an adjunct to competition. For the present, regulation is necessary
because in most instances no more than two or three utilities will compete in
any given market. Competition between so few utilities-oligopolistic competition-will not produce results equal to competition by many firms. Nevertheless, every effort should be made to increase competition at both the
wholesale and retail levels.
An increase in wholesale competition may be required before retail
competition will substantially increase. Far too often the potential retail
competitor is dependent upon its retail rival for its source of supply. This
creates a price squeeze potential that has not been eliminated despite the
Supreme Court's ruling in FPCv. Conway Corp.8 3 that the Commission must
consider price squeeze issues in considering wholesale rates. To date, the
Commission's exercise of its price squeeze authority has been disappointing, 84 and the courts have been split as to their authority to grant relief
in price squeeze situations.8 5
82. After obtaining wheeling rights, the municipal electric system in Cleveland, Ohio, was
able to purchase bulk power from two additional suppliers. It is now purchasing at wholesale

from three different suppliers.
83. 426 U.S. 271 (1976).
84. Hjelmfelt, 4 Ace Squeeze Thoyfor Implementation of Federal Power Commission v. Conway Corp., 50 U. CoLO. L. REV. 459 (1979); Report ofthe Committee on Antitrust, 1 ENERGY L. J.
107 (1980); compare City of Bethany v. FERC, Docket No. 80-1633 (D.C. Ct. App. 1981).
85. Compare City of Mishawaka v. American Elec. Power Co., 616 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1980)
(damages were awarded) with City of Newark v. Delmarva Power & Light Co., 467 F. Supp. 763
(D. Del. 1979) (antitrust damages not available).
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CONCLUSION

In 1972, Richard Hellman wrote that the only successful regulation of
electric utilities has been government competition and competitive interaction. 86 He concluded that the theory of natural monopoly, and the related
theory that regulation by state commissions provides a legal substitute for
competition, are incompatible with the facts. Based upon his case studies, he
found that: "[Ultility managements, when exposed to government competition, have lowered prices and gained sales. More crucially, their finances
have met the regulatory test of attracting capital for expansion. In a number
of cases, rates of return have risen and exceeded those of comparable compa'87
nies not under competition.
The years since Hellman's study was published have confirmed his conclusions. However, there is no reason to limit competition to a struggle for
customers between investor-owned and publicly-owned utilities. All utilities
should be compelled to compete. Competition is not only practicable, but it
promises to provide benefits not obtainable from regulation alone.

86. R. HELLMAN, GOVERNMENT COMPETITION IN THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY: A
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY 70 (1972).
87. Id at 228.
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INTRODUCTION

Private financing of federal election campaigns by individuals, interest
groups, and business entities is a fundamental characteristic of American
electioneering. Candidates depend on the receipt of financial contributions
to supply the resources required to direct an effective campaign. t Accompanying this reliance on large contributions is the danger that such contributions "are given to secure a political quidpro quo from current and potential
office holders."' 2 This ever-present risk of political corruption erodes the in*

B.A., Emory University, 1980; J.D., American University, 1983.

1."The increasing importance of the communications media and sophisticated massmailing and polling operations to effective campaigning make the raising of large sums of
money an ever more essential ingredient of an effective candidacy." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1,26 (1976). Out of the $81.65 million raised by the five leading candidates in the 1980 Presidential race, $80.05 million was spent. This illustrates the candidates' heavy dependence on
their ability to raise money. Wash. Post, Nov. 16, 1981, at A3, col. 1.

2. Buckley v. Valco, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976).
17
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3
tegrity of the American electoral process. To combat these infirmities, Con-4
Act of 1971 (FECA or Act).
Campaign
gress passed the Federal Election
5
Since 1971, Congress has amended the Act three times due to various constitutional violations, ambiguities in statutory interpretation, and enforcement difficulties.
The FECA's major purpose is to limit "the actuality and appearance of
6
corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions." One
manner of achieving this goal is the requirement that candidates, their polit-7
ical committees, and independent contributors file disclosure statements
8
with the Federal Election Commission (FEC or Commission). Such reporting requirements serve a dual purpose. First, they furnish the voter with
information on the source of a given candidate's funds, as well as how he
spends these funds. Second, public access to a candidate's financial record
serves as a deterrent to political quidpro quo. Furthermore, the purpose of the
Act is enhanced by provisions that limit the amount that an individual or
group may contribute.9 There are essentially two ways to finance a campaign privately. Supporters of a candidate can either make direct expenditures for the candidate's benefit, or they can make contributions to others (such
as the candidate himself or his committees), who then spend the money for
the candidate's benefit. Contributions, but not expenditures, by individuals
0
and non-party political committees are limited by the Act.'
The various amendments to the FECA have not fully resolved the difficulties and uncertainties that have hampered the enforcement of its regulatory scheme. The 1980 Presidential and Congressional elections produced

3. Public awareness of political honesty is especially acute in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal. Id. at 27. See also Buckley v. Valco, 519 F.2d 821, 838-40 (D.C. Cir. 1975), a dsn
part and rev'd n part, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (extensive discussion of corruption in campaign
financing).
4. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified
as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-56 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) and in various sections of 18, 47

U.S.C. ).
5. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat.
1263; Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475;
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187, 93 Stat. 1339 (1980)
(codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-56 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) and in various sections of 18, 26, 47

U.S.C.).
6. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976).
7. 2 U.S.C. §§ 432, 434 (Supp. IV 1980). This section of the Act requires candidates and
their political committees to file detailed reports of their receipts and expenditures. 2 U.S.C.
§ 434(a) (Supp. IV 1980). Every person who is neither a candidate nor a political committee
and who makes independent expenditures expressly advocating the election or defeat of a
clearly identified candidate, in an aggregate amount in excess of $250 during a calendar year,
shall file a statement with the Commission. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431(17), 434(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
8. The enforcing body of the FECA is the Federal Election Commission. The Commission was established by the 1974 amendments. 2 U.S.C. § 437c (Supp. IV 1980). In addition to
overseeing the entire regulatory scheme, the Commission may also recommend legislation, issue
advisory opinions, subpoena witnesses and information for the furtherance of its investigations,
and pursue both civil and criminal violations of the Act in the appropriate forum.
notes 117, 128-30 and accom9. 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a-441b (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Se infra
panying text for a discussion of the contribution limits and their applicability to the note case.
10. The Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), held that expenditure
ceilings were unconstitutional. See infranotes 37-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the Buckley decision. But f 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (1976), which prohibits electoral expenditures by
corporations or labor organizations. This provision was not at issue in Buckler.
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an overwhelming amount of litigation.II One of the more significant disputes arising from the 1980 elections posed the question of whether draftcandidate committees were subject to the jurisdiction of the FEC. A draftcandidate committee is a group whose intent and goal is to convince a candidate to enter an election campaign. Such a committee can support either a
single candidate or multiple candidates. It seeks to achieve its goals through
the raising and spending of money solicited from individuals, clubs, unions,
political action committees, and anywhere else it can find people sympathetic to its cause. The most distinguishing feature of a draft committee is
that it supports an undeclared candidate who has disavowed its support. In
order for such a group to be subject to the FECA's contribution ceilings, it
must be defined as a political committee under the Act.1 2 Draft committees
claim that they are not "political committees" and are, therefore, outside of
the contribution ceilings imposed by the FECA. The FEC is of the opinion
that draft committees are political committees and are thereby subject to the
Act's reporting and contribution provisions. The Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 197913 brought draft committees within the reporting requirements of the Act. Thus, draft committees are now required
to disclose their contribution and expenditure activities.1 4 The amendment
is silent, however, as to limits on the amount of contributions a draft committee can receive.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals decision in Federal Election
Commission v. Machihists Non-Partisan PoliticalLeague1 5 (MNPL) hinged upon
interpretation of the term "political committee" and its application to draft
committees. In MiNPL the Carter-Mondale Campaign Committee, Inc.
(Carter-Mondale) alleged that MNPL, a registered multi-candidate political
committee, had violated the Act by making excessive contributions to draft
6
committees espousing the candidacy of Senator Edward M. Kennedy.'
MNPL argued that draft committees were not subject to the contribution
limits of the Act, because they were not "political committees" under the
11. See, e.g., California Medical Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981); FEC v. Citizens for
Democratic Alternatives in 1980, 655 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981); FEC
v. Machinists Non-Partisan Political League, 655 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897
(1981); In re Carter-Mondale Reelection Comm., Inc., 642 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir. 1980); FEC v.
Central Long Island Tax Reform Immediately Comm., 616 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1980); Bread Political Action Comm. v. FEC, 591 F.2d 29 (7th Cir. 1979); FEC v. Phillips Publishing, Inc., 517 F.
Supp. 1308 (D.D.C. 1981); Common Cause v. Schmitt, 512 F. Supp. 489 (D.D.C. 1980),aft'rper
cunam, 455 U.S. 129 (1982); Reader's Digest Ass'n v. FEC, 509 F. Supp. 1210 (S.D.N.Y. 1981);
FEC v. Florida for Kennedy Comm., 492 F. Supp. 587 (S.D. Fla. 1980), rev'd, 681 F.2d 1281
(Ilth Cir. 1982); Common Cause v. FEC, 489 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1980); Republican Nat'l
Comm. v. FEC, 487 F. Supp. 280 (S.D.N.Y.), a~f'dsummari/y, 445 U.S. 955 (1980).
12. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a) (1976). See ifra notes 47-60 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the definition given to political committees.
13. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187, 93 Stat.
1339 (1980) (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-56 (Supp. IV 1980) and in various sections of 18, 26, 47
U.S.C.).
14. H.R. REP. No. 422, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 15, reprntedin 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs 2860, 2874. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
15. 655 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981). The court did not incorporate the 1980 amendments of the FECA into its decision as the facts of MNPL transpired before
the amendment became operative.
16. Id at 383. See in/fa notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
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term's definition in the FECA. 17 The FEC asserted that it did have jurisdiction over draft-candidate committees. The Commission issued a sweeping
subpoena to further its investigation of the violations alleged in the CarterMondale complaint. 18 MNPL, maintaining its position that draft committees were not covered by the Act's provisions, refused to comply with the
subpoena.' 9 The FEC then filed a petition in the district court to enforce
the subpoena. 20 MNPL appealed after the district court ordered compliance
with the FEC subpoena.
Prior courts had refused to decide the jurisdiction question, declaring it
improper to raise jurisdictional issues in an action to enforce the Commission's subpoena. 2 ' These courts held that subpoena enforcement proceedings were of a limited nature, and thus, were not to extend beyond the
enforcement issue. In MNPL, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
reached a contrary result, holding that the FEC's subpoena and investigajurisdiction, and therefore
tion exceeded the Commission's subject matter
22
vacated the lower court's enforcement order.
This article discusses and analyzes the significance of the court's decision in this novel area. The history of the FECA is presented, particularly
regarding its relationship with draft committees. The issues of agency subpoena enforcement and the first amendment right of political association are
also fully detailed. The article concludes by scrutinizing the ramifications of
the court's unprecedented decision and the resulting loophole created in the
FECA.
I.

PRIOR LEGAL HISTORY

The following discussion will review federal election law, necessary to
an understanding of MNPL, and will present an overview of draft committees and their treatment under the FECA. An examination of a federal
agency's power to investigate, and to issue and enforce subpoenas is also
17. See tnfra note 117.
18. 655 F.2d at 384. The Commission's power to issue and request enforcement of subpoenas is provided in 2 U.S.C. § 437d (Supp. IV 1980). See infia notes 132-37 and accompanying
text.
19. 655 F.2d at 384.
20. Id See 2 U.S.C. § 437d(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
21. See FEC v. Florida for Kennedy Comm., 492 F. Supp. 587 (S.D. Fla. 1980), rev d, 681
F.2d 1281 (11th Cir. 1982) (although the court found some support for the proposition that a
draft committee is not a political committee, and therefore not within the scope of the FECA,
the court held that the issue of the Act's "coverage" could not be decided at the subpoena
enforcement stage). Butsee FEC v. Wisconsin Democrats for Change in 1980, Order No. 80-C124 (W.D. Wisc. Apr. 24, 1980) (the district court found that subject matter jurisdiction did
exist and thus the subpoena was within the Commission's authority). See infra notes 61-66 and
accompanying text for a discussion of these two draft Kennedy cases. See also United States v.
Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950) (administrative subpoenas may be broad in nature);
Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946) (purpose of subpoena is to
procure evidence, not to prove a charge); Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501
(1943) (issue of coverage of the Act was not for the district court, but for the Secretary of Labor
to decide). See infra notes 78-100 and accompanying text for a discussion of agency subpoena
enforcement.
22. 655 F.2d at 382.
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presented. Finally, the impact of the first amendment right of political association as it relates to compelled disclosure of information will be discussed.
A.

The Hslo~y of the FECA

The Constitution expressly grants Congress the power to regulate the
elections of members of the House of Representatives and Senate. 23 The
Supreme Court has acknowledged that "the function contemplated by Article I, section 4, is that of making laws."- 24 Congress broad power to regulate
Presidential and Vice-Presidential elections is also recognized by the
25
Court.
A traditional concern in American politics is the prevention of corruption in elections. 26 Congress has attempted to prevent such abuses by enacting reporting and disclosure requirements. The seminal federal disclosure
law, the Act of June 25, 1910,27 required committees that influenced congressional elections in two or more states to report all expenditures and contributions, as well as the identity of the recipients or contributors of those
funds. It further required a person to report his expenditures if he spent
more than $50 in a year for the purpose of influencing a congressional election in more than one state and if the expenditure was not made through a
political committee. 28 The Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 considerably broadened the disclosure requirements. 29 Congress again maintained
that corruption was the justification for requiring the disclosure of the political activities of individuals. 30 Political committees were defined as organizations "which [accept] contributions or [make] expenditures for the purpose
of influencing or attempting to influence the election of candidates or presidential and vice-presidential electors (1) in two or more States, or (2) . . . [as
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1, provides that "[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding
Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to
the Places of chusing Senators."
24. Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1931). In Smey, the Court stated that among the
functions Congress has in regulating elections is the "prevention of fraud and corrupt practices." Id. This is the precise compelling interest that justified the contribution limitations in
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). See Exparte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 661 (1884) (Congress
has wide supervisory role over entire range of election law).
25. "The power of Congress to protect the election of President and Vice-President from
corruption being clear, the choice of means to that end presents a question primarily addressed
to the judgement of Congress." Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 547 (1934). See also
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 85-109 (1976); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970) (Congress
has authority to change voting age in federal elections).
26. See, e.g., FEC v. MNPL, 655 F.2d 380, 388-89 n. 17 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897
(1981).
27. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 392, 36 Stat. 822 (1910). For a general discussion of history of
federal election disclosure law, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 61-62 (1976); United States v.
UAW, 352 U.S. 567 (1957). See also Redish, Campaign Spending Laws and the First Amendment, 46
N.Y.U. L. REV. 900 (1971).
28. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 392, 36 Stat. 822, 822-24 (1910).
29. Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, ch. 368, tit. III, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925) (current
version at 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)). Although the FECA of 1971 repealed the
Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, many provisions of the Corrupt Practices Act were incorporated into the FECA.
30. See 65 CONG. REC. 9507-08 (1924) (statements of Sen. Robinson).
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a] subsidiary of a national committee." 3 ' The committees were required to
report total contributions and expenditures, including the names and addresses of each person who contributed $100 or more or who received $10 or
more in a calendar year. 32 In Burroughs v. United States,3 3 the Supreme Court
upheld the Corrupt Practices Act stating that Congress had the "power to
pass appropriate legislation to safeguard . . .an election from the improper
34
use of money to influence the result . . .
The next major piece of legislation was the Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1971.'5 The FECA has been amended three times since its inception. 36 The most rigorous changes occurred pursuant to the 1976 Supreme
Court decision in Buckley v. Valeo .37 Because Buckl is the source of authority in most federal election litigation, 38 a brief examination of the opinion is
39
appropriate.
Generally, the Court in Buckl struck down the FECA's expenditure
limitations but upheld the Act's contribution ceilings and disclosure requirements. 4° The Court used an "exacting" level of scrutiny to provide the
broadest protection for the first amendment rights of free political expression
and association. 4 ' The Court stated that expenditure limits "reduce[d] the
quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the
depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached. This is
because virtually every means of communicating ideas in today's mass society requires the expenditure of money."' 4 2 By contrast, a limit on the
amount of a contribution "entails only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage in free communication . . . . [I]t permits the
31. Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, ch. 368, § 302(c), 43 Stat. 1070, 1070 (1925).
32. Id at § 305.
33. 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
34. Id at 545. See Birnbaum, The Consttutitnality Of The Federal Corrupt Practices Act After
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 28 AM. U.L. REV. 149 (1979) (overall discussion of the
Federal Corrupt Practices Act, its effectiveness and constitutionality, with emphasis on the Act's
effect on corporate political activity).
35. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-56 (1976
& Supp. IV 1980) and in various sections of 18, 26, 47 U.S.C.).
36. See supra note 5.
37. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
38. See, e.g., California Medical Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981); FEC v. Central Long
Island Tax Reform Immediately Comm., 616 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1980); Common Cause v.
Schmitt, 512 F. Supp. 489 (D.D.C. 1980), aff'dper curiam, 455 U.S. 129 (1982).
39. See generaly Clagett & Bolton, Buckley v. Valeo, Its Aftermath, And Its Prospects. The
Constitutiona/iy of Government Restraints on Political Campaign Financing, 29 VAND. L. REV. 1327
(1976); Nicholson, Buckley v. Valeo: The Constitutionah'ty of the Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendments of 1974, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 323 (1977); Comment, Buckley v. Valeo: The Supreme
Court and Federal Campaign Reform, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 852 (1976).
40. See supra text accompanying note 10. The suit in Buckley was brought by various candidates, incumbent officials who sought re-election, potential contributors, political committees,
and numerous party organizations. 424 U.S. at 7-8. The complaint sought an injunction
against enforcement of the major provisions of the Act, as well as a declaratory judgment that
its provisions were unconstitutional. Id at 8-9. The appellants claimed that a limitation on the
"use of money for political purposes constitute[d] a restriction on communication violative of
the First Amendment," since money is essential for effective political communication. .d at 11.
Additionally, the appellants argued that the disclosure and reporting requirements of the Act
"unconstitutionally impinged on their right to freedom of association." Id.
41. Id at 16.
42. Id at 19.
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symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution but does not in
any way infringe the contributor's freedom to discuss candidates and issues." 43 Thus, although both ceilings affect first amendment rights, the contribution limitations do not encroach as seriously upon protected political
44
expression or association.
The Act's primary purpose, limiting "the actuality and appearance of
corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions," was
enough to justify contribution limits. 45 The corruption justification was insufficient, however, to permit expenditure ceilings, since the Court felt that
4+i
the danger of corruption through unlimited expenditure was minimal.
The language of the Act 4 7 appears to incorporate as political committees a nearly unlimited range of issue-oriented groups. 48 The Court in Buckley, however, recognizing the dangers of a broad definition, sharply limited
the scope of the term "political committee."
To fulfill the purposes of the Act [the definition of political com43. Id at 20-21.
44. Id at 23. The contribution ceilings still permit the joint participation of individuals to
form independent political committees (such as MNPL). Such committees, through the combined efforts of individual contributions, have the ability to exert substantial political influence.
Id at 28 n.31.
45. Id at 26. The Court found it unnecessary to consider two other proposed justifications
for the contribution limitations-neutralizing the voices of affluent groups and persons, and
reducing the skyrocketing costs of election campaigns. Id. at 25-26.
46. Id. at 46-47. "While the independent expenditure ceiling fails to serve any substantial
governmental interest in stemming the reality or appearance of corruption in the electoral process, it heavily burdens core First Amendment expression." Id at 47-48.
The Court also disposed of the argument that the removal of the expenditure limits would
hamper the overall regulatory scheme by pointing out that expenditures "controlled by or coordinated with" the candidate or his campaign are treated as contributions under the Act and, as
such, are subject to the contribution limits. Id at 46-47.
47. The relevant terms of the Act at the time of the litigation are defined below. Although
these provisions have since been amended, the changes would not affect the outcome of the
issues discussed here.
"IP]olitical committee" means any committee, club, association, or other group of persons which receives contributions or makes expenditures during a calendar year in an
aggregate amount exceeding $1,000;
"[C]ontribution"(1) means a gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything of
value made for the purpose of(A) influencing the nominationfor election, or election, of any person to Federal office
• •

, or

(B) influencing the result of an election held for the expression of a preference
for the nomination of persons for election to the office of President of the United
States. ..
"[E]xpenditure"(1) means a purchase, payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money
or anything of value, madefor the purpose of(A) inluencig the nom'nationfor election, or the election, of any persons to Federal
office . . . .or

(B) influencing the results of a primary election...
2 U.S.C. § 43 1(d), (e), (f) (1976) (amended 1980) (emphasis added).
48. In United States v. National Comm. for Impeachment, 469 F.2d 1135 (2d Cir. 1972),
the court expressed its fears that a liberal interpretation of the Act's provisions would discourage
many groups from organizing and expressing their viewpoints. Under this liberal interpretation
"every little Audubon Society chapter would be a 'political committee,' for 'environment' . ...
[A] Boy Scout troop advertising for membership to combat 'juvenile delinquency' or a Golden
Age Club promoting 'senior citizens' rights' would fall under the Act." Id at 1142. See infia
note 51 and accompanying text.
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mittees] need only encompass organizations that are under the control of a
candidate or the major purpose of which i's the nomination or election of a
candidate. Expenditures of candidates and of "political committees" so construed can be assumed to fall within the core area
sought to be addressed
by Congress. They are, by definition, cam49
paign related.
The Court in Buckley believed that a less restrictive definition would be "im50
permissibly broad."
In reaching this definition, the Court relied on two lower court decisions. 51 In UnitedStates v. National Committeefor Impeachment,52 the Committee
published an advertisement, five months before the Presidential election,
calling for the impeachment of President Nixon because of his Vietnam policies. The advertisement declared that the Committee would support any
candidate for election to the House of Representatives who would back the
impeachment drive. 53 The government asserted that the Committee was a
political committee, since it was trying to influence the outcome of the Presidential election through the advertisement and the contributions requested.
The Second Circuit interpreted the Act's language "made for the purpose of
influencing" 54 "to mean an expenditure made with the authorization or consent, express or implied, or under the control, direct or indirect, of a candidate or his agents."' 55 The court also "construe[d] the Act to apply only to
committees soliciting contributions or making expenditures the major purpose of which is the nomination or election of candidates." ' 56 The court,
therefore, held the Committee to be outside of the narrow definition of polit57
ical committee.
The National Committeefor Impeachment interpretation of political committee was followed in ACLU v. Jenings,58 where an advertisement was published which deprecated President Nixon's position on busing. 59 The court
inJennings was in "full agreement" with the National Committeefor Impeachment
interpretation, because it successfully circumvented potential first amend60
ment infirmities in the Act.
Regulation of federal elections has been reshaped frequently. The
FECA has undergone these changes through congressional amendments and
judicial interpretations. The term "political committee" is one term that the
49. 424 U.S. at 79 (emphasis added).
50. Id at 79-80.
51. United States v. National Comm. for Impeachment, 469 F.2d 1135 (2d Cir. 1972);
ACLU v. Jennings, 366 F. Supp. 1041 (D.D.C. 1973) (three-judge court), oacatedasmoot sub nom.,
Staats v. ACLU, 422 U.S. 1030 (1975).
52. 469 F.2d 1135 (2d Cir. 1972).
53. Id. at 1136-38.
54. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 301(e), (f), 86 Stat. 3,
11-12 (1972) (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 431(8), (9) (Supp. IV 1980)).
55. 469 F.2d at 1141.
56. Id. The court declared that the government's construction of the Act was incompatible
with the first amendment right to free expression. Id at 1142.
57. Id. at 1140-41.
58. 366 F. Supp. 1041 (D.D.C. 1973) (three-judge court), vacatedas moot sub nom., Staats v.
ACLU, 422 U.S. 1030 (1975).
59. 366 F. Supp. at 1042-44.
60. Id at 1057.
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courts have construed. The Supreme Court's narrow definition of political
committees in Buckley restricts the scope of groups and committees that are
subject to regulation under FECA.
B.

Draft-CandidateCommittees

Draft-candidate committees have only recently become a conspicuous
factor in the campaign process. Due to their brief history, draft committees
had been the subject of litigation on only two prior occasions at the time of
the MNPL decision. 6 ' These cases entailed an unprecedented assertion by
the FEC of subject matter jurisdiction over draft committees for the purpose
of enforcing subpoenas. Both involved draft committees which were attempting to convince Senator Edward M. Kennedy to enter the 1980 Presidential campaign.
In FEC v. Flondafor Kennedy Committee (FFKC),"2 the district court implied the FEC probably lacked subject matter jurisdiction over draft committees. 63 Nonetheless, the court held it was precluded from considering the
4
issue of subject matter jurisdiction in a subpoena enforcement proceeding."
In FEC v. Wsconsih Democratsfor Change in 1980,65 the court addressed the
issue of coverage, and found that "on its face" the subject matter of the
subpoena was within the agency's authority and therefore enforceable."" Because no court has directly addressed the issue of FEC jurisdiction over draft
groups, examination of prior draft-candidate cases does not aid in determining whether the FEC has such jurisdiction.
Legislative activity provides more aid in ascertaining whether Congress
intended the Act to cover draft committees. The Act itself is devoid of any
explicit draft committee language. Additionally, no mention of draft committees existed in the Act's legislative history until consideration of the 1980
amendments. 67 Congressional discussion of contribution and expenditure
ceilings for political committees consistently refers to these limitations as
they relate to the campaign of a particular candidate. 68 The absence of any
681 F.2d
61. FEC v. Florida for Kennedy Comm., 492 F. Supp. 587 (S.D. Fla. 1980), rev'd,
1281 (11 th Cir. 1982); FEC v. Wisconsin Democrats for Change in 1980, No. 80-C-124 (W.D.
Wisc. Apr. 24, 1980). Both cases involved committees named in the Carter-Mondale complaint
issued to MNPL.
62. 492 F. Supp. 587 (S.D. Fla. 1980), rev'd, 681 F.2d 1281 (11 th Cir. 1982). The reversal in
this case was handed down on Aug. 2, 1982. In reaching its conclusion that the FEC had no
jurisdiction to investigate the FFKC, the Eleventh Circuit relied heavily on MNPL, indicating
"substantial" agreement with that opinion. 681 F.2d at 1282.
63. The district court believed judicial authority generally supported the proposition that
the term "political committee" is limited to a group whose major purpose is the nomination or
election of a candidate. 492 F. Supp. at 595 & n. 12 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79
(1976); United States v. National Comm. for Impeachment, 469 F.2d 1135, 1141 (2d Cir. 1972);
ACLU v. Jennings, 366 F. Supp. 1041, 1057 (D.D.C. 1973)).
64. The FFKC court cited as its authority Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327
U.S. 186 (1946). Under Oklahoma Press, statutory coverage does not have to be demonstrated
before an investigation can proceed.
65. No. 80-C-124 (W.D. Wisc. Apr. 24, 1980).
66. Id, slip op. at 4-5.
67. See infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
68. Set H.R. REP. No. 1057, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 57-58 (1976). See also H.R. REP. No.
1239, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1974) (limits applicable only to expenditures related to a "clearly
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discussion of draft committees by Congress suggests it did not intend that the
Act cover draft committees.
The FEC itself sheds more light on the FECA's coverage of draft committees. Through advisory opinions6 9 the Commission is able to render its
views on a number of issues. The FEC has sought to bring draft committees
within the definition of political committee. Advisory Opinion 1979-26 contains the initial response to pre-candidacy activities. 70 The Commission
stated that an individual should be able to "test the waters" to determine the
feasibility of possible candidacy without being subject to contribution limitations. Exploratory groups, formed for that purpose, therefore, were not
political committees. The Commission also stated, however, that a candidate could not amass campaign funds through these means before declaring
candidacy; rather, funds contributed were available only to ascertain polit7
ical support for a potential candidacy through activities such as polling. 1
In Advisory Opinion 1979-40,72 the Florida for Kennedy Committee
(FFKC) requested an opinion regarding the applicability of the Act's contribution and expenditure limits. Although the Commission found that Senator Kennedy was not a candidate, it nevertheless held the FFKC subject to
the Act's provisions, thereby limiting the amount a person or political com73
mittee could contribute to FFKC to $5000.
The Commission, in its annual reports, has repeatedly suggested that
74
draft committees be incorporated into the political committee definition.
The annual report is submitted to Congress and contains the Commission's
legislative recommendations. Since 1975, the FEC has recommended that
Congress make both the reporting and contribution provisions applicable to
draft groups. 75 The extensive amendments in 1976 did not affect draft committees. In 1980, however, in response to the Commission's continued urging, Congress made the Act's reporting provisions applicable to draft
groups. 76 The 1980 amendments did not deal with contribution ceilings for
identified candidate"); S. REP. No. 229, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 124 (1971) (reporting requirements
would be required by "every [political] committee supporting a candidate.") (supplemental
views of Senators Prouty, Cooper, and Scott).
69. 2 U.S.C. § 437f (Supp. IV 1982); 11 C.F.R. § 112 (1982) (authorizes the Commission to
issue advisory opinions). An advisory opinion is an interpretation of the law without any binding legal affect. It is issued by the Commission upon the request of an interested party.
70. FEC Advisory Opinion 1979-26, 1 FED. ELECTION CAMP. FIN. GUIDE (CCH) 5408
(June 18, 1979). Rep. Grassley of Iowa questioned whether "exploratory committees," whose
purpose was to determine the viability of becoming a candidate, were subject to contribution
limits.

71. Id. at 2. It can be said that a draft committee, like an exploratory committee, attempts
to "feel out" the public and convince a candidate to run by showing him the extent of his public
support. Both groups deal solely with the pre-candidacy stage.
72.

FEC Advisory Opinion 1979-40, 1 FED. ELECTION CAMP. FIN. GUIDE (CCH) $ 5425

(Aug. 17, 1979).
73. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)(C), (a)(2)(C) (1976). See also FEC Advisory Opinion 1979-49,
I FED. ELECTION CAMP. FIN. GUIDE (CCH) 5433 (Oct. 5, 1979) (Commission affirmed Advisory Opinion 1979-40).
74. See 1975-1980 FEC ANN. REP.

75. Brief in Opposition of Machinists Non-Partisan Political League, Respondent at 15-16,
FEC v. MNPL, 454 U.S. 897 (1981) (cert. denied).
76. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187, § 104, 93
Stat. 1339, 1348 (1980) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434 (Supp. IV 1980)). "The change was made to
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draft groups in any way. Most recently, the Commission has submitted a
legislative recommendation which would require draft groups to comply
with the contribution and expenditure provisions of the Act in the same
77
fashion as political committees.
The recent development of draft committees has coincided with efforts
by the Commission to stunt the growth of these committees. As draft groups
have become more influential, the FEC has increasingly sought jurisdiction
over them. Congress thus far has refused to comply fully with the Commission's request. The legislature has had ample opportunity, to incorporate
draft groups into the Act but has done so in only a limited manner. Congressional silence, prior to 1980, should not be construed as an intention to
incorporate draft committees in the Act.
C.

FederalAgency Power of Investigation and Subpoena Enforcement

When conducting investigations into possible violations of the law,
many federal agencies have the authority to subpoena information for the
purpose of aiding their inquiry. 78 The FECA authorizes the FEC to issue
subpoenas 79 and permits the Commission to seek enforcement through the
district court if the subpoenaed party refuses to comply.8 0 These subpoenas
may compel disclosure of various records, documents, and membership lists,
all of which tend to be of a personal nature. 8 ' Such disclosure may not be
compelled, however, if it will chill the free exercise of political expression and
association protected by the first amendment. 8 2 Before a subpoena is enforced, a district court must consider the extent to which it will require demonstration by the issuing agency of statutory jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the investigation. It is in this context that subpoena enforcement
requests are examined.
Agencies involved in regulating corporate and business matters have initiated most subpoena enforcement litigation. In these areas, the Supreme
Court has granted wide deference to agency requests. The Court's decision
ensure that organizations set up to 'draft' individuals who are not actually candidates will be
required to report." H.R. REP. No. 96-422, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 15, repr'ntedin 1979 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2860, 2874. These amendments became effective after the draft-Kennedy
activities and are therefore inapplicable in MNPL.
77. Letter from Mr. John McGarry, Chairman of the FEC, to Mr. Charles Mathias, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration (Aug. 21, 1981). The proposal
would amend the Act to cover contributions and expenditures made "for the purpose of influencing a clearly identified individual to seek nomination for election.
Id (emphasis
added).
78. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission, 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1976); Securities and Exchange
Commission, 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1976); Internal Revenue Service, 26 U.S.C. § 7602 (1976); Fair
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 209 (1976).
79. 2 U.S.C. § 437d(a)(3), (4) (Supp. IV 1980).
80. 2 U.S.C. § 437d(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
81. For contents of requested subpoena in MNPL, see tnfra note 135 and accompanying
text.

82. See Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.

Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 245 (1957). See
rnfta notes 101-12 and accompanying text for discussion of first amendment protections from
compelled disclosure.
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in Untied States v. Morton Salt Co. 8' furnished the test used to ascertain the
viability of a requested subpoena. This test is designed to narrow the issues
that may be litigated at a subpoena enforcement proceeding to whether the
agency has the statutory authorty to undertake the investigation and obtain
the information sought. The subpoena is enforceable if "the inquiry is
within the authority of the agency, the demand is not too indefinite and the
information sought is reasonably relevant." 84 The utilization of the Morton
Salt test usually results in a district court's "rubber stamp" enforcement of
85
the subpoena.
In addition, during subpoena enforcement proceedings, most courts refuse to consider jurisdictional or substantive defenses which might be raised
against an administrative complaint. 8" These courts believe that to do
otherwise would severely hamper agency investigations. This rationale has
been applied to FEC investigations as well. The Fifth Circuit, in FederalElection Commission v.Lance, 8 7 explicitly adopted the Morton Salt framework in
challenges to an FEC subpoena during an enforcement proceedrejecting
ing. 88 In FEC v. Floridafor Kennedy Committee,8 9 an FEC subpoena of a draft83. 338 U.S. 632 (1950). In Morton Salt, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) had required various corporations to file reports demonstrating whether they had complied with a
lower court's cease and desist order, as well as with other FTC regulations. Id at 634. Morton
Salt, along with the other respondents, objected to the FTC's jurisdiction and subsequently
declined to supply the information demanded. Id at 637. In formulating the test the Court
relied heavily on Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208 (1946). See also
Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 (1943). (subpoena issued by Secretary of Labor should be enforced unless information sought was "plainly incompetent or irrelevant to any
lawful purpose of the Secretary . . . ." Id

at 509).

For a general overview of the history of federal agency subpoena enforcement litigation see
I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 4 (2d ed. 1978).
84. 338 U.S. at 652. See United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57 (1964) (subpoena must
have legitimate purpose and must be relevant to that purpose); FEC v. Lance, 617 F.2d 365 (5th
Cir. 1980) (court's role in subpoena enforcement proceeding is a limited one), a 'din part, rev'din
part on other grounds, 635 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir.) (en banc),cert denied, 453 U.S. 917 (1981). See also
SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 584 F.2d 1018, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1071
(1979); FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 873 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974
(1977); Federal Maritime Comm'n"v. Port of Seattle, 521 F.2d 431, 434-35 (9th Cir. 1975); SEC
v. Savage, 513 F.2d 188, 189 (7th Cir. 1975); SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distrib. Co., 480 F.2d
1047, 1052-53 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 915 (1974); Adams v. FTC, 296 F.2d 861, 866
(8th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 864 (1962).
85. See, e.g., FTC v. Carter, 636 F.2d 781, 785-87 (D.C. Cir. 1980); FTC v. Owens-Corning
Fiberglas Corp., 626 F.2d 966, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1980); SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 584 F.2d
1018, 1023-24, 1032-33 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1071 (1979). But see, e.g., CAB v.
United Airlines, Inc., 542 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1976); Montship Lines, Ltd. v. Federal Maritime
Bd., 295 F.2d 147 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
86. See Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 213 (1946); Endicott
Johnson Corp v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501, 509 (1943); FEC v. Lance, 617 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1980),
afd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 635 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 453 U.S.
917 (1981); FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 879 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
974 (1977); Federal Maritime Comm'n v. Port of Seattle, 521 F.2d 431, 434-35 (9th Cir. 1975);
SEC v. Savage, 513 F.2d 188, 189 (7th Cir. 1975); SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distrib. Co., 480
F.2d 1047, 1052-53 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 915 (1974); Adams v. FTC, 296 F.2d 861,
866 (8th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 864 (1962).
87. 617 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1980), afdinpart,rev'd in part on other grounds, 635 F.2d 1132 (5th
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 917 (1981).
88. 617 F.2d at 369. The court also cited Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327
U.S. 186 (1946), and Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 (1943).
89. 492 F. Supp. 587 (S.D. Fla. 1980), rev'd, 681 F.2d 1281 (1 1th Cir. 1982). See supra notes
64-65 and accompanying text.
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candidate committee was enforced by the district court without hearing coverage objections.
A number of cases place limits on judicial enforcement of subpoenas.90
9
In Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Wallihng, ' a case consistently cited as supporting broad judicial subpoena enforcement, the Supreme Court concluded
its discussion with restraining language. 92 The Court also recognized that
many essential issues, ordinarily decided by an agency's administrator,
93
The district court
should be carefully reviewed by the district court.
"should not become a mere rubber stamp for the approval of arbitrary action by an administrative agency." ' 94 Opinions recognizing the limited judicial role in subpoena enforcement proceedings, preface their decisions with
95
Inthe assurance that the investigation is within the agency's jurisdiction.
deed, the Morton Salt test has been held subject to exceptions where a "patent
96
lack of jurisdiction" is evident.
These judicial limitations have been similarly applied to the investiga97
tory authority of the FEC. In Jones o. Unknown Agents of the FEC, the District of Columbia Circuit found the Commission's inquiry power to be broad
but not limitless. 98 The court required that the Commission's investigation
99
These
"bear some possible relation to [its] responsibilities under the Act."
parameters apply not only to the FEC's statutory authority to undertake an
investigation, but also to the scope of its examination.1°°
The Morton Salt test provides federal agencies, such as the FEC, with a
means for obtaining enforcement of their subpoena demands. The test's insubstantial requirements, combined with the district court's refusal to permit
90. See, e.g., United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950); FTC v. Carter,
636 F.2d 781, 785-87 (D.C. Cir. 1980); FTC v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 626 F.2d 966,
974 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Appeal of FTC Line of Business Report Litigation, 595 F.2d 685, 702-03
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 958 (1978); FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555 F.2d 862, 872 (D.C. Cir.)
(en bane), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 974 (1977).
91. 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
92. "Persons from whom [the administrator] seeks relevant information are not required to
submit to his demand, if in any respect it is unreasonable or overreaches the authority Congress has gien."
Id at 217 (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 216-17. "The issues of authority to conduct the investigation, relevancy of the
materials sought and breadth of the demand are neither minor nor ministerial matters." Id at
217 n.57.
94. Id. at 216 n.56 (quoting General Tobacco & Grocery Co. v. Fleming, 125 F.2d 596, 599
(6th Cir. 1942)).
95. These cases are in the business regulation context. See, e.g., United States v. Morton
Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950); FTC v. Carter, 636 F.2d 781, 785-87 (D.C. Cir. 1980); FTC
v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 626 F.2d 966, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1980); FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 555
F.2d 862, 872 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. dented, 431 U.S. 974 (1977).
96. CAB v. Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft, 591 F.2d 951 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
97. 613 F.2d 864 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Jones, a contributor to the campaign of a candidate
under investigation, was questioned at his home by agents of the FEC. Id. at 868-69. Jones was
questioned about various personal matters, including his political beliefs and affiliations. Id
The court held that the investigation itself was not objectionable, but that questions about
political beliefs are unrelated to legitimate investigations and beyond the FEC's authority. Id.
at 873.
98. Id at 872.
99. Id
100. Id. Cf FEC v. Central Long Island Tax Reform Immediately Comm., 616 F.2d 45 (2d
Cir. 1980) (court refused to enforce provisions of FECA where Act's provisions were inapplicable to defendant's activities).
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substantive defenses addressed to the merits of the agency's potential complaint, usually result in compulsory enforcement by the district court. This
is especially true with subpoenas of a corporate or business nature where
overbreadth of the subpoena is the only effective check placed upon an
agency.
D. First Amendment Rights of PoliticalAssoczation
Once the district court has enforced an agency's subpoena, the subpoenaed party is required to disclose the requested information. Compelled
disclosure itself can violate first amendment protections.' 0°
An essential
function of the first amendment is to protect "free discussion of governmental affairs . . .including discussions of candidates."' 1 2 The compelled disclosure of the activities of a political group, such as a draft-Kennedy
committee, may violate this basic constitutional freedom.' 0 3 The constitutional importance given to associational rights stems from the Court's recognition that group association unquestionably enhances the ability of
individuals to express their point of view. 104 In order to protect this essential
constitutional right, the Court has subjected forced disclosure requests, in
the context of political association, to the closest scrutiny possible.' 0 5 The
inherent dangers of compelled disclosure are particularly acute in the con06
text of political campaigns. '
To satisfy this intense level of scrutiny, the Supreme Court has demanded that the state's subordinating interest be compelling. 0 7 Buckley also
requires that the government's interest must bear a "relevant correlation" or
a "substantial relation" to the information being requested.' 0 8 This strict
101. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976). See also Gibson v. Florida Legislative
Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963);
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960);
NAACP v. Alabama ex relPatterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
102. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966). See also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 484 (1957) (first amendment should assure uninhibited interchange of political and social
ideas).
103. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958). Because of the political nature of an FEC investigation,
liberal subpoena enforcement becomes distinctly more dangerous than the enforcement of other
business-related agencies' subpoenas.
104. NAACP v. Alabama ex relPatterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). The Court has most
recently reiterated this point in Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290,
295 (1981).
105. NAACP v. Alabama ex ret Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958). See also Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) ("exacting scrutiny").
106. The Court in Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971), explicitly declared
that the first amendment constitutional guarantee has "its fullest and most urgent application
precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office."
107. NAACP v. Alabama cx rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958). See also Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); Sweezy v.
New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 265 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Common Cause v.
Schmitt, 512 F. Supp. 489 (D.D.C. 1980), aJ'dper curiam, 455 U.S. 129 (1982).
108. 424 U.S. at 64; see alsoGibson v. Florida Legislative Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524
(1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex relPatterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958).
Following Buckle, courts have consistently applied a strict level of scrutiny when construing election law regulation of freedom of association and expression. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of
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scrutiny test, first established in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 10 9 can be
met by a showing of sufficiently important government interests. 110 The
Court in Buckley, in fact, held that the FECA disclosure requirements successfully met this exacting level of scrutiny.' It The Court, however, placed
restrictions on its holding. To demonstrate a compelling state interest, the
FEC must first show that the disclosing individual or group falls within the
Act's jurisdiction.
As a consequence, in subpoena enforcement proceedings, the first
amendment issue may be avoided by a statutory construction holding the
FECA's reporting provisions were not intended to encompass the party requested to report. If the Act does not cover the individual or group in question, there is no need to inquire into first amendment violations; the Act is
simply inapplicable. If the individual or group is within the jurisdiction of
the FEC, a compelling interest for the subpoenaed information then must be
shown. Circumstances may exist where the first amendment infringement is
so great, and the state's interest in requiring disclosure so slight, that application of the Act's provisions could not pass constitutional muster.112 The potentially "chilling effect" of a compelled disclosure on first amendment rights
becomes a factor to be weighed by a court in construing the coverage of the
Act in an FEC subpoena enforcement proceeding.
II.
A.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF

FEC v.MNPL

The Draft-Kennedy Committees' Activites Prior to Commencement of the
Commission's lnvestigaton

The conflict in MNPL involved varying interpretations of the status of
the draft-Kennedy committees under the FECA. 113 The MNPL was the separate segregated fund'1 4 of the International Association of Machinists
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Common Cause v. Schmitt, 512 F. Supp. 489 (D.D.C.
1980), afd per curiam, 455 U.S. 129 (1982).
109. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
110. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 97 (1961) (the
state's showing of sufficiently important government interests is especially significant where the
"free functioning of our national institutions" is threatened).
111. 424 U.S. at 66-68. The Court found three categories that justified the Act's reporting
requirements. First, disclosure would provide voters information on where campaign finances
come from and how they are spent, thereby helping create a more educated voting public. H.R.
REP. No. 564, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (197 1). Second, public exposure of the sources of contributions and expenditures would deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance of corruption.
S. REP. No. 689, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974). Finally, the compilation of records through
disclosure would help detect possible violations of contribution limits. 424 U.S. at 67-68.
112. "There could well be a case ...
where the threat to the exercise of First Amendment
rights is so serious and the state interest furthered by disclosure so insubstantial that the Act's
requirements cannot be constitutionally applied." Bucktey, 424 U.S. at 71 (1976). See, e.g., Bates
v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.Patterson, 357 U.S. 449
(1958); Doe v. Martin, 404 F. Supp. 753 (D.D.C. 1975).
113. 655 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981). The detailed facts of MfNPL
were not disputed by the parties.
114. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C) (1976). Separate segregated funds are established by corporations, labor organizations (such as the IAM), or membership organizations for the purpose of
soliciting political contributions from their members. Any separate segregated fund established
under 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C) is defined as a political committee. I I C.F.R. § 100.5(b) (1982).
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(IAM), t" 5 and was registered with the FEC as a multi-candidate political
committee."I 6 The FEC concluded that MNPL's contributions to the draftKennedy committees were subject to the contribution limits of the Act,, 17
because the draft-Kennedy committees were "political committees" within
the meaning of the Act. The MNPL, on the other hand, contended the draft
committees were "engaged only in pre-candidacy activities" and that the
FEC lacked jurisdiction over such activities." 8
The IAM first voiced its disenchantment with the policies of President
Carter, whom it had supported in the 1976 Presidential election, 19 in September 1978. 1AM President William W. Winpisinger sharply criticized the
President during a speech evaluating Carter's administration. 1 20 A few
115. The IAM promotes itself as an organization emphasizing support for "friends of labor." Its political arm is the MNPL. The IAM has traditionally supported Democratic candidates, but does not always adhere to the party line. The IAM is the third largest labor
organization in the United States, consisting of approximately 879,000 members, ranking only
behind the AFL-CIO and UAW. See Republican Nat'l Comm. v. FEC, 487 F. Supp. 280, 30506 (S.D.N.Y.) (Appendix "A"), affd summarily, 445 U.S. 955 (1980) (discussing advantages of
labor organization support under the FECA).
116. 2 U.S.C. § 431(4) (Supp. IV 1980); 11 C.F.R. 100.5(e)(3) (1982). A multi-candidate
committee is a registered political committee that "has received contributions for Federal elections from more than 50 persons" and "has made contributions to 5 or more Federal candidates." Id
117. 2 U.S.C. § 441a (1976), provides in pertinent part that:
(a)(1) No person shall make contributions(A) to any candidate and his authorized political committees with respect to
any election for Federal office which, in the aggregate, exceed $1,000;
(B) to the political committees established and maintained by a national political party, which are not the authorized political committees of any candidate, in
any calendar year which, in the aggregate, exceed $20,000; or
(C) to any other political committee in any calendar year which, in the aggregate, exceed $5,000.
(2) No multi-candidate political committee shall make contributions(A) to any candidate and his authorized political committees with respect to
any election for Federal office which, in the aggregate, exceed $5,000;
(B) to the political committees established and maintained by a national political party, which are not the authorized political committees of any candidate, in
any calendar year, which, in the aggregate, exceed $15,000; or
(C) to any other political committee in any calendar year which in the aggregate exceed $5,000
(3) No individual shall make contributions aggregating more than $25,000 in any
calendar year ...
2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1), (2), (3) (1976). See 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1976) (amended 1980) (contribution
limitations applicable to banks, corporations, and labor organizations); see infra notes 128-30
and accompanying text.
The Commission concluded that the MNPL "is not only subject to the contribution limitations of 2 U.S.C. § 441a, but also to the restrictions of 2 U.S.C. § 441b as to any of its activities
in connection with federal elections." Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3 n.2, FEC v. MNPL,
454 U.S. 897 (1981) (cert. denied).
118. Brief in Opposition of Machinists Non-Partisan Political League at 6, FEC v. MNPL,
454 U.S. 897 (1981) (cert. denied).
119. The branches of the IAM spent an estimated $151,358 for support of Carter's election
and $199,541 for voter registration and get-out-the-vote drive in 1976. Republican Nat'l
Comm. v. FEC, 487 F. Supp. 280, 305-06 (S.D.N.Y.) (Appendix "A"), aJf'dsummarily, 445 U.S.
955 (1980).
120. Winpisinger stated in part:
President Carter has abandoned his constituency, his party's platform, and his own
campaign pledges. Carter may be the best Republican President since Herbert Hoover. Look at his record.
President Carter-to me-is through. He is a weak, vascillating [sic] and ineffective
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weeks later, Winpisinger proclaimed that Carter "does not merit our support, because he has abandoned his party's principles, platform, campaign
pledges and the constituency which put him in office."' 2 1 President Carter,
however, maintained those policies that were unpopular with the IAM. By
February 1979, the IAM and MNPL began forming draft-Kennedy groups
throughout the nation. 1 2 2 The alleged goal of these groups was to convince
Senator Edward M. Kennedy to become a Presidential candidate.' 23 Between May 1979 and the time when Senator Kennedy declared his candidacy in early November, the MNPL gave approximately $30,000 to draftKennedy groups in seven states. 124 During this time, after the MNPL had
made its draft-Kennedy contributions and before Kennedy formally declared his candidacy, the Carter-Mondale Campaign Committee filed a
125
complaint with the FEC against MNPL.
B.

The FEC's Investigation of the Draft-Kennedy Committees

The Carter-Mondale complaint alleged that nine draft-Kennedy committees' 26 were in violation of various provisions of the FECA. 127 Specifically, it alleged: (1) that these nine draft committees were "political
committee(s)" as the FECA defines that term, 128 (2) that the nine named
President. I know as well as anyone, that those are dangerous words. I know how easy
it is for an incumbent-sitting president to launch some spectacular and recoup his
image almost overnight. This guy had the opportunity to become a fresh, young
leader with a resolve and a drive to lead this country out of the Nixon/Ford aftermath.
dented, 454 U.S. 897
Brief for Appellant at 6-7, FEC v. MNPL, 655 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
(1981).
121. Id. at 7.
122. Id Early draft-Kennedy groups were formed in Iowa, Illinois, and Florida. By late
summer 1979, New Hampshire, Indiana, Wisconsin, and Hawaii also had received donations
from MNPL. Id.at 7-10.
123. Id at 8. The purpose of the draft-Kennedy groups was elaborated in Winpisinger's
"National Call for Kennedy" letter, which the draft committees distributed during 1979. The
letter stated that "you and I simply must find a way to convince Senator Edward Kennedy to
run for the Presidency next year," and that the committees will have achieved their goal once
Kennedy announced his candidacy. Upon achieving this desired goal, the committees would
terminate their existence. Id
124. Id. at 7. See supra note 122.
125. See 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a) (1976) (amended 1980). Any individual or group who believes a
violation of the Act has occurred may file a complaint with the Commission. 2 U.S.C.
§ 437g(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). Once the complaint is received, the Commission may commence
an investigation of the charged party only if it has "reason to believe" that a violation has
occurred or is about to occur. Id at § 437g(a)(2).
126. The nine draft committees were: Florida for Kennedy Committee; New Hampshire
Democrats for Change; Democrats for Change in 1980; National Call for Kennedy; Illinois
Citizens for Kennedy; Committee for Alternatives to Democratic Presidential Candidate; Minnesotans for a Democratic Alternative; D.C. Committee for a Democratic Alternative; and Citizens for a Democratic Alternative in 1980. Brief for Appellee at 3 n.2, FEC v. MNPL, 655 F.2d
380 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
127. MNPL, 655 F.2d at 383.
128. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(d) (1976) (amended 1980). If the draft committees were determined
to be political committees under the Act, then the MNPL contributions to them would be
subject to various provisions of the FECA. See infra notes 176-89 and accompanying text. Most
important, MNPL and the draft committees would be required to comply with the contribution
limitations provided in 2 U.S.C. § 441a (1976). See supra note 117.
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29
and theredraft committees were affiliated within the meaning of the Act,'
13 :0
and
limitation,
contribution
$5,000
a
single
to
subject
fore all were
the
violating
thereby
limit,
contribution
this
exceeded
had
(3) that MNPL
Act. The Carter-Mondale complaint expressly declined to give its opinion on
whether Senator Kennedy had become a "candidate" for the purposes of the
Act. 13
Based on the Carter-Mondale complaint, the FEC found "reason to believe"' 3 2 that MNPL had violated certain provisions of the Act. 'I On No:4
vember 5, 1979, the FEC issued a "sweeping subpoena" to MNPL,' '
requesting all materials and documents made in connection with any com5
munication between MNPL and the draft-Kennedy groups.'" The subpoena also ordered MNPL to "provide a list ofevery oficial, employee, stafmember,
and volunteer of the organization, along with their respective telephone numbers." t:113
MNPL moved to quash the subpoena for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
but the FEC denied the motion on November 27, 1979.137 MNPL contin-

129. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(5) (1976); 11 C.F.R. § 110.3(a)(1)(ii)(D) (1982).
If political committees are held to be affiliated, then all such affiliated political committees
are treated as a single "political committee" for the purpose of contribution limitations. Thus,
individuals would be prohibited from making contributions in the aggregate in excess of $5,000
to the entire group of affiliated "political committees." If political committees are held to be
unaffiliated, then individuals may contribute up to $5,000 to each, up to a total of $25,000.
Additionally, if political committees are found to be unaffiliated, a multicandidate political
committee, such as MNPL, may give up to $5,000 to each political committee. But if the committees are affiliated, a multi-candidate political committee can contribute only $5,000 to the
whole group. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a) (1976). Thus, there is a considerable financial advantage to a
candidate who obtains the support of unaffiliated political committees. See Wash. Post, Sept.
16, 1979, at AI, A4, col. 1.
130. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(I)(C), (a)(2)(C) (1976).
131. MNL, 655 F.2d at 383.
132. See 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a) (2) (1976) (amended 1980); see supra note 124.
133. The FEC stated that it had "reason to believe" that:
[B]y contributing, in aggregate, in excess of $5,000 in a calendar year to [various draftKennedy committees] MNPL may have violated 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(2)(C). The Commission has determined that these committees, among others, may be affiliated within
the meaning of the Act and the Commission's regulations and that, if affiliated, contributions to them must be aggregated for purpose of the limitations set forth in 2 U.S.C.
§ 441 a(a) (2) (C).
Letter from William C. Oldaker, General Counsel of the FEC, to Howard F. Dow, SecretaryTreasurer of the MNPL (Oct. 19, 1979), quotedin MNPL, 655 F.2d at 383.
134. See 2 U.S.C. § 437d(a)(3), (4) (1976) (amended 1980) (provides FEC power to issue
subpoenas).
135. MNPL, 655 F.2d at 384. The subpoena also requested:
All documents and materials (including but not limited to minutes, notes, memoranda, or records of telephone conversations) relating to meetings, discussions, correspondence, or other internal communications whereby the MNPL or any of its
committees or sub-units determined to support or oppose any individual in any way
for nomination or election to the office of President in 1980.
Id
136. Id (emphasis in original). The extreme broadness and delicate nature of the subpoena
became an essential factor in the appellate court's decision to require a showing of subject matterjurisdiction by the FEC before court enforcement of the subpoena. See nfra notes 166-72 and
accompanying text.
137. Brief for Appellee, supra note 126, at 5-6 and Brief for Appellant at 19-20, FEC U.
MNPL, 655 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981). (Commission decided to
postpone all decisions regarding subject matter jurisdiction until investigation of MNPL was
completed). See II C.F.R. § 111.6 (1982). See atso, 2 U.S.C. § 437d(a)(3), (4) (1976); I1 C.F.R.
§ 111.13 (1982).
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ued to refuse to comply with the subpoena.
C.

The District Court Proceedings

The FEC then filed suit in the District Court for the District of Columbia to force MNPL to comply with its subpoena. 138 MNPL objected on the
grounds that the FEC lacked jurisdiction over the subject of the inquiry and
that the Commission must demonstrate a compelling need for the materials
sought because of the sensitive first amendment nature of the materials. The
Commission, according to MNPL, could not demonstrate the requisite need
to obtain information concerning the draft-committee activities at issue.' 3 9
The district court enforced the FEC's subpoena demand in late January
1980, holding that MNPL's jurisdictional objections could not be properly
heard in a subpoena enforcement proceeding.' 40 Applying the test established in UnitedStates v. Morton Salt Co. ,
the court stated that three requirements must be satisfied in order to enforce the subpoena. First, "the inquiry
must be made within the authority of the agency."' 42 The court stated that
"lilt was just this type of matter that caused Congress to set the whole machinery in motion when it enacted the statute."' 14: The inquiry, therefore,
was within the FEC's authority. Second, the demand may not be too indefinite. Here, the court found that because of the very nature of the subject
matter, the sweeping character of the subpoena was as restrictive as possible.' 44 Finally, the materials sought must be "reasonably relevant." The
district court found that the information was necessary for the Commission
to carry out its duties under the Act.' 4' The district court additionally rejected MNPL's first amendment objections, giving minimal consideration to
the issue. 146
III.

THE CIRCUIT COURT'S ANALYSIS IN

FEC v. MNPL

The analysis in MNPL extends beyond that in any previous draft-committee litigation. 47 In earlier subpoena enforcement proceedings involving
138. 2 U.S.C. § 437d(b) (1976) (upon petition by the Commission, the district court may
require compliance with a subpoena issued by the FEC if the subpoenaed party refused to
adhere to the Commission's demand).
139. Brief for Appellant, supra note 137, at 21-22.
140. For the text of the district court's opinion and order see Joint Appendix at 13-17, FEC
v. MNPL, 655 F.2d 380 (D.C. Cir.), cer. denzed, 454 U.S. 897 (1981).
141. 338 U.S. 632 (1950). See supra notes 76-100 and accompanying text.
142. Joint Appendix, supra note 140, at 13.
143. Id at 13-14.
144. Id. at 14.
145. Id
146. Id
147. Another case concerning draft committees, FEC v. Citizens for Democratic Alternatives in 1980, 655 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981), was decided the same
day as MNPL. Like MNPL, Citizens for Democratic Alternatives in 1980 (CDA) was an organization which advocated Senator Kennedy's entrance into the Presidential campaign. The
CDA was alleged to have received contributions in violation of the Act. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a),
(0 (1976). The court found no distinctions between the issues raised in the cases and held in
FECv. CDA, as in MNPL, that the CDA was not subject to the Act's provisions, thereby making
the subpoena unenforceable.
The CDA was formed in August 1979 by individuals who sought an alternative to Presi-
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draft groups, the district courts had refused to hear jurisdictional arguments. 148 Unlike these earlier cases, MNPL was decided on jurisdictional
merits rather than purely subpoena enforcement grounds. The court refused
to restrict itself to the Morton Salt 149 test, which is customarily employed to
"rubber stamp" judicial enforcement of federal agency subpoena
150
requests.
The court divided its issue analysis into two prongs. The first prong
examined whether the district court should have determined if there was
subject matter jurisdiction for the Commission's investigation before it enforced the subpoena.'' The circuit court held that such determination was
necessary. The second prong called for an evaluation of whether the FEC
actually had the requisite subject matter jurisdiction, to conduct the
investigation. 152
A.

Standardsfor JudicialEnforcement of the FEC Subpoena

In the first prong the court analyzed the appropriate standards for judicial enforcement of an FEC subpoena. The Morton Salt test was cited as
providing the criteria previously used in enforcing subpoenas of a commercial or corporate character.l: The court in MNPL also presented the applicable limitations to the Morton Salt analysis. 154 Such limitations exist when
there is a "patent lack of jurisdiction,"' 1 5 or where an agency overreaches
the authority granted by Congress. -6 The court went on to list four factors
which made it especially important for a court to assure itself that the FEC
investigation was within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Commission
57
before lending its authority to enforce the subpoena.
First, the court stated that the FEC's investigation of the draft-Kennedy
groups denoted an unprecedented assertion of subject matter jurisdiction
over draft committees. 15 8 The court declared that "extra-careful scrutiny"
should be used because of this untried extension of FEC investigatory audent Carter in the 1980 Presidential election. Brief in Opposition of Citizens for Democratic
Alternatives in 1980 at 3, FEC v. CDA, 454 U.S. 897 (1981) (cert. denied). The CDA received
some funding; however, its main activity was the compilation and distribution of a weekly newsletter which was sent to groups and individuals sympathetic to CDA's draft-Kennedy views. Id
Once Senator Kennedy announced his candidacy, the CDA disbanded. Id at 4.
148. See FEC v. Florida for Kennedy Comm., 492 F. Supp. 587 (S.D. Fla. 1980), rev'd, 681
F.2d 1281 (11 th Cir. 1982); FEC v. Wisconsin Democrats for Change in 1980, No. 80-C-124
(W.D.. Wisc. Apr. 24, 1980); see supra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 141-46 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 78-100 and accompanying text.
151. 655 F.2d at 384.
152. Id.
153. 1d at 385. For a full discussion of judicial enforcement of agency subpoenas, see supra
notes 78-100 and accompanying text.
154. 655 F.2d at 385-86.
155. Id at 386 (quoting CAB v. Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft, 591 F.2d 951, 952
(D.C. Cir. 1979)).
156. 655 F.2d at 386 (quoting Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 217
(1946)).
157. 655 F.2d at 386-90.
158. Id at 386. The two other cases on draft-candidate committees were subpoena enforcement proceedings against the same draft-Kennedy Committees involved in MNPL. FEC v.
Florida for Kennedy Comm., 492 F. Supp. 587 (S.D. Fla. 1980), rev'd, 681 F.2d 1281 (1 Ith Cir.
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thority. I' 9 The investigative domain of the FEC was distinguished from
investigative functions of other agencies. Although other agencies administer regulations in the commercial and corporate areas, the FEC's subject
matter extends over individuals and groups "ono'insofar as they act, speak and
associatefor politicalpurposes. "30 It was precisely this contrast in the characteristics of subject matter jurisdiction that was one of the foundations for a
more intensive level of scrutiny.
Second, the court contrasted the scope of investigative authority
61
granted to the FEC with the broad investigatory power of other agencies,1
such as the Federal Trade Commission1 62 or the Securities and Exchange
Commission.'16 3 Because of the corporate and business regulatory functions
of these agencies, the judiciary has permitted them to investigate in a general, roving manner. 164 Such agencies have the ability to commence inquiries on their own initiative. The FEC, however, does not have such liberal
investigative powers. The Commission may only launch an investigation
pursuant to a signed, sworn, and notarized complaint filed by an individual
or group. 165 The severe contrast between the scope of investigatory power of
the FEC and of other agencies supported the requirement that a court assure
itself of statutory jurisdiction before enforcing an FEC subpoena.
The third and most significant reason for demanding careful judicial
scrutiny, was the "delicate nature of the materials demanded in [the FEC's]
broad subpoena."' 66 The first amendment, the court said, was intended to
protect the very subject matter of the subpoena's request." t 7 By enforcing
disclosure of these "delicate materials," the government would obtain
firsthand knowledge of which citizens were contributing to the defeat of the
current administration. The compelled release of such information, therefore, carried a great potential for "chilling" the first amendment guarantees
of free exercise of political speech and association.168
1982); FEC v. Wisconsin Democrats for Change in 1980, Order No. 80-C-124 (W.C. Wisc. Apr.
24, 1980). Both of these decisions enforced the subpoena order.
159. 655 F.2d at 387.
160. Id (emphasis in original). See 2 U.S.C. §§ 431, 441a (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
161. 655 F.2d at 387.
162. 15 U.S.C. § 46 (1976).
163. 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1976).
164. An early line of case law sought to restrict agency investigatory powers, often denying
enforcement of subpoenas unless a definite need for the requested materials was shown. Ste, e.g.,
Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1936); FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 (1924); Harriman
v. ICC, 211 U.S. 407 (1908). The Court later altered its position by permitting agencies to
conduct "fishing expeditions" for the purpose of merely satisfying their official curiosity. See,
e.g., United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632
(1950); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946); Endicott Johnson
Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 (1943). The limited role of subpoena enforcement proceedings
was used to support the roving agency investigations. For general discussion of judicial subpoena enforcement proceeding see I K. DAIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 4 (2d ed.
1978); supra notes 78-100 and accompanying text.
165. 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(l) (1976) (amended 1980).
166. 655 F.2d at 388.
167. Id "[Plolitical expression and association concerning federal elections and officeholding" are the heart of intended first amendment guarantees. d
168. The court also pointed out that the requested FEC information "isof a fundamentally
different constitutional character" than the commercial or corporate information sought by
SEC or FTC investigations. Id
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The court then reviewed the NAACP v. Alabama ex re. Patterson169 line of
cases which requires the state to show a compelling and subordinating interest before a court will force disclosure of information that would infringe on
first amendment guarantees. 7 0 In its decision, the MNPL court did not require the FEC to demonstrate a compelling interest before it could procure
the information from MNPL. Instead, it assumed arguendo that if statutory
jurisdiction to conduct the investigation could be established, then the FEC
could show a compelling interest for the investigation. If, on the other hand,
the Commission lacked jurisdiction over draft committees, then no compelling interest could possibly exist.' 7 1 Thus, due to the sensitive character of
the requested information, it became even more important for the court to
assure itself that the FEC had jurisdiction to conduct this investigation
72
before the subpoena would be enforced. 1
The fourth and final factor causing the court to examine the jurisdiction
issue closely was that the FEC's claim of jurisdiction over draft-candidate
groups "rest[ed] solely upon a legal interpretation of the statute which [did]
1 73
not depend upon any facts sought to be gleaned through the subpoena.'
The finding of jurisdiction depended purely on a statutory interpretation of
whether draft committees are "political committees" under the FECA. Additional facts obtained through the enforcement of a subpoena would have
74
no bearing on this legal determination. 1
The court in MNPL concluded that the combination of these four factors required a court to assure itself that an FEC investigation was within the
subject matter jurisdiction of the Commission before a subpoena could be
enforced.1 75 The highly deferential attitude espoused in Morton Sall was not
adopted by the MNPL court in this novel political association context. The
next logical step was to determine whether the Commission did, in fact, have
jurisdiction over draft-candidate groups. This was the second prong of the
court's decision.
B.

FECJursdction Over Draft-CandidateGroups

If a draft-candidate group is to come within the strictures of the FECA,
thus conferring FEC jurisdiction, it must fit within the definition of a political committee.' 76 The FEC argued that the draft-Kennedy groups were
169. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). See also Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); Sweezy
v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); supra notes 101-12 and accompanying text. These
protections are especially critical in an election setting. See Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401
U.S. 265, 272 (1971).
170. 655 F.2d at 389.
171. Id.
172. Id
173. Id at 389-90. The court cited a series of cases from the Seventh Circuit that relax the
Morton Salt and Oklahoma Press rule of "rubber stamp" judicial subpoena enforcement where
"the issue involved is a strictly legal one not involving the agency's expertise or any factual
determinations." Id at 390 n.19 (quoting FTC v. Miller, 549 F.2d 452,460 (7th Cir. 1977)). See
FTC v. Feldman, 532 F.2d 1092, 1096 (7th Cir. 1976); Jewel Cos. v. FTC, 432 F.2d 1155, 115960 (7th Cir. 1970).
174. 655 F.2d at 390.
175. Id.
176. See supra note 47.

1982]

DRAFT-CANDIDA TE COMMITTEES

political committees according to the Act's operative terms. 17 7 MNPL, on
the other hand, asserted that none of the groups to which it contributed were
political committees, thereby making the Act's provisions inapplicable to
it. 178

The court in MNPL, relying on Buckl v. Valeo's narrow interpretation
of the term "political committee," 1 79 held draft groups to be outside the
political committee definition.' 0 The Court in Buckley stated that a broader
definition of political committee could subject nearly any group partaking in
issue discussion to the wide-ranging and cumbersome provisions of the
Act.'' The sole justification permitting contribution ceilings to be constitutionally maintained was FECA's aim "to limit the actuality and appearance
of corruption resulting from large financial contributions."' 8 2 The court in
MNPL found that the danger of corruption perpetrated by draft committees
was far from specifically identified, since a draft group's activities are not
related to a declared candidate.18 3 Draft committees are merely trying to
convince an individual to become a candidate; they are not "promoting a
184
candidate" as provided in the Act's definition of "candidate."'
Buckley's limited definition of political committee, adopted in MNPL,
provides that to fulfill the purposes of the Act a group can be a political
committee only if it is "under the control of a candidate or [its] major purpose. . . is the nomination or election of a candidate."'1 5 Since draft committees did not fall within the Buckley Court's limited definition of political
committee under the Act, and since draft groups' potential for corruption
was not specifically identified, the court in MNPL would not grant the FEC
jurisdiction over the draft-Kennedy committees.186
177. 655 F.2d at 390.
178. Id.
179. 424 U.S. 1, 79 (1976). See also United States v. National Comm. for Impeachment, 469
F.2d 1135, 1142 (2d Cir. 1972); ACLU v. Jennings, 366 F. Supp. 1041, 1055-57 (D.D.C. 1973)
(three-judge court), vacated as moot sub noa., Staats v. ACLU, 422 U.S. 1030 (1975). For a detailed discussion of Buckley's limited definition of political committees see supra notes 47-60 and
accompanying text.
180. 655 F.2d at 390-96.
181. 424 U.S. at 79. See supra note 48.
182. Id at 26. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. The danger of corruption or
appearance of corruption must be actually identified for the Act's limitations to be justified
against first amendment guarantees. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-29.
183. 655 F.2d at 392.
184. Id The FECA specifically defined the term "candidate" in pertinent part as:
[A]n individual who seeks nomination for election, or election, to Federal office,
whether or not such individual is elected, and, for purposes of this paragraph, an individual shall be deemed to seek nomination for election, or election, if he has . . .
(2) received contributions or made expenditures, or has given his consent for any other
person to receive contributions or make expenditures, with a view to bringing about
his nomination for election, or election, to such office ...
2 U.S.C. § 431(b) (1976) (amended 1980).
185. 655 F.2d at 392 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 79 (1976)). The Court in Buckley based its limited definition of political committees on three lower court opinions, Buckley v.
Valeo, 519 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc), afa in part and rev'd in part, 424 U.S. 1 (1976);
United States v. National Comm. for Impeachment, 469 F.2d 1135 (2d Cir. 1972); ACLU v.
Jennings, 366 F. Supp. 1041 (D.D.C. 1973), vaeatedas moot sub noma., Staats v. ACLU, 422 U.S.
1030 (1975). These cases are discussed in MNPL. See MNPL, 655 F.2d at 392-94. For a discussion of the National Committee and jennigs cases see supra notes 51-60 and accompanying text.
186. 655 F.2d at 392-94.
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An examination of the Act's legislative history added support to the
court's holding in MNPL. The court declined to interpret statutory silence
regarding draft committees as congressional intent to include these groups
within the meaning of the Act. l8 7 Moreover, to construe the definition of
political committees broadly would risk violating the Supreme Court's limited definition given to that term in Buckley. The court noted its duty to
arrive at a result free from constitutional doubts. 81 Due to the lack of any
clear legislative intent to include draft groups under the Act's contribution
limits, the court refused to extend the meaning of the provision, thereby
avoiding any constitutional conflict with the Buckley decision. 18 9
C.

The Court's Conclusion in MNPL

The court concluded that in order to protect first amendment guarantees against unwarranted disclosure, where a "serious and novel question of
the Commission's subject matter jurisdiction is presented,"' 90 the district
court must find subject matter jurisdiction prior to enforcing the Commission's subpoena.' 9 ' Since the FEC lacked the requisite jurisdiction over
92
draft committees, the subpoena could not be enforced.'
The court also approved a previously suggested two-step procedure to
be employed when the Commission needs additional factual information
before a sound jurisdictional decision can be made. 19 3 In Reader's Digest Association v. FEC,'94 a New York district court set out this two-step procedure,
187. Id at 394.
188. Id "It is [the Court's] duty in the interpretation of federal statutes to reach a conclusion which will avoid serious doubt of their constitutionality." Id (quoting Richmond Co. v.
United States, 275 U.S. 331, 346 (1928)). See generalty United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 45,
47 (1953); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937); Ashwander v. TVA,
297 U.S. 288, 341, 346-47 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62
(1932).
189. 655 F.2d at 394. The court in MNPL, citing United States v. National Comm. for
Impeachment, 469 F.2d 1135, 1139 (2d Cir. 1972), agreed that the legislative history, prior to
1979, is silent regarding the extent of the definition of political committees, leaving it to the
courts to set the parameters of the definition. 655 F.2d at 394.
The amendments enacted in 1980, according to the court, furnished some insight as to
whether the contribution limits were intended to cover draft groups. In response to continued
FEC requests to establish FEC jurisdiction over draft groups, Congress made the reporting provisions applicable to draft committees. See H. R. REP. No. 422, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 15, reprtied
bn 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2860, 2874 (change was specifically made to require
draft organizations to report). Nonetheless, Congress refused to subject draft committees to the
Act's contribution provisions. Indeed, as the court in MNPL stated, "not even a whisper about
limiting contributions to 'draft' groups has ever been heard in the legislative history of FECA."
655 F.2d at 395. See supra notes 51-60 and accompanying text.
190. 655 F.2d at 396.
191. Id
192. Id
193. Id
194. 509 F. Supp. 1210 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Reader's Digest sued to enjoin the FEC from
continuing an investigation into possible violations of the FECA through Reader's Digest's distribution of a computer reenactment of Senator Kennedy's accident at Chappaquiddick. Id at
1211. The reenactment had been commissioned by Reader's Digest in connection with an article on the Chappaquiddick accident. Reader's Digest claimed the article was protected by both
the first amendment and the news story exemption of 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(i) (Supp. IV 1980),
and that the investigation was therefore outside the FEC's statutory jurisdiction. 509 F. Supp.
at 1212. Section 431(9)(B)(i) exempts from FECA coverage any news story, commentary, or
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the purpose of which is to achieve an appropriate balance between first
95
amendment protections and the agency's need for effective investigations. 1
The first step permits information to be subpoenaed for the purpose of deter96
If, on the basis of this informining whether statutory jurisdiction exists.'
mation, the Commission makes a finding of "probable cause" that it has
jurisdiction to conduct the investigation, then under the second step, the
investigation may be extended to determine whether substantive violations
have taken place.1 97 The MNPL court readily accepted the utilization of the
initial "limited subpoena" for future FEC litigation. 198
IV.
A.

ANALYSIS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT'S OPINION

An Evaluation of the Court's Rationale in MNPL

The balance between first amendment rights and the public's right to
an informative election process has traditionally been a delicate one.'99 Although the court's holding was essentially one of statutory interpretation, the
constitutional overtones heavily influenced its rationale.
The court's analysis in MNPL was fundamentally sound, since the issues
could not have been scrutinized in any other sequence. If the threshold
question-whether the district court should determine that subject matter jurisdiction existed before enforcing the subpoena-was answered in the negative, then it was senseless to proceed to the succeeding question. In this first
prong, the court initially distinguished administrative subpoenas in a corporate or commercial context from FEC subpoenas in the political associational context. 20 0 After laying this groundwork, the court presented four
characteristics of the Commission's subpoena, which together, required the
district court to assure itself of the FEC's subject matter jurisdiction prior to
20 1
enforcing the subpoena.
The first two factors presented by the court were readily justified. First,
the unprecedented nature of the FEC investigation and the political character of the subpoena supported the requirement that the district court determine the existence of statutory jurisdiction before enforcing the
Commission's subpoena. 20 2 Second, the limited scope of the FEC's investigatory power, as compared to the broad investigatory powers of other ageneditorial distributed by a broadcasting station or publication, unless such facility is owned or
controlled by a candidate, party, or political committee.
195. 509 F. Supp. at 1215; see MNPL, 655 F.2d at 396-97.
196. In Reader's Digest, this preliminary investigation would seek to determine whether the
FECA's statutory exemption is applicable. 509 F. Supp. at 1215. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(i)
(Supp. IV 1980).
197. 509 F. Supp. at 1215. The Reader's Dzgest test, as well as MNPL's four factors that
require heightened judicial scrutiny of an FEC investigation during a subpoena enforcement
proceeding, has subsequently been adopted in FEC v. Phillips Publishing, Inc., 517 F. Supp.
1308 (D.D.C. 1981).
198. 655 F.2d at 397.
199. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (Court balanced first amendment restrictions on political expression against Act's discouragement of political corruption). See also Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
200. 655 F.2d at 385. See supra notes 153-56 and accompanying text.
201. 655 F.2d at 386-90. See supra notes 157-75 and accompanying text.
202. 655 F.2d at 387. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
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cies, also pointed toward the need for ascertaining subject matter jurisdiction
prior to the enforcement of an FEC subpoena.2 0 3 These factors alone, however, did not warrant a departure from past subpoena enforcement practices. 20 4 It was the third factor, the "delicate nature of the materials
demanded," 20 5 that was the most significant reason for requiring scrutiny of
subject matter jurisdiction.
If disclosure of these "delicate materials" would, in fact, infringe upon
first amendment rights of political association, the court must first assure
itself that the Commission has the right to obtain the information. For example, if the subpoena were enforced and subject matter jurisdiction were
subsequently found to be lacking, the disclosing group's rights would have
been violated without any adequate remedy. 20 6 Once the names and materials are disclosed, the judiciary cannot erase that knowledge from the minds
of those who have become privy to the information. Hence, the court appropriately adopted the requirement that a subordinating and compelling state
interest must be shown if compulsory disclosure would infringe on first
amendment guarantees.2 0 7 This interest cannot be shown in the absence of
subject matter jurisdiction.
The final factor-that the jurisdiction issue was a purely legal matter
for which no additional facts were needed-provided another strong reason
for requiring the district court to find subject matter jurisdiction before enforcing the subpoena. 20 The rationale of the preceeding factor is applicable
here. Thus, if there is no need or basis for the subpoenaed material, there is
no reason to risk an unnecessary violation of an individual's constitutional
rights.
In the second prong of its analysis the court in MNPL properly found
draft committees to be outside the sphere of the FECA's contribution restrictions. The court accurately applied the Buckley decision's narrow construction of the term "political committee" 20 9 to find draft committees excluded
from that definition. 21 0 In addition, the court saw the lack of legislative
discussion of draft groups, along with the FEC's efforts to acquire coverage
21
of draft committees, as demonstrating an absence of statutory jurisdiction. '
In conclusion, the court also proposed a means of handling similar problems
203. 655 F.2d at 387. See supra notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 78-100 and accompanying text.
205. 655 F.2d at 388.
206. See generally NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
207. 655 F.2d at 389. See Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,
265 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See supra notes 105-112 and accompanying text.
Although the court did not require the FEC to demonstrate a compelling interest, the court
assumed that the Commission could meet this standard if it had jurisdiction over draft groups.
655 F.2d at 389. This assumption was made for the purpose of avoiding discussion of an issue
that would not be reached.
208. 655 F.2d at 389-90.
209. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79.
210. 655 F.2d at 391-94.
211. See supra notes 176-89 and accompanying text.
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in the future 21 2 by adopting the two-step procedure provided in Reader's Di2 13
gest Association v.FEC.
Less than two months after the MNPL decision was handed down, the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, in FEC v.Phillips
Publishing, Inc. 2'4 applied the MNPL analysis to an FEC subpoena enforcement proceeding. The court in Philhps Pubhshing employed MNPL's four
factors to determine that the FEC's subject matter jurisdiction should be
carefully scrutinized before enforcing the subpoena. 21 5 The district court
further stated that if an enforcing court decides that the FEC requires additional factual information to make a reasonable determination whether jurisdiction exists, then the Reader's Digest two-step procedure may be
employed. 2 16 But the "district court need not permit further investigation
by the FEC if additional factual information is not needed to determine
whether the FEC has jurisdiction. ' 2 17 Phillps Publishing presented an ideal
situation for the application of the MNPL approach to this type of FEC
litigation.
B.

Ramifications of the MNPL Decision

Although the court's analysis in MNPL was legally and logically correct, undesirable consequences in the campaign arena are likely to flow from
the decision. That the opinion was a correct analysis of the statute and case
law simply illustrates the need for strengthening of the FECA. The question
which arises is whethet'such strengthening, through coverage of draft groups
by the FECA, would be constitutionally acceptable under the mandate of
Buckleyv.
If contributions to draft committees continue to go unharnessed, such
groups will play a larger role in upcoming elections. This would defeat the
FEC's past policy of preventing the proliferation of political action commit2 18
tees (PAC's).
212. 655 F.2d at 396-97. See supra notes 193-98 and accompanying text.
213. 509 F. Supp. 1210 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
214. 517 F. Supp. 1308 (D.D.C. 1981). In Philips Puhbhhig, the FEC ordered respondents
to answer interrogatories which were sent to gather information in furtherance of its investigation. Id at 1311. Phillips Publishing refused to comply with the Commission's request, claiming the press exemption of 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(i) (Supp. IV 1980). Id at 1309-10.
215. 517 F. Supp. at 1311.
216. Id at 1313. It is interesting to note that the Reader's Digest approach is used in reference to the press exemption in both Reader's Digest and Philips Pubhthig. The court in MNPL,
nevertheless, has made it applicable to cases questioning the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in other areas of FEC jurisprudence.
217. Id at 1314 (citing MNPL as authority) (no additional information necessary since press
exemption was applicable on facts before the court).
218. For discussions of FEC policy opposing proliferation of political action committees
(PAC's) see Egan, Affiliation of PohtialAction Committees Underthe AntiproiferattinAmendments to the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 29 CATH. U.L. REV. 713 (1980); Comment, Independent
Political Committees and the Federal Election Laws, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1981).
PAC's have developed as a means of circumventing the general rule that national banks,
corporations, or labor organizations are prohibited from making any expenditure or contribution to benefit any candidate of a federal primary or general election. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980). Generally, these limitations are avoided by the creation of separate segregated
funds from which the PAC can function. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2)(C) (1976).
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Besides merely contravening FEC policies, the MNPL decision will have
a more critical impact. Most significantly, the decision creates a loophole in
the Act's regulatory scheme. As long as a draft committee does not become
formally connected with a candidate, it may receive contributions and spend
money without limitation.2 9 The only regulations presently applicable to
draft groups are the Act's disclosure provisions. 220 These new reporting requirements will not diminish draft groups' future effectiveness in campaign
finance.
Although a regulated political committee cannot accept a contribution
of more than $5,000 from an individual or from a multi-candidate political
committee, a draft group has no such contribution limits. 22 Thus, it is now
beneficial for individuals to delay formal declarations of candidacy as long
as possible. The longer a potential candidate officially stays out of the race,
the more money draft groups will be able to receive and spend to "induce"
that individual to run. 222 This will provide ample opportunity for a large
flow of money to draft committees from both the corporate sector and individuals. An "undeclared" candidate has the potential of building up a substantial financial head start on his "declared" opponent, completely outside
the FECA's reach.
The fact that a draft committee does not have the advice and direction
of a candidate, as compared to a declared candidate's political committee,
will not hamper the draft group's money-raising effort. There are many individuals, well established and trained in political campaign management,
who could be hired to run a draft committee operation while the candidate
himself remains officially detached from any campaign efforts. Moreover,
such campaign managers could easily contact the potential candidate, surreptitiously, and obtain strategic viewpoints regarding operation of the draft
committee. 223 Surely this was not intended in Congress regulatory game
plan.
An amendment to the FECA, designed to alleviate these problems stemming from the MNPL decision, would bring draft committees explicitly
under the contribution ceilings contained in the Act. The MNPL court
rightly expressed constitutional misgivings over a finding that draft committees are covered by the Act, given the lack of unequivocal legislative intent
to effect such coverage and the narrow definition of "political committee" in
Buckey .224

A necessary prelude to a constitutionally viable amendment would be
congressional hearings aimed at exploring in detail the ramifications of the
219. Wash. Post, Oct. 14, 1981, at A5, col. 1. See NAT'L J., Sept. 15, 1979, at 1535.
220. 2 U.S.C. § 434 (Supp. IV 1980).
221. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(I)(C), (a)(2)(C) (1976).
222. The danger of this loophole was recognized by a California federal district court in

Gifford v. Congress, 452 F. Supp. 802 (E.D. Cal. 1978). "If the Act did not include unofficial
candidates within its purview, an obvious and enormous loophole would exist." Id at 805.
"For example, a candidate . . . could postpone officially qualifying for office until a large
amount of money had been raised-thereby avoiding many of the Act's . . . requirements." Id
at 805 n.7.
223. Wash. Star, May 22, 1981 at A3, col. I.
224. 655 F.2d at 394.
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MNPL decision and the potential for undermining the purposes of the Act
which those ramifications present. The resulting amendment would be
based upon a finding by Congress that FECA regulation of draft committees
is necessary "to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption," thereby
conforming with the constitutionally sufficient justification for contribution
2 25
limitations adopted in Buckley.
Another requirement expressed in the Buckley opinion is that any government regulations in this area be "closely drawn to avoid unnecessary
abridgment of associational freedoms. '2 26 In reaching its definition of
"political committee" the Buckley court specifically reiterated its concern
that the Act not be applied to "groups engaged purely in issue discussion." 227 An amendment to bring draft committees within the compass of
the FECA contribution limits, therefore, should be tightly drawn in carrying
out Congress intention to prevent the appearance or reality of corruption.
Such an amendment should cover those groups whose activities could lead to
financial war chests for undeclared candidates, and should avoid bringing
within its scope groups engaged purely in issue discussion. The draft-Kennedy groups of MNPL should be covered, but the National Committee for
Impeachment 228 or the American Civil Liberties Union 229 should not.
The Court in Buckley was not called upon to interpret the Act in relation to draft committees. The Court did adopt a narrow definition of "political committee," but it also was clear that in adopting this definition it was
giving effect to the "core area sought to be addressed by Congress."' 2 30 A
carefully drafted amendment to the FECA, bringing draft committees
within the contribution limitations in order to avoid the potential of corruption, would pass constitutional muster under Buckley.
The shortcomings in the FECA revealed by the MNPL decision can be
rectified by legislative action, but the MNPL decision may give impetus to
legislative action in quite another direction. A great deal of campaign funding comes from PAC's. 2 3 1 The MNPL decision will result in a vertical
proliferation in the number of PAC's by enabling a single "higher" PAC to
contribute freely to many "lower" draft groups set up by the "higher"
PAC. 2 32 This vertical multiplication will most likely occur in all classes of
225. 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976).
226. Id at 25.
227. Id at 79.
228. See supra text accompanying notes 51-57.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 58-60.
230. 424 U.S. at 79. See FEC v. Florida for Kennedy Committee, 681 F.2d 1281, 1293 (11 th
Cir. 1982) (Clark, J., dissenting).
231. For example, PAC contributions to the 1980 Presidential and Congressional campaigns
totalled $60.5 million. FEC, Press Release (Aug. 4, 1981).
232. This is precisely what occurred in MNPL. The MNPL is the political arm of the IAM,
a major labor union. To achieve the political aims of the IAM, MNPL set up "lower" draftKennedy groups. The lAM, therefore, could funnel money through the MNPL to any of these
draft-Kennedy committees.
For a discussion of the development and congressional regulation of PACs as well as the
constitutionality of these regulations see Birnbaum, The Constitutionalityof the FederalCorrupt Practires Act Aer First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 28 AM. U.L. REV. 149 (1979); Bolton,
Consttutional Limitations on Restricting Corporate and Union Politial Speech, 22 ARIZ. L. REV. 373
(1980); Mager, Past and Present Attempts by Congress and the Courts to Regulate Corporate and Union
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PAC's. Different categories of PAC's traditionally contribute proportionately more to different political parties. For example, labor groups usually
support Democratic candidates because of the Democrats' pro-labor policies;
corporate PAC's often support Republicans because of their business sympathies. 233 Corporate PAC's comprise nearly one-half of all "non-party related" political committees, and out number labor committees nearly four to
234
one.
If all PAC's could contribute free from any FECA regulation, corporate
committees' influence would become insurmountable. Assuming that the
political perspectives of Republicans and business PAC's remained in accord, abolishment of all FECA contribution ceilings would give the Republicans a tremendous advantage. These tempting benefits of unlimited
2 35
and constant
contributions, along with the Act's alleged ineffectiveness
236
have caused many Congressmen, especially Republicans, to
revisions,
consider scrapping the entire Act or, at the very least, cutting the agency's
financing in half.23 7 Such a cut in the FEC budget would complement the
Reagan administration's policy of severe reductions in the federal government. Some Congressmen have recommended the abolishment of the Commission's enforcement powers on the grounds that it has become "ridden
with red tape" and that the election process can be sufficiently protected
from abuse by the Act's disclosure provisions. 238 President Reagan has given
his support to these proposals, provided he can obtain bipartisan backing, so
that it does not appear that only Republicans are assailing the
Czmpaign Contributions and Expenditures in the Election of Federal Offlials, 1976 S. ILL. U.L.J. 338;
Sorauf, Pohiical Parties and PoliticalAction Committees: Two Lift Cycles, 22 ARIz. L. REV. 445
(1980); Comment, Corporate Political Action Committees: Effect of the Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendments of 1976, 26 CATH. U.L. REv. 756 (1977); Comment, Independent Poltical Committees
and the Federal Election Laws, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1981).

233. For the 1980 Congressional elections, labor PAC's gave $11.4 million to Democratic
candidates as opposed to only $.8 million to Republican contenders. The Republicans received
approximately $5 million more than Democrats from corporate PAC's. FEC, Press Release
(Aug. 10, 1981). In these elections, the Democrats significantly narrowed the edge that the
Republicans enjoyed in contributions from corporate PAC's, while simultaneously maintaining
their traditional margin over Republicans in contributions from labor PACs. Wall St. J., Sept.
25, 1980, at 8, col. I. This division among corporate PAC's helped give the Democrats a lead in
fund-raising from all PAC sources. Id This PAC funding is subject to the FECA's contribution
limitations. 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
234. FEC, Press Release (Aug. 4, 1981).
235. The FEC has been regarded as "a toothless watchdog that, through its lack of clear
goals, questionable competence, and minuscule resources, is almost sure to do a poor job of
policing the 1980 election[s]." Bus. WK., May 19, 1980, at 157. The recent changes in the law
have been accused of failing to "drive money out of politics; they just make it easier . . . for
fragmented and single-issue groups to spend funds than for candidates trying to put together a
coalition. It's hard to see how this is anything like a net gain for our political system." Wall St.
J., Aug. 20, 1979, at 12, col. 1. See Wash. Post, June 27, 1981, at At6, col. 1.
236. See supra note 5.

237. Wash. Post, June 18, 1981, at A20, col. 1.
238. N.Y. Times, May 19, 1981, § 2 at 12, col. 5. A further suggestion was made that if the
FEC is in fact dissolved, its record keeping authority should go to either the House or Senate
itself, or to the General Accounting Office. Id. See also Wash. Post, Nov. 21, 1981, at A3, col. 5.
(Republican Party National Chairman Richard Richards urged Congress to remove contribution ceilings on the amount that parties can contribute to individual candidates). But cf Wash.
Post, Nov. 25, 1981, at A4, col. I (Senate Rules Committee attacks Sen. Roger W. Jepsen's
proposal for abolishment of FEC).
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Commission.
The MNPL decision adds support to the mounting dissatisfaction with
the FECA and the FEC. Although the Act's regulatory scheme continues to
receive substantial support, Congress growing disenchantment with the
Commission, the President's willingness to revoke many, if not all, of the
Act's powers, and the judiciary's reluctance to extend the Act, all point toward a possible final day of reckoning for the FECA in the not too distant
future.
V.

CONCLUSION

The MNPL decision provided a logical and effective answer to the novel
issue presented. Although turning away from judicial authority in some respects, the court concluded that in this unprecedented area, the district court
should first determine whether subject matter jurisdiction existed for the
FEC's investigation before enforcing the Commission's subpoena. The court
in MNPL then held that the Commission's investigation of draft groups lacked subject matter jurisdiction since draft groups did not fall within the Act's
political committee definition. Nevertheless, the MNPL court has created a
loophole in the FECA's regulatory scheme. A draft committee now will be
able to receive unlimited contributions for an undeclared candidate, thus
encouraging potential candidates to avoid declaring candidacy until the last
possible moment and adding confusion to an already chaotic campaign process. An amendment to the FECA could close this loophole, but the court's
opinion will add momentum to the growing dissatisfaction with the FEC,
thereby increasing the possibility of repeal or drastic modification of the Act.

239.

Wash. Post, June 18, 1981, at A20, col. I.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Despite repeated efforts of legislators over the past decade, Colorado
does not have an obscenity statute that has withstood constitutional challenge. Legislative enactments in the area have either been vetoed by the
governor,' struck down as unconstitutional by the state supreme court, 2 or
3
repealed by the legislature in favor of a "tougher" law. The legislature's most recent attempts to control obscenity were embodied in two statutes enacted during the 1981 session. One statute prohibits
the promotion of obscene material, 4 and the other statute controls children's
exposure to any sexually explicit material. 5 Rulings at the trial court level
have found significant constitutional defects in both of these statutes, and
challenges to them are presently pending before the Colorado Supreme
6
Court.
In Miller v. California,7 the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the
principle that obscenity is not protected speech under the first amendment
to the Constitution and set forth specific guidelines for state legislatures to
follow in regulating obscenity. 8 In light of the "how to" instructions contained in the Miller decision, many people in Colorado may wonder why the
legislature has had such difficulty drafting obscenity legislation acceptable to
all three branches of government. The following story of one legislative debate is paradigmatic of the problems the legislature has faced with the obscenity issue.
During the 1976 session, the legislature considered several approaches to
outlawing obscenity 9 in the wake of the Colorado Supreme Court's decision
in People v. Tabron,10 which had declared the prior obscenity statute unconstitutional for failure to comply with the Miller standards. Republican Representative Sam Zakhem introduced a severe bill"I making the promotion of
obscenity a Class 4 Felony. When his bill was not favorably reported from
1. S. 450, 52d Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1979), vetoed by the Governor May 20, 1979
(veto sustained by the House, 1979 Colo. H.J. 2298).
2. People v. New Horizons, Inc., 616 P.2d 106 (1980); People v. Tabron, 190 Colo. 149,
544 P.2d 372 (1975).
3. S.447, 1977 Colo. Sess. Laws 982, repealed the 1976 obscenity statute enacted by H.B.
1272, 50th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (1976).
4. CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 18-7-101 to -106 (Supp. 1981).
5. CLo.REV. STAT. §§ 18-7-501 to -504 (Supp. 1981).

6. See infra notes 106, 213, and accompanying text.
7. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
8. Id at 23-24. For a discussion of these guidelines see supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
9. H.B. 1116, H.B. 1197, and H.B. 1199, 50th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (1976).
10. 190 Colo. 149, 544 P.2d 372 (1975). See infra
notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
11. H.B. 1197, 50th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (1976), 1976 Colo. H.J. 220.
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committee, Zakhem vowed: "The battle is not over; I'm going to try to put
12
the teeth back in that bill."'
During a floor debate on the alternative bill,' 3 Zakhem proposed an
4
amendment to outlaw "any ultimate sexual act, normal or perverted.'
Representative Ted Bendelow criticized the Zakhem amendment for making
illegal "a husband and wife exercising their normal marital rights in the
privacy of their own bedroom.' 5 Another representative suggested that
Zakhem "should be given a lifetime membership in Zero Population
Growth.' 1 6 Zakhem's amendment thereupon went down to defeat by a vote
of fifty-seven to one.17
Actually the written version of Representative Zakhem's amendment
was not as Draconian as his colleagues had feared from his verbal description. But the above vignette illustrates the confusion that can arise when
legislators, with differing values and consequently different approaches, try
to formulate obscenity legislation. Some Colorado legislators have been primarily concerned with "cracking down" on obscenity; others have focused
on technical adherence to the Miller standards; while still others have been
primarily interested in limiting the possible infringement of freedom of
speech by obscenity statutes. The attempts to combine these different values
and approaches into one statute through the process of amendment has led
to defective statutes. Rather than trying to interpret away the inconsistencies, Colorado courts have been content to strike down an entire statute or
excise key portions and let the legislature continue to struggle.
This article will explore the history of obscenity law in Colorado, with
special attention to the constitutional defects in past legislation and potential
defects in the 1981 statutes now before the Colorado Supreme Court.
II.

A.

PRE-MILLER OBSCENITY LAW

Stalutog,

One remarkable aspect of obscenity law in Colorado is the total lack of
litigation in this area before the 1970's, despite the fact that Colorado has
had an obscenity statute since 1885.18 The statute passed in that year prohibited the sale, possession, or exhibition of any "obscene, lewd, or indecent,
or lascivious" publication. 19 In an attempt-not entirely successful-to go
beyond tautology in its definition, the statute specifically banned "any newspaper, or magazine, containing pictures of nude, or partly nude, men or
12. Denver Post, Feb. 13, 1976 at 3, col. 1.The bill was officially postponed "indefinitely"
on Feb. 26, 1976 Colo. H.J. 448.
13. H.B. 1199, 50th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (1976). Zakhem also co-sponsored another bill, H.R. 1116, which provided that promotion of obscene material to minors was a class
I misdemeanor. This bill was killed in committee a month after it was introduced. 1976 Colo.
Hj. 123, 448.
14. 1976 Colo. H.J. 588.
15. Smut Bill Okayed, But Sex Is Still Legal, Denver Post, Mar. 7, 1976, at 2, col. 4.
16. Id
17. 1976 Colo. H.J. 588.
18. An Act Concerning Offenses Against Public Morality, 1885 Colo. Sess. Laws 172.
19. Id.
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'20
women, or pictures of men or women in indecent attitudes or positions."
Presumably, under this statute a person could be sent to the county jail for
up to one year just for selling a picture of a lady or gentleman who, although
fully clothed, had adopted an indecent attitude. The same statute had provisions outlawing instruments used for "self-pollution," birth control devices
2
or medicines of any kind, and abortifacients. '

This Victorian nightmare, if read out loud in a room of people even
minimally versed in constitutional law, probably would provoke laughter.
Nevertheless, the basic 1885 statute, including all of the language quoted
above, remained the law of Colorado until 1969.22 In that year Colorado
passed its first modern obscenity statute, 23 which attempted to comply with
the prevailing United States Supreme Court authority in the area. The statute defined "obscene" as material that appealed to the "prurient" interest in
sex and was "utterly without redeeming social value."' 24 Those were two of
the elements the Supreme Court had indicated it would look for in state
obscenity statutes in the 1966 case, A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs ofa
25
Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General of Massachusetts.
B.

Early Cases-PriorRestraints

The first obscenity case to be decided in Colorado, People ex rel. McKevitt
v. Harvey,26 arose under the old statute.2 7 The issue in Harvey was not the
statute's definition of obscenity, but rather the statute's provisions for the
search for and seizure of obscene materials. 28 The case involved a two and
one-half hour search of the defendant's place of business by Denver police,
who were armed with a search warrant. 29 During the search, the officers
seized several hundred articles "which the oftcers examined and determined
30
to be obscene."
The material was used as a basis for the granting of a temporary restraining order prohibiting the sale of the material. 3 1 When, at a later hearing, the judge refused to continue the restraining order as to all of the
publications, the district attorney appealed. 32 The defendant cross-ap33
pealed, contending that the books were unconstitutionally seized.
20. Id
21. Id
22. COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-9-17 (1963) repealed at 1969 Colo. Sess. Laws 321, 325.
23. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 40-28-1 to -10 (1969).
24. Id at § 40-28-1.
25. 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966). A third element prescribed by the Supreme Court, but not
mentioned explicitly in the Colorado statute, was that the material in question must be "patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters." Id.

26.

176 Colo. 447, 491 P.2d 563 (1971).

27. CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 40-9-17 to -27 (1963).
28. 176 Colo. at 451, 491 P.2d at 564-65.
29. COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-9-17 (1963) (which permits the issuance of search warrants

under specified circumstances). See 176 Colo.at 448, 491 P.2d at 563.
30. 176 Colo. at 449, 491 P.2d at 563 (emphasis added).
31. Id, 491 P.2d at 564.
32. Id
33. Id
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Justice William Erickson, who has authored virtually all the majority
opinions dealing with the issue of obscenity, wrote the Harvey opinion in
which the Colorado Supreme Court held that the statutory scheme authorizing the search warrant was defective. This defect arose because the statute
did not provide for an adversary hearing to determine whether the materials
to be seized were in fact obscene prior to the search. 34 Instead, the statute
impermissibly left the determination of whether materials were obscene to
the discretion of police officers, 35 a practice that had been expressly con36
demned by the United States Supreme Court in Marcus v. Search Warrant.
The Colorado court went on to state that any restraint of expression,
"which is imposed in advance of a final judicial determination on the merits
must be limited to the shortest fixed time period compatible with sound judicial resolution. ' 37 The court acknowledged the New York injunctive procedure, upheld in the United States Supreme Court case of Kngsley Books, Inc.
v. Brown, 38 as being an acceptable form of prior restraint. The New York
statute provided for "a hearing one day after joinder of issue and for a final
'39
decision two days after termination of the hearing."
The Colorado court's acceptance of the Kingsley case was not significant
at the time of Harvey because recent revisions of the Colorado obscenity code
had eliminated provisions for restraints on material prior to a judicial determination that the material was obscene.'
Newer obscenity statutes, however, such as the 1981 law, have gone back to providing for restraints prior to
a judicial determination of obscenity. 4 ' The procedure set forth in the 1981
statute appears, in some respects, to comply with the New York procedure
approved in Harvey and Kingsley. 42 Nevertheless, one subsection of the 1981
statute provides for temporary restraining orders in "exigent circumstances"
if the underlying action is "commenced on the earliest possible date."' 43 This
provision may run afoul of the holding in Harvey that prior restraints must be
limited to the "shortest fixred time period compatible with sound judicial
44
resolution."
The Harvey case ruled out searches as means for gathering evidence for
obscenity prosecutions until an adversary hearing has been held and the
materials have been adjudged to be obscene. 45 Law enforcement officers can
Id at 450, 491 P.2d at 564 (citing A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964)).
176 Colo. at 451, 491 P.2d at 565.
367 U.S. 717 (1961). In Marcus the Court held that pornography could not be dealt
other items of "contraband" during a search. Id at 730-31.
176 Colo. at 150, 491 P.2d at 564 (citing Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965)).
354 U.S. 436 (1957).
Harvey, 176 Colo. at 452, 491 P.2d at 565. Joinder of issue would occur in these cases
when the defendant answers the complaint for injunctive relief. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 750
34.
35.
36.
with as
37.
38.
39.

(rev. 5th ed. 1979).
40. Harvey, 176 Colo. at 452, 491 P.2d at 565. The court discussed the changes brought
about by CoLO. REV. STAT. § 40-7-105 (1971), which provided for injunctive relief only after
the material in question had been determined obscene by means of a criminal proceeding in
which someone was convicted for promoting it. Id.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

CoLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-103 (Supp. 1981).
See id at § 18-7-103(5).
Id. at § 18-7-103(3).
176 Colo. at 451, 491 P.2d at 564 (emphasis added).
Id., 491 P.2d at 565.
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otherwise acquire such evidence by purchasing obscene material from its
purveyors or by subpoenaing the material. It was the subpoena procedure
that was challenged in Houston v. Manerbino,46 which was the next recorded
obscenity case in Colorado. In that case, the district attorney submitted to
the court a policeman's affidavit that described in minute detail sexual acts
being portrayed in films exhibited by the defendant, who was charged with
violating the obscenity statute. 4 7 The affidavit served as the basis for the
issuance of a subpoena requiring the defendant to produce the films for the
48
purpose of an adversary hearing.
The Colorado Supreme Court held that such a subpoena was not an
impermissible prior restraint, because "[s]ome means had to be devised to
obtain and preserve the moving pictures for the purpose of conducting an
adversary hearing to determine whether the films were obscene as a matter
49
of law."

III.
A.

THE DETERMINATION OF OBSCENITY AS A MATTER OF LAW

Miller v. California

The Burger court's major contribution to obscenity law, Miller v. Califorma, 50 was designed tomake the regulation of obscenity easier by providing
"concrete guidelines" for state statutes. 51 The decision did not have that
effect in Colorado.
The Court in Miler tried to establish guidelines which would ensure
that obscenity laws could regulate only "hard core" pornography. 52 For material to be denominated as such, a trier of fact would have to decide, according to Miller, that:
(a) [Tihe average person, applying contemporary community standards would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals
to the prurient interest ....
(b) [T]he work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law
(c) [T]he work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artis53
tic, political, or scientific value.
The Md/er decision went on to set forth examples of the types of depictions that could be prohibited under part (b) of the above standard:
(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated.
(b) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions and lewd exhibition of the
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

185 Colo. 1, 521 P.2d 166 (1974).
Id at 4, 521 P.2d at 167.
Id at 5, 521 P.2d at 167.
Id at 8, 521 P.2d at 169.
413 U.S. 15 (1973).
Id at 29.
Id

53. Id

at 24.

OBSCENITY LAW IN COLORADO

1982]
genitals.
B.

54

The First Post-Miller Decision

In People v. Berger, 55 the Colorado Supreme Court had its first opportunity to examine an obscenity prosecution in light of the Mier standards.
The case involved an owner of a Colorado Springs magazine exchange who
was convicted of promoting obscenity. 56 The defendant sold a police officer
magazines that the court described as follows:
The photographs contained in the magazines depict nude male
and female models posed in various positions. Although the
magazines portray male and female genitalia, none of the photographs depicts sexual intercourse, masturbation, fellatio, cunnilingus, or other explicitly sexual conduct. In addition to the
photographs, all of the magazines, except one, contained literary
to those found in
articles in the form of short stories comparable
57
present day "confession" type magazines.
The statute underlying this prosecution was essentially the same statute
that the court overturned as unconstitutional two years later in People v.
Tabron.58 But the court avoided the constitutional issue in Berger by relying
on the principle enunciated one month earlier in Houston v. Manerbino, that
the question of whether materials were obscene was in the first instance a
matter of law for the court to decide. 59 Focusing on a statement in Mi/er
that states could prohibit only patently offensive "hard core" sexual conduct,
the court in Berger stated: "In our view, while the photographs depict male
and female genitals in a non-turgid state, they do not reveal any form of
sexual conduct which could be categorized as 'hard core' pornography or
which would be patently offensive to most people." ' 60 Thus, the court found
the magazines to be not obscene as a matter of federal constitutional law,
and did not have to reach the question of whether the statute complied with
the Miller test. 6 ' By describing the threshold point in the test as being turgidity versus limpness of genitals, however, the court in Berger apparently
ignored the comment in the Miller opinion that a state statute could regulate
62
under part (b) of the standard "lewd exhibition of the genitals."
Nevertheless, the Berger court's intentions in setting up such a standard
can be better understood from the following comment: "In fact, a number
of magazines on today's news stands which appeal to large segments of the
community exhibit photographs of the nude human body which are comparable to those contained in the seven magazines which provide the basis for
54. Id. at 25.

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
(1964)).
60.
61.
62.

185 Colo. 85, 521 P.2d 1244 (1974).
Id at 86, 521 P.2d at 1244.
Id at 87, 521 P.2d at 1245.
notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
190 Colo. 149, 544 P.2d 372 (1976). See infta
Berger, 185 Colo. at 88, 521 P.2d at 1245 (also citing Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184
185 Colo. at 89, 521 P.2d at 1246.
Id.
Miller, 413 U.S. at 25.
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63
the charges in this case."
The court in Berger seemingly wanted to ensure that popular
"centerfold" magazines, such as Playboy, Penthouse, and Cosmopohtan, are not

subject to prosecution in Colorado.
IV.

THE COLORADO CONSTITUTION AND OBSCENITY

While basing its holding on the first amendment to the federal Constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, the Colorado court
in Berger made the following thought provoking statement:
In order to find that the materials are obscene as a matter of law
and capable of supporting a criminal prosecution, we must find not
only that the obscenity standards of the statute, as construed under
the First Amendment, are met, but also that there has been some
abuse of freedom of speech, as envisioned under the broader protective standard of Article II, Section 10 of the Colorado
Constitution. 64
The breadth of the Colorado Constitution's protection of free speech
can be seen in the language of article II, section 10:
No law shall be passed impairing the freedom of speech; every person shall be free to speak, write or publish whatever he will on any
subject, being responsible for all abuse of that liberty; and in all
suits and prosecutions for libel the truth thereof may be given in
the direction of the court, shall deterevidence, and the jury, under
65
mine the law and the fact.
It should be noted that the Colorado Constitution states the right in
positive terms, that "every person shall be free to speak, write, or publish
whatever he will on any subject," 66 while the United States Constitution's pro"67
scription is stated in the negative, "Congress shall make no law . .
The Colorado Constitution speaks of liability for the abuse of freedom
of speech, but it is clear from the context that the framers saw abuse as
occurring primarily in the form of slanderous speech and libelous writings.
A credible argument can thus be advanced that obscenity is protected expression under the Colorado Constitution. Nonetheless, while the Colorado
Supreme Court has declared that the state constitution provides broader
protection to free speech than its federal counterpart, there are no Colorado
decisions in the area that significantly conflict with federal first amendment
law.
After the comment in People v. Berger, the court has never again referred
to the potential of article II, section 10 of the Colorado Constitution to give
68
broader protection to sexually explicit materials. Furthermore, the chances
of the court unequivocally declaring obscenity to be protected speech are
63. 185 Colo. at 89, 521 P.2d at 1246.
64. Id at 89, 521 P.2d 1245-46.
65. CoLo. CONsT. art. II, § 10.

66. CoLO. CoNsT. art. II, § 10 (emphasis added).
67. U.S. CONST. amend. I.

68. See, e.g., People v. Tabron, 190 Colo. 149, 544 P.2d 372 (1976).
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remote. The justices surely recognize that such a decision would probably
be overturned by the voters either through the removal of justices from office 69 or the enactment of a constitutional amendment through the referendum process. 70 If courts do indeed watch the election returns, the Colorado
court must have taken notice of recent events in California, where that state
supreme court's interpretation of the California Constitution as prohibiting
71
the death penalty was promptly overruled by the voters.
V.

SATISFYING THE MILLER STANDARDS

The next major case in Colorado obscenity law was People v. Tabron, 72 a
1976 supreme court decision that declared the state's obscenity statute to be
unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the Miller standards. The statute at issue 73 had been passed in 1971, two years before the Miller case was
decided. Therefore, this statute was drafted to comply with the then-prevailing federal constitutional standards enunciated in the Memoirs case. 74 In
reviewing the conviction of a defendant who had exhibited the film "Deep
Throat" 75 in a public theater, the Colorado Supreme Court in Tabron discussed the following aspects of the Mier standards.
A.

Lackig serious hterar, artistic,pohti'cal, or scientli.i value

One major change made by Miller was that obscenity was no longer
defined to be "utterly without redeeming social value," as in the Memoirs
test, but rather had to "[lack] serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value." 76 The court in Tabron ruled that the Colorado statute's use of the
discarded Memoirs test was "[t]he most apparent defect" in its definition of
obscenity. 77 The Tabron court recognized the argument that a state should
be free to adopt the "utterly without redeeming social value" test because
that test presents a heavier burden for the state to meet than the standard
contemplated by Miller. Nevertheless, the court held that its approval of the
old standard would deprive a defendant who may have relied on the new
Miller standard of "fair warning that his action, when committed, consti78
tuted a crime."
The Tabron court ignores the point that the Memoirs standard was rejected in Miller precisely because it placed on the prosecution "a burden
69. COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 25.

70. Id, art. XIX, § 2.
71. See People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert. dented, 406
U.S. 988 (1972), overruled by popular enactment of CAL. CONST. art. I, § 27, on Nov. 7, 1972.
72. 190 Colo. 149, 544 P.2d 372 (1976).
73. COLO. REv. STAT. § 40-7-101 (1971).
74. 383 U.S. 413 (1966). See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
75. 190 Colo. at 151, 544 P.2d at 372. Rather than trying to compel the defendant to
produce the film by means of a subpoena duces tecum, the prosecutors acquired from the Los
Angeles Police Department a videotape of "Deep Throat" that had been edited differently from
the version the defendant was showing. Id, 544 P.2d at 372-73. The court indicated in dicta
that the videotape had been admitted into evidence without a proper foundation. Id, 544 P.2d
at 373.
76. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
77. 190 Colo. at 157, 544 P.2d at 378.
78. Id. at 158, 544 P.2d at 378.
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' 79
virtually impossible to discharge under our criminal standards of proof."
In 1977, the United States Supreme Court approved an Illinois statute that
retained "the strt~ter Memoirs formulation of the 'redeeming social value' factor." 80 Thus, states were free, despite Miller, to retain the stricter Memoirs
test to assess the societal value of obscene materials. The Colorado court in
Tabron was not justified in its concern that a defendant have notice of the
standard, because when a defendant has notice of a stricter standard, afortiorari he has notice of a less strict standard.

The 1981 Colorado statute does comply with the Miller standard that to
be obscene, material must "[lack] serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."' 1 There was testimony, however, in Colorado House committee
hearings on the enacting bill that pointed up the limited usefulness of this
part of Miler test.8 2 The House State Affairs Committee heard testimony
from Reverands Moore and Mahoney, both ministers of the Church of
World Peace, that the members of their church use pornographic literature
and "obscene" devices, both proscribed by the 1981 statute, in their worship
services. According to the tenets of the Church of World Peace, "sexual energy is a profound religious force." Reverend Moore said he believed the
1981 statute discriminated against the religious practices of his church and
83
in favor of the Judeo-Christian moral code.
The committee members seemed somewhat nonplussed by this testimony, one legislator asking if the ministers were using the term "church"
rather "loosely." ' 4 Reverend Mahoney replied that his group had been recognized as a church by the Internal Revenue Service.8 5
The above exchange may appear comical, but one serious issue raised is
whether the Miller standard might be too limited, by protecting only prurient material that has value in four disciplines: art, science, literature, and
politics. The absence of "religion" in this list may have implications arising
out of the free exercise clause of the first amendment as well as the free
86
speech clause.
B.

Specifally Defined Conduct

The second shortcoming of the Colorado statute, according to the court
in 7abron, was its failure to comply with part (b) of the Miller standard,
which said that a statute could only prohibit depictions or descriptions of
''a7
sexual conduct that were "specifically defined by the applicable state law.
The pertinent part of the Colorado statute defined an obscene work as one
79. 413 U.S. at 22.
80. Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767, 773 (1977) (emphasis added).
81. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 18-7-101(2)(c) (Supp. 1981).
82. Colorado House State Affairs Committee Hearings on SB 38, House Committee Room F,

Apr. 14, 1981, 1:48-2:50 P.M. (available at the state archives on tape) [hereinafter cited as House
Hearings].

83. Id

84. Id
85. Id
86. But see Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (polygamy not protected under
free exercise clause).
87. 413 U.S. at 24.
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that "predominantly appeals to prurient interest, i.e., a lustful or morbid
interest in nudity, sex, sexual conduct, sexual excitement, excretion, sadism,
1188 The Tabron court commasochism, or sado-masochistic abuse ....
mented: "Given their plain and ordinary meaning, the words 'nudity, sex,
sexual conduct, sexual excitement . . . sadism, masochism, or sado-masochistic abuse,' are not representative of the specificity contemplated by the
Supreme Court in Md/er." 89
The court arrived at this conclusion by comparing the language of the
Colorado statute to the examples given in the Miller opinion of what a state
statute could define for regulation under part (b) of the standard:
"(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts,
normal or perverted, actual or simulated; (b) Patently offensive representation or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals." 9
In spite of Tabron's specific disapproval of the use of the terms "sadism"
and "masochism," the 1981 Colorado statute has again included those terms
in its definitional section. 9 1 Since the Colorado legislature has twice suffered
the embarrassment of having its obscenity enactments struck down by the
state supreme court, it is difficult to understand why the legislature has included language in a new statute that has been specifically disapproved by
that court. Clues as to the origin of this anomaly may be seen in the legisla92
tive history of Senate Bill 38, which resulted in the current law.
Republican Senator Ted Strickland, the prime sponsor of Senate Bill 38
and of much of the state's obscenity legislation in recent years, assigned the
drafting of the 1981 statute to a group headed by Bob Miller, former Greeley
District Attorney and now United States Attorney for Colorado. 93 Mr.
Miller apparently modeled the Colorado legislation after the Texas obscenity statute,94 the constitutionality of which he said had been upheld by the
United States Supreme Court in Cg'stal Theaters v. Wade. 95 The case Mr.
Miller referred to, however, was a memorandum decision involving a denial
of stay, not a decision on the merits of the Texas statute. Indeed, at the time
of the committee hearings, the only federal authorities upholding the constitutionality of the Texas statute were the memorandum decisions of two federal district courts that were affirmed in part by the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Red Bluff Drive-In, Inc. v. Vance96 on June 23, 1981, after the Colorado statute had been passed. The Red Bluff decision upheld the inclusion of
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-7-101(1) (1971).
190 Colo. at 159, 544 P.2d at 379.
413 U.S. at 25.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-101(2)(b)(II) (Supp. 1981).
1981 Colo. Sess. Laws 998.

93.

Colorado Senate Affais Comm. Hearings on S 38, Senate Committee Room 320 E, Feb. 24,

1981, 9:18 to 10:37 A.M. (available at the state archives on tape) (hereinafter cited as Senate
Hearings].

94. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 43.21 to -.23 (Vernon 1974 & Supp. 1982).
95. 444 U.S. 959 (1979) (mem).
96. 648 F.2d 1020 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1264 (1982). There was brief
mention of the Texas statute in Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308 (1980) (per
curiam), a case invalidating the use of Texas injunctive procedures to prevent the future showing of allegedly obscene motion pictures. Justice White remarked in a footnote to his dissenting
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"sadism" and "masochism" in the definitional parts of the statute, but found
several other portions of the Texas statutory scheme "questionable," and incourt decisions that might convoked the abstention doctrine to await9 state
7
stitutionally construe those provisions.
In upholding the inclusion of "sadism" and "masochism," 9 8 the Red
Bluff court relied on the 1977 Supreme Court decision of Ward v. Illinois.99
Ironically, the Supreme Court in Ward upheld10 0 the constitutionality of an
Illinois obscenity statute that had wording nearly identical to that of the
Colorado statute struck down in Tabron; the statute was approved primarily
because the supreme court of Illinois had construed the statute in such a way
as to comply with Miller.' 0 '
The defendant in Ward asserted that sado-masochistic materials could
not be constitutionally proscribed because they were not expressly included
within the examples Md/er gave to explain part (b) of its standard. 10 2 Justice White, writing for the Court, replied, "but those specifics were offered
merely as 'examples'.

.

. and.

.

. 'were not intended to be exhaustive.' "103

Justice White went on to say, "[t]here was no suggestion in Miller that we
intended to extend constitutional protection to the kind of flagellatory
materials that were among those held obscene in Misihkin v. New York
"104

The Colorado trial court relied on Ward v. llinois in upholding the
terms "sadism" and "masochism" as used in the 1981 statute. 10 5 But the
Colorado Supreme Court may adopt the reasoning of Justice Stevens, who
dissented in Ward v. Illinois because he believed the Ward majority improperly loosened the tight reins of specificity with which Miller had harnessed
state obscenity regulation.' 6 Of course, the potential constitutional infirmity in the 1981 statute could have been avoided if the drafters had adequately considered Colorado case law rather than relying solely on the Texas
statute as their blueprint.
C.

Community Standards

One of the major changes in the law of obscenity made by the Burger
0 7
Court in Miler was the abandonment of the holding injacobelh' v. Ohio 1
that the community standard must be national in scope.' 0 8 The first prong
of the Mdler guidelines states that whether material is obscene must be judgopinion, "[s]ection 43.21, in turn, tracks nearly verbatim the Miller guidelines." 445 U.S. at 321
n.l.

97. 648 F.2d at 1027-36.
98. Id at 1027.

99.. 431 U.S. 767 (1977).
100. Id at 770.
101. Id at 775.

102. Id. at 773.
103. Id (citing Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 114 (1974)).
104. Id. (citing Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 505-10 (1966)).
105. People v. Seven Thirty-Five East Colfax, Inc., No. 81CV5779 (Denver Dist. Court,
Mar. 15, 1982), appealdocketed, No. 82SA212 (Colo. Sup. Ct. May 4, 1982).
106. 431 U.S. at 777-82 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
107. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
108. Id at 195.

19821

OBSCENITY LAW IN COLORADO

ed with reference to "'the average person applying contemporary community standards.' "109 The Court thus stated:
It is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the
First Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las
Vegas, or New York City. . . .People in different States vary in
their tastes and attitudes, and this diversity is not to be strangled
by the absolutism of imposed uniformity. 10
In People v. Tabron,1 ' the Colorado Supreme Court noted that the Miller
decision had not given much guidance as to what the boundaries should be
for the localized community standard. " 2 In the companion case to Tabron,
People v. Tabron (II) "', the Colorado Supreme Court decided that a statewide community standard was required.
It is fundamentally unfair that any person would be called
upon to undergo a trial that would entail criminal penalties for the
violation of a state obscenity statute without knowing what the
standard is that will determine his guilt or innocence. The random
decision of a judge or jury cannot be the standard, and the state
statute should not be construed in a different manner in Denver,
4
Littleton, Grand Junction, Colorado Springs, and Aspen. 1
The court in Tabron II seemed to be concerned about equal protection
of the law for defendants and uniformity of interpretation for courts. The
Colorado Supreme Court's agreement with the Miller opinion that "a national standard would be an exercise in futility,"' 15 however, is itself an exercise in self-delusion. A statewide standard for Colorado is necessarily an
amalgam of the attitudes toward obscenity ranging from Boulder college students and the Capitol Hill denizens to the possibly more conservative citizens of rural areas and the suburbs. Thus, Colorado's spectrum of views on
the subject of obscenity is to some extent a microcosm of the nation's views
as a whole. The true "exercise in futility" may ultimately be the Burger
Court's irrational replacement of a hypothetical, abstract nationwide standard with a local standard that most of the states are interpreting to be an
equally hypothetical, abstract statewide standard.' 16

D.

The Objectionable Work Taken as a Whole

Both prongs (a) and (c) of the three prong Miller standards' 17 emphasized that an objectionable work must be considered in its entirety in making
109. 413 U.S. at 24 (quoting Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S.. 229, 230 (1972)).
110. 413 U.S. at 32-33 (citations omitted).
Ill.

190 Colo. 149, 544 P.2d 372 (1976).

112. Id at 157, 544 P.2d at 377.
113. 190 Colo. 161, 544 P.2d 380 (1976).
abron and Tabron I1 involved prosecution of the
same defendant; however, in the second case the issue was defendant's exhibition of the film
"Behind the Green Door."
114. Id at 162-63, 544 P.2d at 381.
115. Id at 162, 544 P.2d at 381.
116. The Colorado court noted in Tabron II that it was joining a number of other state
courts that had adopted statewide community standards. Id at 163, 544 P.2d at 381.
117. 413 U.S. at 24. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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the determination of whether it is obscene. This principle was first promulgated in 1957 in the fountainhead case of Roth v. United States. 1'8 Roth rejected the common-law view, which had developed from the 19th century
English case of Regina v. Hic/ihn," 9 that a work could be judged obscene
based on an examination of isolated passages and the effect those passages
might have on a particularly susceptible reader.' 20 Roth found that such a
test might encroach on first amendment freedoms by encompassing materials that, taken as a whole, deal with sex in a legitimate manner. 12 1
In People v. New Horizons, Inc. 122 the Colorado Supreme Court struck
down the 1977 Colorado obscenity statute for violating the Miller requirement that obscenity be determined by considering objectionable material in
its entirety. Although the statute included the "taken as a whole" language
in two appropriate places in the definition of "obscene material, '"123 the
Achilles heel of the statute was in its definition of "material": " 'Material'
means any physical object, facsimile, recording, transcription, pictorial representation, motion picture, or reproduction . . . but does not include the printed
24
or written word." 1
The court reasoned that since "material" did not include the printed
word, a jury examining a book or magazine with both pictures and text
could consider only the pictures as being potentially obscene.' 25 Thus, "the
pictures could be declared obscene and the entire magazine banned under
the statute without reference to whether the included text or other articles
imbued the magazine with serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
26
value."1
The court in New Horizons recognized that this provision was designed
to protect free speech by immunizing unillustrated literature from censorship. The court, however, declined to construe the statute so as to give effect
t 27
to the legislative intent.
The legislative history behind this particular blunder reveals the difficulty in passing constitutional obscenity legislation. In 1976, the legislature
was faced with the task of drafting a new obscenity statute in the wake of the
Colorado Supreme Court's decision in People v. Tabron. ' 2 8 There was still a
Democratic majority in the House of Representatives as a consequence of
the Watergate landslide in 1974. The voices of moderation prevailed, resulting in an obscenity statute that outlawed the promotion of all hard-core pornography to children and yet outlawed only live sex performances and
sadomasochistic materials with respect to adults.' 29 The 1976 statute also
118. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).

119. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868), ctedin Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
120. 354 U.S. at 489.
121. Id.

122. 616 P.2d 106 (Colo. 1980).
123.

CoLo. REV. STAT. § 18-7-101(i)(b) (Supp. 1981).

124. Id. at § 18-7-101(5) (emphasis added).
125.

616 P.2d at 110.

126. Id.
127. Id.
128.
129.

190 Colo. 149, 544 P.2d 372 (1976).
1976 Colo. Sess. Laws 555.

1982]

OBSCENITY LAW IN COLORADO

contained a provision exempting the printed or written word from its defini1 30
tion of "material."
The 1976 statute was never litigated at the appellate level, because the
Republicans regained control of the legislature during the 1977 session. As a
result, the 1976 statute was repealed in favor of a more restrictive law that
outlawed the promotion of a broader range of obscene materials to adults. 13
Unlike the 1976 bill, the original version of the 1977 bill did not contain the
exemption for the written or printed word, 132 but Democratic Representa33
tive Wayne Knox added the exemption as an amendment in the House.'
The Senate did not concur in the House amendments and a conference committee was appointed. The majority report recommended that the House
withdraw the Knox amendment,' a3 while the minority report, authored by
Senator Ted Strickland and Representative Ken Kramer, recommended
that the Senate accept the Knox amendment.' 35 The House eventually
adopted the minority report of the conference committee, repassed the
bill,' 3 6 and the Senate conceded to this decision. 137
Thus, through the process of compromise and consensus, an element
was introduced into the bill that conflicted with the original purpose of the
redrafting process, which was to create an obscenity statute in compliance
with the Md/er standards.
E.

Material Must Be Patently Ofensi'e

Included in both part (b) of the Miller test and in the Miller "examples"
for part (b) is the concept that material must be "patently offensive" to be
obscene.' 38 The 1981 Colorado obscenity statute, modelled after the Texas
obscenity law, defines "patently offensive" as "so offensive on its face as to
39
affront current community standards of decency."'
130. Id at 556. According to Rep. Wayne Knox, it was Republican Don Friedman who
originally suggested this provision be included, upon the recommendation of booksellers. Interview with Wayne Knox, State Rep. of Denver (Apr. 23, 1982).
131. 1977 Colo. Sess. Laws 982. The sponsors of the 1977 bill were, itter alia, Sens. Ted
Strickland and Arch Decker (then a Democrat, and Republican candidate for Congress in the
first Congressional district in 1982); Reps. Sam Zakhem and Ken Kramer (now U.S. Congressman, fifth district). -According to Rep. Wayne Knox, the crusade to pass a tougher law may
have been in part sparked by a comment purportedly made by Art Schwartz, a noted defense
attorney in the field of obscenity law, that the 1976 law "legalized pornography." Interview
with Wayne Know, State Rep. of Denver (Apr. 23, 1982).
132. S. 447, 51st Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1977).
133. 1977 Colo. H.J. 1296, amend. 3.
134. 1977 Colo. H.J. 2020.
135. 1977 Colo. H.J. 2081-82.
136. 1977 Colo. H.J. 2090-91. Rep. Knox voted against the bill despite the acceptance of
He said in an interview that he felt there were other constitutional
his amendment. Id
problems with the bill, and that the Colorado Supreme Court had just decided to focus on that
particular defect. Knox also criticized Sen. Strickland for getting obscenity legislation assigned
to the state affairs committee instead of the judiciary committee, where, according to Knox, a
more competent analysis of the constitutional ramifications of bills could be made. Interview
with Wayne Knox, State Rep. of Denver (Apr. 23, 1982).
137. 1977 Colo. Sen. J. 2250.
138. 413 U.S. at 24-25.
139. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-101(4) (Supp. 1981) (emphasis added). See TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 43.21 (a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
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The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, reviewing the constitutionality of
the Texas law in Red Bluff Drive-ln, Inc. v. Vance, 1 4 0 found this definition to be
questionable because of language in Mller and another Supreme Court case,
Smith v. United States. 14 ' The court in Red Bluff indicated that obscenity
should be judged with reference to the community's standards of tolerance
rather than the community's standards of decency.' 42 The Fifth Circuit commented that "the line between protected expression and punishable obscenity must be drawn at the limits of a community's tolerance rather than in
43
accordance with the dangerous standards of propriety and taste."1
The Fifth Circuit decided to abstain from declaring the Texas statute
unconstitutional in order to give state courts the opportunity to interpret the
offending language in a manner consistent with constitutional standards. 144
The distinction drawn by the Fifth Circuit, however, may not rise to constitutional significance because that court overlooked the fact that a jury instruction approved in the Miller case referred to community standards of
"decency," though the constitutional ramifications of that term were not in145
cluded in the Miller Court's discussion of the instruction.
F.

Obscenity in the Context of Verbal Assault

In the Colorado case of People '. Weeks 146 a defendant was charged with
violating the state telephone harassment statute' 4 7 by making obscene telephone calls. "48 The trial court dismissed the charges, accepting defendant's
argument, inter alia, that the statute was unconstitutionally applied to defendant because it did not comply with the Miller standards in its definition
of "obscene." ' 149 The Colorado Supreme Court ordered the charges reinstated, finding that the requirements of Miller "are inapposite when the
question is whether the state may prohibit unwanted verbal assaults on a
person within the privacy of his own home."' 50 The court pointed out that
the gravamen of the offense was not the content of the speech, as it would be
in an ordinary obscenity prosecution, but rather the manner in which the
message was delivered-"the thrusting of an offensive and unwanted com51
munication on one who is unable to ignore it.'
VI.

THE BROAD DOCTRINES:

STANDING, OVERBREADTH, VAGUENESS,

AND EQUAL PROTECTION

In the preceding section there was a discussion of the Miller guidelines,
which are specific to obscenity law. But broader doctrines of first amend140. 648 F.2d 1020 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1264 (1982).

141. 431 U.S. 291 (1977).
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

648 F.2d at 1028-29 (citing Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 305 (1977)).
648 F.2d at 1029.
Id
413 U.S. at 31.
197 Colo. 175, 591 P.2d 91 (1979).
CoLw. REv. STAT. § 18-9-111(1)(e) (1976).
197 Colo. at 177, 591 P.2d at 93.
Id at 180, 591 P.2d at 95.
Id
Id at 182, 591 P.2d at 96.
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ment jurisprudence and constitutional law in general, such as standing, overbreadth, vagueness, and equal protection, can also have an impact on the
consideration of the constitutionality of obscenity statutes.
A.

Standing

In Colorado obscenity cases, the standing doctrine has been invoked
when a defendant asserts that a statute is overbroad. 152 The general principle of standing is that a person to whom a statute may be constitutionally
applied cannot challenge that statute on the ground that it could be unconstitutionally applied to others in situations not before the court.' 53 An exception to this rule, however, is the situation in which a litigant claims that a
statute regulating speech is overbroad because it infringes on protected areas
of speech as well as prohibits that which it can legitimately prohibit. 154 In
those cases, a litigant whose conduct might be prohibited under a more narrowly drawn statute is allowed to challenge the overbroad statute under the
assumption that the existence of the statute might "chill" the exercise of
those legitimate activities that the statute encompasses.' 5 5 Under this rationale the defendant in People v. Tabron, t 56 who had exhibited "Deep
Throat," a film that probably could have been legitimately banned by a
correctly drawn statute, was given standing to challenge the constitutionality
57
of the statute.'
A recent Colorado Supreme Court case, Marco Lounge, Inc. o. City of Federal Heights,' 58 elucidates the court's view of the standing principle. The
Marco case was unique for several reasons: it was the first time the supreme
court decided a case in which the issue was the use of zoning legislation to
control obscenity; it was the first time a justice other than William Erickson
wrote an opinion in the area; ' 59 and, it was the first time the obscenity issue
split the court. 16°
The case involved a bar with live, nude dancers in Federal Heights.161
The music stopped when the town board of trustees adopted a zoning ordinance that relegated all nude entertainment, pornography shops, and massage parlors to "E- 1 Entertainment" districts.1 62 The catch was that no such
districts existed, and they could only be created by the voters through the
initiative process.' 63 With respect to Marco's case, the most significant provision of the ordinance declared: "Nothing herein shall apply to premises 1i152. E.g., People v. Weeks, 197 Colo. 175, 591 P.2d 91 (1979).
153. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973).
154. Id. at 611-12.
155. Id at 612.
156. 190 Colo. 149, 544 P.2d 372 (1976).
157. Id at 152, 544 P.2d at 373.
158. 625 P.2d 982 (Colo. 1981).
159. Justice Lohr authored the majority opinion.
160. Justices Erickson, Dubofsky, and Quinn joined in the majority opinion, while the Justices who are generally regarded as more conservative, Lee, Rovira, and Chief Justice Hodges,
dissented.
161. 625 P.2d at 984.
162. Id
163. Id
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censed under the State Liquor Code, except that live, nude entertainment
shall be prohibited in all such premises."' 64 Neither the majority nor the
dissenting opinion seemed to appreciate the effect of this provision on the
legal theory of the Marco case.
Both the majority and the dissenting opinions in Marco agreed that the
state, pursuant to the powers granted by the twenty-first amendment, may
constitutionally prohibit live, nude entertainment in establishments operating with a state liquor license. 16 5 Both opinions cite the United States
Supreme Court decision in Cahfiorn'a v. LaRue'16 6 as authority for that
proposition.
Inexplicably, the dissenting justices stated there was no standing based
on the failure of the Marco Lounge to seek enactment of an E-1 entertainment district by initiative before attempting to enjoin enforcement of the
ordinance.' 6 7 Justice Rovira stated in his dissent:
At such time as Marco has attempted to establish an E- I Entertainment District and the qualified electors of Federal Heights
have defeated such a proposal, then it would be in a position to
complain of a denial of freedom of speech, and it would have
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the zoning
68
ordinance.'
Why would Marco Lounge initiate a proposal to create an E- 1 entertainment district, unless it planned on serving sarsaparilla instead of liquor? The justices seemed to forget that since the Marco Lounge had a
liquor license it was specifically exempted from the zoning provisions of the
69
ordinance and absolutely prohibited from providing nude entertainment. 1
Thus, in granting standing to Marco Lounge under the loosened standing rules for claims of overbreadth, the majority contradicted the stance the
court had taken two years earlier in People v. Weeks. 170 In Weeks the court
denied an obscene caller standing to attack the telephone harassment statute
under the following rationale:
[Ulse of the [overbreadth] doctrine is reserved for those defendants
whose speech is at the fringes of that activity which the statute is
designed to regulate. Those defendants whose speech is central to
the interests which the statute seeks to protect and is clearly of a
type regulated by the statute in question, cannot attack the statute
as overbroad. They must demonstrate that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to them.' 7 '
Justice Lohr, in a footnote to his majority opinion in Marco, questioned
whether the above statement was consistent with the overbreadth standing
164. Id

(quoting FEDERAL HEIGHTS, COLO. Ordinance § 10-1-5A.4 (Aug. 28, 1976)).

165. 625 P.2d at 986, 989.
166. 409 U.S. 109 (1972). The LaRue holding was later solidified in a post-Marco case, New
York State Liquor Authority v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714 (1981).
167. 625 P.2d at 991 (Rovira, J., dissenting).
168. Id
169. FEDERAL HEIGHTS, COLO. Ordinance § 10-1-5A.4 (Aug. 28, 1976).
170. 197 Colo. 175, 591 P.2d 91 (1979).
171. Id at 179, 591 P.2d at 94.
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doctrine as enunciated by the United States Supreme Court. 172 Indeed, Justice Erickson, in writing the above passage from Weeks, cited Broadrick v.
Oklahoma 7 3 and a Colorado case, Bolles v. People,' 74 neither of which supports the Weeks proposition.
Aside from the faulty Weeks precedent and the failure of the Mlarco court
to apply the appropriate portion of the Federal Heights ordinance, the
standing issue in Marco came down to the applicability of the following statement from Broadrick v. Oklahoma: "[P]articularly where conduct and not
merely speech is involved, we believe that the overbreadth of a statute must
not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's
plainly legitimate sweep."' 75 Because Marco's conduct was plainly and legitimately proscribed by the statute, the question of his standing would de76
pend on whether the statute was substantially overbroad. 1
B.

Overbreadth
1.

Zoning Ordinances: Marco Lounge, Inc. v. City of Federal Heights

The majority opinion in Marco Lounge, Inc. v. City of Federal Heights was
correct in finding the zoning ordinances at issue in that case substantially
overbroad. For there to be an overbreadth problem, the statute must first be
found to encompass protected conduct.' 77 The Marco majority pointed out
that certain forms of live, nude entertainment are protected expression
under the first amendment,""8 citing, inter aia, Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc. 179 The
United States Supreme Court in Doran gave "Ballet Africains" as an example of protected nude entertainment. 80
The zoning ordinance of Federal Heights constituted a blanket prohibition of these protected forms of expression; nude dancing was allowed only
in non-existent E-1 districts. The city and the dissenters suggested that the
provisions for initiated elections to establish E-1 districts rescued the ordinance from facial invalidity. The majority rejected this contention pointing
out that such "place" restrictions had only been upheld when the issuance of
licenses or permits for the protected activity was governed by definite standards and the decision was subject to judicial review.' 8 1 The majority
stated:
Putting aside the question whether the time and expense incident
to such a procedure would in themselves unconstitutionally burden
exercise of First Amendment rights, see Baysde Enterprises,Inc. v. Carson, . . . we hold that Marco's right to challenge the zoning plan
cannot be conditioned on lack of success in a standardless, unre172. 625 P.2d at 986 n.5.
173. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
174. 189 Colo. 394, 541 P.2d 80 (1975).
175.

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
(1975)).

413 U.S. at 615.

See itfra text accompanying notes 178-216.
NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964).
625 P.2d at 985.
422 U.S. 922 (1975).
Id. at 933.
625 P.2d at 988 n.10 (citing Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546
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82
viewable popular election.'

The majority opinion is persuasive as far as it goes. The central question, however, was not fully addressed. It is absurd to suggest that a regulatory scheme is valid which requires an individual to submit his right to
engage in constitutionally protected expression to a popular election. As the
majority in Marco pointed out, the possibility of censorship by a majority
vote was the essential reason for enshrining the right of free expression in the
Constitution. 183
2.

Obscenity Must Be Erotic: People v. Tabron

Some of the weakest overbreadth analysis in Colorado case law can be
found in People v. Tabron. 184 The court faulted the Colorado obscenity statute not only because it failed to comply with the Miller standards, but also
because it was "drawn overly broad" in its inclusion of "activities which
185
could be described or depicted in some context other than an erotic one."'
One of the Colorado court's authorities for the proposition that obscenity
must be erotic was Erznoznzk v. City ofJacksonville. 8 6 In Erznoznzk, the United
States Supreme Court declared a municipal ordinance unconstitutional that
banned nudity on drive-in movie screens that were visible outside the movie
premises from a public place. The Supreme Court stated that despite the
aim of protecting children, the drive-in ordinance was overly broad because
it was not limited to sexually explicit nudity, but would encompass nonerotic nudity such as the naked body of a war victim in a documentary
18 7
film.
In reaching its conclusion that the Colorado statute regulated nonerotic material, the Colorado court was taking the word "nudity" in the statute's definition of "obscene" out of context. The statute defined as "obscene" that which "predominately appeals to prurient interest, i.e., a lustful or
morbid interest in nudity .. ."i88 It is difficult to understand how nudity
appealing to lustful interests could be depicted in a non-erotic context.' 89
3.

Impingement on Privacy Interests: The 1981 Colorado Statute

The 1981 Colorado obscenity statute prohibits the "promotion" of "obscene devices" as well as obscene publications. 190 An obscene device is defined as "a device including a dildo or artificial vagina, designed or
marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital or182. 625 P.2d at 988-89 (citing Bayside Enterprises, Inc. v. Carson, 450 F. Supp. 696 (M.D.
Fla. 1978)).
183. 625 P.2d at 988.
184. 190 Colo. 149, 544 P.2d 372 (1976).
185. Id.at 159, 544 P.2d at 379.
186. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
187. Id.at 213.
188. CoLt). REV. STAT. § 40-7-101(1) (1971) (emphasis added).
189. Yet Justice Erickson so prefers this analysis that he once again employed it in a com-

panion case to Tabron, Menefee v. Denver, 190 Colo. 163, 166, 544 P.2d 382, 383 (1976), which
declared the Denver municipal obscenity ordinance unconstitutional.
190. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-102(2)(a)(I) (Supp. 1981).
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gans.' ' 9 1 To promote an obscene device is to "manufacture, issue,
92 sell, give,
provide, lend, mail, deliver . . .or to oer or agree to do the same.'
statThe Fifth Circuit, interpreting the
93 Texas progenitor of Colorado's
ute in Red Bluff Drive-In, Inc. v. Vance,1 found that the above sections, taken
together, appeared overly broad because they swept within their ambit "acts
the state cannot criminalize."' 94 The Fifth Circuit stated:
The literal language of the statute forbids the most sensitive and
intimate conversations. For example, a husband could be found to
have violated the letter of the statute by uttering in the privacy of
the marital bedroom a verbal suggestion to procure for his wife one
of the commercially available small appliances referred to as
vibrators.195 (Footnote omitted).
The court recognized that this kind of prohibition was inconsistent with
196
which held
the United States Supreme Court decision in Stanley v. Georgia,
of the
privacy
the
reach
into
not
could
obscenity
that statutes regulating
the
declaring
from
abstained
however,
in
Red
Bluff,
Circuit
The
Fifth
home.
Texas statute unconstitutional. Instead, the court decided to await a nar97
rowing construction by state courts.1
Representative Chris Paulson, a member of the Colorado House of Representatives, expressed concern about the privacy aspects of the Colorado
statute in the 1981 House hearings on Senate Bill 38.198 Paulson later offered the following amendment to the bill,' 99 which was accepted and incorporated into the statute: "This section does not apply to a person's conduct
otherwise prescribed [sic] by this section which occurs in that person's resiwholesale promotion or
dence as long as that person does not engage in the
' 20 0
promotion of obscene material in his residence."
This amendment is an exercise in tautology and to paraphrase, the
amendment says: This section does not apply to conduct in your residence
as long as you do not engage in the conduct prohibited by this section in
your residence. In essence, the section begs the question with respect to the
overbreadth of the term "promote," except that it appears to give a blanket
exemption for use of obscene desires in the residence.
4.

Infringement on Protected Adult Activity: The 1981 "Display"
Statute

The obscenity statute modelled after Texas law was not the only legislain this area during the 1981 session. The legislature also sucactivity
tive
191. Id.at § 18-7-101(3).
192. Id. at 18-7-101(6) (emphasis added).
193. 648 F.2d 1020 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1264 (1982).
194. Id.at 1029.
195. Id.at 1029-30.
196. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
197. 648 F.2d at 1030. See also People v. Mizell, No. 82CR1053 (Dist. Ct. 4th Jud. Dist. Oct.
21, 1982) ("promote" found overbroad).
198. House Hearings, supra note 82.
199. 1981 Colo. H.J. 1235.
200. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 18-7-102(6) (Supp. 1981).
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ceeded in enacting a statute to limit childrens' access to obscene material. 2 0
The most controversial portion of the statute prohibits the display of
sexually explicit materials that are "harmful to children" at "news stands or
any other business or commercial establishment frequented by children or
where children are or may be invited as part of the general public. ' 20 2 The
statute defines "harmful to children" as pertaining to those materials that
appeal to the "prurient interest in sex of children," that are patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community as to what is sutablefor
children, and that are "lacking in serious literary, artistic, political, and scien20 3
tific valuefor children."
The legislature had attempted to pass similar legislation during the
1978 session, only to have it vetoed by Governor Richard Lamm. 20 4 In conjunction with his veto, the Governor initiated a voluntary agreement with
major vendors of adult magazines to have their distribution outlets keep
such magazines behind the counter or otherwise out of the reach of children. 20 5 The Governor also vetoed the 1981 statute, but this time the legis20 6
lature overrode the veto by large margins.
According to the Governor's veto message, he was advised by the Attorney General to disapprove the bill because it was unconstitutionally vague
and overbroad. 20 7 The Governor stated that the legislation would "impinge
upon and jeopardize the business of quality bookstores, galleries, and even
grocery stores which might have one questionable book or magazine among
' 20 8
its multitude of other goods and merchandise.
The Governor's point has merit. It is common knowledge that many
paperback books and magazines sold in grocery stores, drug stores, and at
assorted other locations contain sexual descriptions that many adults would
not find suitable for children. Under this statute, such establishments would
have to prohibit children from coming in at all or, at a minimum, would
have to physically segregate the book and magazine section from the rest of
20 9
the store, and not allow children to enter this section.
In a lawsuit brought by booksellers to enjoin enforcement of the statute,
the Denver district court severed the "display" section from the statute, finding that it was unduly burdensome on booksellers and "chilling" to the
"channels of dissemination." ' 2 10 In preparing their case for the Colorado
Supreme Court, the booksellers can take comfort from the indications in
Marco Lounge, Inc. v. City of Federal Heights that a majority of the justices on
201.

Cou). REV. STAT. §§ 18-7-501 to -504 (Supp. 1981).

202. Id at § 18-7-502(5).
203. Id at § 18-7-501(2) (emphasis added).
204. Message from the Governor, 1981 Colo. H.J. 2263.
205. Id
206. The Senate vote was 27-8 in favor of overriding Governor Lamm's veto of H.B. 1310,
1981 Colo. Sen. J. 2597. The House vote was 47-15 in favor of overriding. 1981 Colo. H.J.
2328.
207. Message from the Governor, 1981 Colo. H.J. 2263.
208. Id
209. See Tattered Cover, Inc. v. Tooley, No. 8 ICV09693, slip op. at 4 (Denver Dist. Ct. Jan.
26, 1982), appeal docketed, No. 82SA85 (Colo. Sup. Ct. Mar. 23, 1982).
210. Id. at 5.
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the supreme court look unfavorably on regulatory schemes that are exces21
sively burdensome on first amendment rights. '
The Colorado district court, however, upheld the part of the statute
prohibiting the sale of sexually explicit materials to minors,212 relying on
Ginsberg v. New York. 2 13 Ginsberg was a United States Supreme Court case
holding that states have the power to control the dissemination of certain
material to minors even though that same material might involve protected
expression if distributed to adults. 2 14 Also left intact by the Colorado district
court was a controversial portion of the statute that prohibits the admission
of children to sexually explicit movies without reference to whether they are
215
accompanied by a parent.
C.

Vagueness

The critical vulnerability of the 1981 obscenity statute appears to be a
section that exempts from prosecution "any accrediled theater, museum, library, school, or institution of higher education." 2 " Examining the term
"accredited" in the case of People v. Seven Thiry-fve East Co/fax, Inc. ,2 1 7 the
Denver district court said: "Although this term is frequently mentioned in
conjunction with 'schools' it is not a common, or even appropriate term in
connection with museums, libraries and theaters. 2' - 8 The court found the
term unconstitutionally vague, 2 t 9 as did the district court judge considering
220
a parallel provision in the "display" statute in Talered Cover, Inc. v. Tooley.
The "accredited" section in the obscenity statute was not in the original
bill, but rather, was introduced into the bill by an amendment reminiscent
of the fatal defect in the 1979 legislation. Senator Ted Strickland, who offered the amendment, 22 said in an interview that the amendment was offered to protect legitimate concerns and thereby gain uniform support for
222
the bill in the general assembly.
The discussion of this section that took place during the House hearings
casts some light on the underlying rationale or lack thereof.22 " Republican
Representative James Lee, an attorney, asked Bob Miller, a proponent of the
211. 625 P.2d at 988.
212. Tattered Cover, Inc. v. Tooley, No. 81CV09693, slip op. at 4 (Denver Dist. Ct. Jan. 26,
1982), appeal docketed, No. 82SA85 (Colo. Sup. Ct. Mar 23, 1982).
213. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
214. Id at 637-39.
215. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-7-502(2) (Supp. 1981).
216. Id. at § 18-7-104(1)(b) (emphasis added).
217. No. 81CV5779 (Denver Dist. Ct. Mar. 15, 1982), appeal docketed, No. 82SA212 (Colo.
Sup. Ct. May 4, 1982). See also People v. Mizell, No. 82CR1053 (Dist. Ct. 4th Jud. Dist. Oct.
21, 1982) ("accredited" section struck down as denial of equal protection).
218. Id at 5.
219. Id at 6.
220. No. 81CV90693, slip op. at 6 (Denver Dist. Ct. Jan. 26, 1982).
221. 1981 Colo. Sen. J. 629.
222. Interview with Ted Strickland, State Senator, (Apr. 23, 1982). A legislative drafting
office file on the 1977 statute reveals that the word "bona fide" was also considered for use in
this type of provision. Sen. Strickland also commented that one substitute for the offending
term that was considered, but rejected, was "legitimate."
223. See House Hearings, supra note 82.
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bill, "[wihat's the definition of an 'accredited theater?' ",224 Miller replied
2 25
that he did not know.
Senator Strickland spoke up: "That word was carefully chosen because
of the reference to institutions of higher education . . . an accredited theater
2 26
is part of that institution.
"You're not talking about commercial theaters?" asked Representative

Lee.

22 7

"No," Senator Strickland replied.

22 8

What is remarkable about this dialogue is that it occurred, and yet no
one attempted to resolve the ambiguity in the bill.
D.

Equal Protection of the Law.- The Handicappedand the Prohibition of Obscene
Devices

In the case challenging the parallel Texas obscenity statute, one of the
plaintiffs, a paraplegic, raised an equal protection claim against the statute's
proscription of obscene devices. 229 This plaintiff argued that enforcement of
2 30
the statute would deny him the constitutional right to a normal sex life.
The Fifth Circuit dismissed this argument with the comment that no such
23
constitutional right has been recognized. '
The 1981 Colorado statute defines obscene devices as devices "designed
or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of human genital organs."2 32 This language is broad enough, however, to include prosthetic implants and electrode devices designed to aid impotent men. The right of
those handicapped by impotence to use such devices, and the concomitant
right of persons to sell such devices, should be recognized on the basis of the
privacy right enunciated in Griswoldv. Connecticut2 33 and the right of personal
234
autonomy recognized in Roe v. Wade.
VII.

OBSCENITY LAW AND THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE LEVELS
AND BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT

A.

Levels
Federal-State: The Abstention Doctrine

1.

The abstention doctrine allows federal courts to abstain from exercising
224. Id
225. Id

226. Id
227.

Id

228. Id
229. Red Bluff Drive-In, Inc. v. Vance, 648 F.2d 1020, 1028 (5th Cir. 198 1),cert. denied, 102
S. Ct. 1264 (1982).
230. Id
231. Id.
232. CoLO. REv. STAT. § 18-7-101(3) (Supp. 1981)..
233. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (there is a privacy right in connection with birth control devices).
234. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (struck down an abortion law for infringing on the constitutional
right of personal autonomy).
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jurisdiction over constitutional challenges to state action if the resolution of
state law questions by the state courts might make the federal constitutional
questions moot. 23 5 It is not surprising that in the one federal court encounter with the thorny problem of the constitutionality of a Colorado obscenity
statute, this doctrine was invoked. In Bergstrom v. Rickells,236 an inmate of
the Colorado State Penitentiary brought an action alleging that the mail
room officer of the penitentiary had failed to deliver him certain books on
the grounds that they were obscene. 23 7 The Board of Corrections had
adopted a regulation, pursuant to the 1979 obscenity statute, which banned
"obscenity contraband," and the prisoner contended the regulation was invalid. 2:38 The district court abstained from deciding the constitutionality of
the statute. "[W]hen the state court's interpretation of the statute or evaluation of its validity under the state constitution may obviate any need to consider its validity under the Federal Constitution, the federal court should
hold its hand, lest it render a constitutional decision unnecessarily. 2 39
2.

State-City: Preemption

Pierce v. Ciy and County of Denver240 involved a suit brought by the manager of a university bookstore against the city to enjoin enforcement of an
obscenity ordinance.2 4 1 The city council had moved quickly to adopt a new
ordinance in the wake of the invalidation of its previous ordinance in Menefee
v. City and County of Denver.2 4 2 The Colorado Supreme Court in Pierce held
that the court's adoption of statewide community standards in Tabron II rendered the regulation of obscenity a matter of statewide concern under the
Colorado Constitution. 243 Therefore, the city ordinance was invalid because
244
it exceeded the state legislative grant of power.
B.

Branches.- Legislative-Judzal

The judiciary in Colorado has not been inclined to assist the legislature
by construing obscenity statutes so as to bring them into compliance with
constitutional guidelines; instead the courts have completely invalidated
these statutes, forcing the legislature "back to the drawing board."
1.

Original Proceeding

One avenue open to the legislature for expediting the "trial-and-error"
process that has developed in obscenity legislation is the "original proceed235. See Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
236. 495 F. Supp. 210 (D. Colo. 1980).
237. Id at 210. The action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff asserted that
the refusal to deliver the books he purchased violated his first amendment rights.
238. Id. at 211.
239. 495 F. Supp. at 212 (quoting City of Meridian v. Southern Bell Tele. & Tele. Co., 358
U.S. 639, 641 (1959)).
240. 193 Colo. 347, 565 P.2d 1337 (1977).
241. Id. at 348, 565 P.2d at 1337-38.
242. 190 Colo. 163, 544 P.2d 382 (1976). This was a companion case to People v. Tabron,
190 Colo. 149, 544 P.2d 372 (1976).
243. See 193 Colo. at 349, 565 P.2d at 1339; COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6.
244. 193 Colo. at 350-51, 565 P.2d at 1339-40.
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ing." The Colorado Constitution provides: "The supreme court shall give
its opinion upon important questions upon solemn occasions when required
by the governor, the senate, or the house of representatives; and all such
opinions shall be published in connection with the reported decision of said
245

court."

Despite the seemingly mandatory nature of this language, the supreme
court has generally resisted giving guidance to the legislature on the grounds
2 46
that such decisions must be made in the context of a concrete controversy.
While formal interrogatories have never been submitted on an obscenity
statute, an informed source in the legislature imparted the information that
a senior senator of the majority party approached Chief Justice Hodges on
2 47
the subject informally and has not received an encouraging response.
2.

Authoritative Construction

In promulgating new guidelines for state obscenity regulation, the
United States Supreme Court was careful to say in Mier v. California,248 that
states did not have to meet the guidelines by passing new obscenity statutes. 249 Instead, an authoritative construction could be placed on existing
250
state statutes by state courts thereby incorporating the Miller standards.
251
A number of state courts accepted this suggestion.
The Colorado Supreme Court, however, did not. In People v. Tabron, the
court stated: "What the prosecution urges, under the guise of 'authoritative
construction,' is a 'wholesale rewriting' of the Colorado Obscenity Statutes." 252 The court indicated that such wholesale rewriting would amount
to a judicial usurpation of legislative power and thus, a violation of the doc53
trine of separation of powers.2
But in People v. New Horzons, Inc. ,254 the case involving the 1979 statute
and its exemption for the printed word, the court did not have the excuse
that authoritative construction of the statute would involve wholesale rewriting. The court could have easily construed the offending provision in accordance with the legislative intent that publications could not be declared
obscene on the basis of the printed word alone. The court, however, avoided
the issue of construction by declaring "we are bound by the clear language
of the statute and must declare it unconstitutional. ' 25 5 The stance of the
Colorado court seems inconsistent with the United States Supreme Court's
245. COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
246. See In Re Interrogatories Propounded By the Senate, 131 Colo. 389, 291 P.2d 1013

(1955).
247. The source asked that neither he nor the senior senator be identified. See Note, Constitutiona/i
h of Obscenity Statutes: People v. New Horizons, 52 CoLO. U.L. REV. 575, 580 (1981).

248. 413 U.S. at 24 n.6.
249. Id
250. Id.
251. Note, Constitutionah"o ofObscenio Statutes: People v. New Horizons, 52 CoLO. U.L. REV.
575, 582 n.44 (1981).
252. 190 Colo. 149, 160, 544 P.2d 372, 379 (1976).
253. Id (quoting Art Theater Guilde, Inc. v. State ex. rel. Rhodes, 510 S.W. 2d 258 (Tenn.
1974)).
254. 616 P.2d 106 (Colo. 1980).
255. 616 P.2d at 110.
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view as expressed in Broadrick v. Oklahoma .256 According to Broadrick, the
striking down of an entire statute under the overbreadth doctrine is a remedy that should be used "sparingly and only as a last resort," and instead a
25 7
"limiting construction" should be employed whenever possible.
3.

Severability

Having abandoned any hope of getting the supreme court to authoritatively construe its enactments, legislators have sought salvation in the concept of severability. Senator Strickland expressed his disappointment that
the supreme court had failed to sever the offending language in the 1979
statute that exempted the printed word.2 58 Strickland emphasized that in
the 1981 statute the draftsmen had included two severability clauses, one at
the end of the definitional section 259 and one at the end of the entire
260
statute.
Senator Strickland's remarks expose a basic misunderstanding of the
canons of statutory interpretation. It is a well-established principle that penal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of those whose interests they
adversely affect, 26 ' and that courts cannot construe a statute in a manner
that will criminalize conduct that was previously not criminal. 262 It would
have been inconsistent with these principles for the supreme court in New
Horizons to strike from the 1979 statute the offending language exempting
the printed word and thereby create a new class which would be subject to
penal sanctions-the purveyors of exclusively narrative pornography.
Senator Strickland is not the only person who failed to recognize these
principles. In Tattered Cover, Inc. v. Tooley, 2 6 3 the district court judge solved
the vagueness problem involving the language "accredited theater" in the
"display" statute 264 by striking the entire exemption for accredited institutions. 265 Thus, the court extended the reach of the statute. Theoretically,
the revised statute would be violated when a college bookstore manager sells
a book that depicts sexual matters unsuitable for children to a seventeenyear-old freshman.
The district court judge examining the 1981 obscenity statute has apparently arrived at a more reasonable construction by striking only the word
"accredited" 266 from the exemption provision. If this construction is upheld
on appeal, the severability clause will not have solved the legislature's prob256. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
257. Id at 613.
258. House Hearng, supra note 82.
259. Coto. REV. STAT. § 18-7-101(9) (Supp. 1981).
260. Id. at § 18-7-105.
261. Van Gerpen v. Peterson, 620 P.2d 714 (1980).
262. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 115-16 (1974).
263. No. 81CV09693 (Denver Dist. Ct. Jan. 26, 1982), appeal docketed, No. 82SA85 (Colo.
Sup. Ct. Mar. 23, 1982).
264. Id. at 6.
265. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 18-7-503 (Supp. 1981).
266. People v. Seven Thirty-five East Colfax, Inc., No. 81CV5779, slip. op. at 5-6 (Denver
Dist. Ct. Mar. 15, 1982), appeal docketed, No. 82SA212 (Colo. Sup. Ct. May 4, 1982).
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lem. The statute will still have to be amended to account for the new possibility that pornographic theaters may qualify under the exemption clause.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The story of obscenity law in Colorado has been one of a legislature that
is ill-prepared for the task of drafting constitutional statutes, and a court that
is unwilling to do the job for the legislature. As a result, Colorado has not
had an enforceable obscenity statute for ten years. In the future, the legislature must avoid the seductive shortcut of selecting another state's law as a
model on which to base a new Colorado obscenity statute. Instead, legislators must be sensitive to both Colorado and federal case law in this area and
carefully scrutinize any amendments to the original bill.

THE FCC's MULTIPLE OWNERSHIP RULES AND
NATIONAL CONCENTRATION IN THE
COMMERCIAL RADIO INDUSTRY *
MICHAEL 0.

WIRTH, PH.D.**

INTRODUCTION

The [Federal Communication] Commission has traditionally
accorded this rule the highest station among its several multiple
ownership regulations. The "seven station" rule is the ultimate
multiple ownership regulation, with all other proscriptions and exemptions occurring within the constraints it imposes. Since the
adoption of the "seven station" rule in 1953, the Commission has
never seen fit to waive this regulation, demonstrating the regard
held for the rule's integrity.'
From the moment the FCC first imposed an arbitrary upper limit on
the number of broadcasting stations that one business entity could own, 2 the
Commission's multiple ownership regulation has been a source of controversy. 3 Some authorities argue that the rule is too lenient and a more stringent national concentration standard ought to be imposed. 4 Others contend
the Rule is, at best, concerned with the wrong kind of ownership concentration, 5 and at worst, arbitrary and capricious. 6 Regardless of the point of
* The author gratefully acknowledges the funding support provided by the National
Association of Broadcasters toward the completion of this article.
**
Assistant Professor of Mass Communications and Adjunct Professor of Law, University
of Denver.
1. Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making in Docket No. 20548, 63 F.C.C. 2d 832, 834
(1977).
2. An upper limit of six FM stations to a customer was imposed in 1940. See 5 Fed. Reg.
2384 (1940). This was followed by imposing an upper limit of three on prospective television
owners. See 6 Fed. Reg. 2284 (1941). The television limit was increased to five in 1944. See 9
Fed. Reg. 5442 (1944). No formal rules existed for AM stations until the Commission promulgated the 7-7-7 Rule (7-7-5 at the time). See Report and Order in Docket No. 8967, 18 F.C.C.
288 (1953). Prior to this an informal upper limit of seven AM stations existed as a result of the
FCC's refusal to allow CBS to purchase full interest in an eighth standard broadcast station,
KQW, in San Jose. See Sherwood B. Brunton, II F.C.C. 407 (1946).
3. See Howard, Muliple Broadcast Ownership: Regulatory History, 27 FED. CoM. B.J. 1, 8
(1974) for a brief discussion of NBC's initial problems with the FCC's numeric limits on television. See also Editorial, BROADCASTING Aug. 10, 1981 at 98. The most extensive and expensive
objection to the Seven Station Rule was lodged by Storer Broadcasting Co. (originally called
the Fort Industry Co.). Storer's challenge was turned back, however, by a nearly unanimous
Supreme Court decision favoring the FCC. United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S.
192 (1956).
4. See FCC Network Study Memorandum, Multiple Ownership and Television, 1 J. OF
BROADCASTING 250, 261 (1957); HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE,
NETWORK BROADCASTING, H.R. REPORT No. 1297, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 659-60 (1958). These
provide the FCC Network Study Staff's call for a long run FCC goal of one station per licensee.
See also H.R. REP. No. 607, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 141 (1957).
5. See Trask, The Palace of Hunbug--A Study of FCC Policies Relating to Group Ownership of
Television Stattons, 22 FED. COM. B.J. 185, 210 (1968). See Rosse, Dertouzous, Robinson and
Wildman, Economic Issues in Mass Communicalton Industrtis, I FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRO-
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view, however, one thing is clear, the FCC has broad and substantial discre7
tion in fashioning ownership regulations.
The result of this extensive discretionary power is that the Commission's
ownership decisions are, in most instances, upheld by the courts.8 Consequently, interested parties must influence Commission ownership policy at
its inception if they feel strongly about an issue. 9 Failure to persuade the
FCC that a particular view ought to be the "reasonable" view adopted by
the Commission, leaves two options: 1) pressure Congress to amend the
Communications Act, 10 or 2) wait until the political climate at the Commission becomes more favorable to the interest asserted.
As to the second strategy, the FCC's original Multiple Ownership Proceeding l ' provides a classic example. Ten parties (all broadcasters) filed
comments on September 27, 1948.12 The comments almost uniformly opposed the imposition of arbitrary numeric limits on station ownership by the
Commission. 13 The Commission ignored the arguments and instituted the
Seven Station Rule.' 4 Today, after nearly three decades of waiting, a deregulatory climate exists at the FCC.15 Commission Chairman, Mark Fowler, recently suggested that it might be a good idea for the FCC to consider
the possibility of permitting groups to own more than seven AM radio sta16
tions, seven FM radio stations, and seven television stations [TV].
This article will focus on the radio portion of the policy question raised
CEEDINGS OF THE SYMPOSIUM ON MEDIA CONCENTRATION 40, 188 (1978) [hereinafter cited as

Rosse].
6. See Brief for Respondent at 25-26, United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S.
192 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Respondent]; Comments of National Broadcasting Co.
Pursuant to the Federal Communications Commission Multiple Ownership Proceedings in
Docket No. 8967 at 18, 20 (Sept. 27, 1948); Comments of the Trans-American Television Corporation On Proposal to Amend the Multiple Ownership Rules in Docket No. 8967 at 27, 43-44
(Sept. 27, 1948).
7. See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 192 (1943); United States v. Storer Broadcasting
Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956); FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775
(1978).
8. According to Powe, FCC Determinations of Networking Issues in Multiple Ownership
Proceedings, 3 Federal Commumiations Commision Network Inquiy pecta/ Staf 1, 19 (1980),
"[wjhatever may be the outer limit of the Commission's authority, there is no indication in the
three cases that the Commission has approached it." Cf. United States v. Midwest Video Corp.,
406 U.S. 649 (1972).
9. Subsequent court review will be totally unsuccessful unless the Commission has utilized an "unreasonable" means of promoting diversity of mass communications sources. FCC v.
National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 795 (1978); Powe, supra note 8 at 19.
10. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-744 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
11. The reference here is to the FCC's initiation of formal rulemaking, Notice of Proposed
Rule Making, 13 Fed. Reg. 5060 (1948).
12. Review of Original FCC Docket No. 8967 (Aug. 6, 1981) (available in National
Archives, Suitland, Md.).
13. Id.
14. Report and Order in Docket No. 8967, 18 F.C.C. 288 (1953). The industry's arguments although largely ineffective did cause the Commission to increase the number of FM
stations that one party could own (from six to seven) and ultimately got the television station
limit raised to seven (only five of which could be VHF) in a subsequent proceeding; see Report
and Order in Docket No. 10822, 43 F.C.C. 2797 (1954).
15. The FCC has moved recently to deregulate cable television, some aspects of radio, and
license renewal procedures for radio and TV.
16. FCC OK's Westinghouse-Teleprompter, BROADCASTING Aug. 3, 1981 at 29-30.
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by Mr. Fowler's suggestion. 1 7 The issue of whether the FCC's Seven Station
Rule should be retained to control national concentration in radio will be
addressed. First, a brief history of the Seven Station Rule will be provided.
Next, the FCC's rationale for promulgating the Rule will be discussed, and
the status of radio group ownership with respect to national concentration
issues will be described. The next section will contain a list of policy alternatives which FCC policymakers can consider. The alternatives will be critically evaluated, including the author's policy recommendations and
conclusions.
I.

HISTORY OF THE SEVEN STATION RULE

The first formal rule promulgated by the FCC limiting the number of
commercial stations that could be owned by one entity restricted FM station-ownership to six stations.' 8 This 1940 rule was instituted at a time
when there were fewer than fifty FM stations on the air.19 Shortly thereafter
(April 30, 1941), the FCC issued a rule which limited national television
ownership to three stations. 20 This TV limit was later increased to five in
May 1944 as a partial response to an NBC petition requesting that the upper
21
limit be set at seven television stations.
No formal maximum limit on AM station ownership was imposed by
the Commission prior to its decision in Docket 8967.22 However, the FCC's
decision in Sherwood B. Brunton23 made clear the Commission's opinion that
full ownership of more than seven AM stations nationally is not in the public
interest, at least with respect to a powerful national radio network.
On August 19, 1948, the FCC issued a Notice of Proposed Rule Making
which recommended that a financial entity be limited to ownership of seven
AM stations, six FM stations, and five television stations. 2 4 The rule making
was completed on November 27, 1953, when the Commission issued a Report
and Order limiting ownership to seven AM stations, seven FM stations, and
five TVs. 25 The final modification to the FCC-established arbitrary upper
17.

Much of the discussion is applicable to a discussion of national concentration in the

television industry. However, the obvious differences between these two industries (7,937 licensed commercial radio stations on the air versus 763 TV stations) suggests that they ought to
be separated analytically.
18. 5 Fed. Reg. 2384 (1940). According to Howard, supra note 3, at 8, the FM standard
was contained in Rule 3.228 (now codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.240 (1981)).
19. Comments of Trans-American Television, supra note 6, at 3.
20. 6 Fed. Reg. 2284 (1941). According to Howard, supra note 3, at 8, the TV standard
was originally issued as Rule 4.77 in 1940 and was applicable to experimental television stations. Rule 4.77 was replaced by Rule 4.226 (now codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.636 (1981)) when
the FCC allowed experimental stations to switch to commercial operation in 1941.
21. 9 Fed. Reg. 5442 (1942). According to Powe, supra note 8, at 28, there were only five

commercial television stations in operation when NBC made its request.
22. Report and Order in Docket No. 8967, 18 F.C.C. 288 (1953).
23. 11 F.C.C. 407, 412-13 (1946). At the time, CBS already had controlling interest in
seven AM stations, six of which were 50,000 watt clear channel stations. Since KQW in San
Jose was also a 50,000 watt clear channel station, the FCC's decision in this case would not
necessarily have prevented a less powerful entity with a less powerful station lineup from obtaining an eighth station.
24. See supra note 11.
25. Seesupra note 22. The Report and Order in Docket No. 8967, 18 F.C.C. 288 (1953) also
dealt with the extent of ownership interest which would activate imposition of the promulgated
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limits on national station ownership took place in September 1954, when the
Commission increased the television limit to seven (provided that only five
26

were VHFs).
II.

THE FCC's RATIONALE FOR THE SEVEN STATION RULE

The Seven Station Rule was established at a time when the communications industry was experiencing rapid change. The television industry was
just becoming a meaningful nationwide force. 27 Conversely, the radio industry was on the verge of losing most of its national influence. 28 Larger
broadcast interests were uniformly opposed to the rule's limitations. 29 Very
little was heard or written concerning the position taken by smaller broad3
casters, 30 and Congressional sentiment was mixed.
In light of the countervailing forces present in the regulatory environment, the FCC attempted to effect a "reasonable" compromise with respect
to the Seven Station proceeding. 32 The policy objective underlying the
Commission's decision was to maximize nationwide broadcast competition
33
(the number of different owners) while minimizing industry disruption.
limits. Although these limits were set at a low level (one percent), they are outside the concern
of this article. The rules as promulgated and as subsequently modified can be found in 47
C.F.R. §§ 73.35 (AM), 73.240 (FM), and 73.636 (TV) (1981).
26. Report and Order in Docket No. 10822, 43 F.C.C. 2797 (1954). This does not suggest
that the FCC has been inactive with respect to its concern over concentration of broadcast
media. Numerous proceedings have dealt with issues concerning regional and local media concentration. However, with the exception of the FCC's attempt to institute a Top 50 Ownership
Rule, 45 F.C.C.2d 1851 (1964) and in Notice of Proposed Rule Making in Docket No. 16068
(June 21, 1965), no formal action has been taken with respect to the Seven Station Rule.
27. The FCC's issuance of its Sixth Report and Order in Docket No. 8736, 41 F.C.C. 148
(1952), ended the freeze on new TV station construction effective July 1, 1952. Howard, supra
note 3, at 9, indicates that the Seven Station Rule was promulgated at a time of great activity in
the expansion of broadcasting. According to Sterling, Television and Radz Broadcastiig, WHO
OWNS THE MEDIA? 80 (1979), 108 television stations were on the air when the freeze was lifted.
By 1956 there were 441 television stations in operation.
28. See E. BARNOUW, THE GOLDEN WEB 288-90 (1968) for a discussion of television's impact on radio ratings. As of December 1953 there were 2,495 licensed AM stations on the air
and 537 licensed FM stations. These totals represent growth rates of 35% and 171% respectively
from 1948 when the FCC first proposed the Seven Station Rule.
29. See supra note 6.
30. The only evidence in Docket No. 8967 suggesting that small broadcasters might have
favored the Rule was a letter from E. B. Craney of Pacific Northwest Broadcasters. Docket No.
8967, 5 (Aug. 31, 1948). In Craney's view two Class IA's in the hands of one individual tends
toward monopoly; one Class IA in the hands of a national network tends toward monopoly; and
that if the FCC planned a limitation with respect to the number of stations the best way is to
license one station to each applicant.
31. See SenatorJohnson Blasts FCC Seven- TV-Limit Proposal, BROADCASTING Jan. 18, 1954 at
31. See also 93 CONG. REC. 5586, in which Senator White suggests that concentration of control
limitations should be decided by Congress rather than the FCC. Section 19 of S. 1333 (1948)
provided that no persons under common control shall own or control stations in the same
broadcast band which serves more than 25% of the population. This wording was dropped by
the time the bill was reported out of committee on June 9, 1948.
32. This author's operational definition of a "reasonable" compromise is that all of the
parties interested in the outcome get something, but none get everything they wanted. This
approach normally results in a decision which will be upheld on appeal.
33. This objective is not explicitly stated in the Commission's decision in Report and Order in Docket No. 8967, 18 F.C.C. 288 (1953). The clearest support for this view is contained in
Brief for Petitioners at 41-42, United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956)
[hereinafter cited as Brief for Petitioners]. The policy objective which the FCC followed in this
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The FCC's reasons for promulgating arbitrary numeric limitations fall into
two categories: 1) fulfillment of agency responsibilities as outlined by statute
reasons for choosing the numeric
and interpreted by case law, and 2) specific
34
limitations contained in the Order.
A.

Fulfillment of Agency Responsibilties

The Seven Station Rule was "designed to implement the Congressional
35
policy against monopoly."
One of the basic underlying considerations in the enactment
of the Communications Act was the desire to effectuate the policy
against the monopolization of broadcast facilities and the preservation of our broadcast system on a free competitive basis. See Federal
Communications Commission v. Sanders Brothers, 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
This Commission has consistently adhered to the principle of "diversification" in order to implement the Congressional policy
against monopoly and in order to preserve competition. That principle requires a limitation on the number of broadcast stations
which may be licensed to any one person or persons under common
control. It is our view that the operation of broadcast stations by a
large group of diversified licensees will better serve the public interest than the operation of broadcast stations by a small and limited
36
group of licensees.
The FCC was careful to explain that it was not attempting to enforce the
antitrust laws through the Seven Station Rule. 3 7 Rather, it stressed that
"the fundamental purpose [of the rules] is to promote diversification of ownership in order to maximize diversification of program and service viewpoints as well as to prevent any undue concentration of economic power
' 38
contrary to the public interest."
decision is consistent with the theory of FCC behavior forwarded by R. NOLL, M. PECK & J.
McGoWAN, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF TELEVISION REGULATION 120-21 (1973). They contend
that "[g]iven the information available to them, the commissioners attempt through their decisions to maximize some objective function, including the welfare of the commissioners as individuals and of groups affected by their decisions, and the survival and growth of the regulatory
agency." Id.
34. See Report and Order in Docket No. 8967, 18 F.C.C. 288 (1953).
35. Id. at 291. The Commission pointed to sections 311 and 313 of the Communications
Act for specific authorization. Id. at 290.
36. Id. at 291. Further support for the FCC's position is provided in FCC v. Pottsville
Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137 (1940). Congress was gravely concerned that, absent an
assertion of governmental control, "the public interest might be subordinated to monopolistic
domination in the broadcasting field." See also Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20
(1945). Competition in the presentation of viewpoints, no less than competition in the economic
sense, is vital, for "the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public ...
." d.
37. See Report and Order in Docket No. 8967, 18 F.C.C. 288, 290 (1953). The Communications Act of 1934 does not empower the Commission to enforce the antitrust laws. Every time
the Commission has dealt with communication ownership issues, the affected industry bases
part of its case on this fact. However, from Mansfield Journal Co. v. FCC, 180 F.2d 28 (D.C.
Cir. 1950) to the present (see supra cases cited in note 7), the courts have made it abundantly
clear that the FCC's powers in this area go far beyond those contained in the antitrust laws.
38. See Report and Order in Docket No. 8967, 18 F.C.C. 288, 290, 291 (1953).
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United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co.

The Report and Order in Docket 8967 provided the general philosophy
underlying the FCC's Seven Station Rule. However, additional insight into
the FCC's rationale for promulgating the Rule was provided when Storer
Broadcasting challenged the Seven Station Rule in court. 39 The brief filed
4
on behalf of the Commission in the United States Supreme Court 0
presented a number of additional arguments in support of the contention
that the Seven Station Rule was "reasonable." The Commission advanced
the traditional rationale for regulation of broadcasting--scarcity of available
channels 4 t-to support the need for an upper limit on the number of stations that any one entity could own. 42 Another familiar theme-the media
power rationale for regulation-was also used to justify the rules.
Moreover, since the formation of public opinion is important
on the national, as well as on the local level, effective diversification
cannot be achieved merely by assuring that there will be some
competition in each region. To permit the growth of large chains,
however, the component stations might happen to be distributed,
43
would be to invite a creeping trend to uniformity.
The Commission further argued that the Rule would protect small, independent broadcasters from the bargaining advantages possessed by chain
broadcasters, 44 and that the Commission's primary statutory rationale for
promulgating the Rule was to assure "the larger and more effective use of
'
radio." 45
Additional reasons cited by the FCC for upholding the Seven Station Rule were that the rules rests on the informed judgment of years of
agency experience 46 and is eminently reasonable, 4 7 that a trend toward
heavy concentration is antithetical to the maximum utilization of radio facilities and contrary to the public interest, 48 and that promulgation of a multiple ownership rule is a fairer, more efficient procedure than an ad hoc
49
approach to the issue.

C.

Why the Commission Chose A Limit of Seven

The vagueness of the record presenting the FCC's rationale for selecting
specific numeric limitations on ownership is in sharp contrast to the specific39. See United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 220 F.2d 204 (D.C. Cir. 1955), aJ'd, 351
U.S. 192 (1956).
40. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 33 at 12.
41. See B. OWEN, EcONOMICS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 103 (1975).

42. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 33, at 12.
43. d. at 13.
44. d. This view provides a fuller understanding of what the FCC meant by preventing
"any undue concentration of economic power contrary to the public interest." See Report and
Order in Docket No. 8967, 18 F.C.C. 288 (1953).
45. 47 U.S.C. § 30 3 (g). This section also was used to support the FCC's Chain Broadcasting Regulations in NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943).
46. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 33, at 14.
47. Id. The FCC made it clear in this portion of its brief that Storer had the burden of
demonstrating that the Seven Station Rule was unreasonable, and that Storer had failed to do
SO.
48. Id. at 35.
49. Id. at 36-37.
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ity of the regulatory philosophy portions just discussed. The FCC selected
the number seven in the case of AM stations "in order that present holdings
of such stations be not unduly disrupted." 50 In addition, the seven station
limit "is consistent with the historical development of AM broadcasting and
the tremendous expansion that has been achieved" within that framework. 5 1
In the case of FM stations, the number seven was selected because "[i]t
is
considered desirable to have the same limitation applicable to both aural
services because of their inter-relationship and the present status of FM's
growth."' 52 Finally, the number five was continued in effect for television
because the Commission indicated that "based on extensive experience with
the problems of multiple ownership, [the limitations] have proven practica'53
ble and desirable.
III.

THE STATUS OF GROUP OWNERSHIP IN RADIO

Past studies of broadcast group ownership have primarily focused on
television, with little research of radio. Because radio group ownership has
received so little attention, this section will briefly review past empirical attempts to identify the impact that group ownership has had on various
measures of television performance, and the economic reasons for being engaged in radio group ownership. Summary data regarding the extent of radio group ownership over time will be presented.
A.

Review of TV Studies

A number of studies have been conducted that partially assess the impact of television group ownership on station performance. The results of
the studies are not conclusive when applied to group ownership in radio.
However, because they provide the only empirical evidence available with
respect to group-owned broadcast station behavior, a review is in order.
The evidence regarding group ownership in television suggests that it
has had minimal impact on station profitability5 4 or station rates. 55 Such
50. See Report and Order in Docket No. 8967, 18 F.C.C. 288, 295 (1953).
51. Id. at 295. Cohn, Proceedings of theSymposium on Media Concentration, I FTC 203 (1978),
indicates that the number seven was selected while he was at the Commission in the early 1940's
on the theory that anyone who controlled more than one percent of the AM stations on the air
would be a monopolist. See also Magic Number, BROADCASTING Aug. 31, 1981 at 16. The FCC's
chief staff architect of the Seven Station Rule, Arthur Scheiner, disagrees with Cohn. He states
that the Seven Station Rule limits "were not intended to represent any given percentage of
existing stations." See Ownership Background, BROADCASTING Sept. 14, 1981 at 23.
52. Report and Order in Docket No. 8967, 18 F.C.C. 288, 295 (1953).
53. Id. at 294.
54. P. CHERINGTON, L. HIRSCH, & R. BRANDWEIN, TELEVISION STATION OWNERSHIP: A
CASE STUDY OF FEDERAL AGENCY REGULATION (1970); Boyer & Wirth, The Economics of Regula-

tion by Poliy Directive: FCC Public Interest Requirements, 21 Q. REV. OF ECON. AND Bus. 77, 90
(198 1); Levin, Compeion, Dwersity, and the Television Group Ownership Rule, 70 COLUM. L. REV.
791, 799, 810 (1970). The Boyer and Wirth study suggests that group owners, as compared with
nongroup owners, behave in a way which indicates they believe FCC license renewal criteria are
relatively insensitive to the quantities of public interest programming. Since this should lead
group-owned stations to offer slightly less public interest programming than stations without
such ownership ties, it should also lead to somewhat larger profits for group-owned TV stations,
other things being equal. See also Bortz, Wirth, & Pottle, The Economics of Televistin Saion Operation in l00-Plus Markets 94 (Feb. 1981) (for National Association of Broadcasters).
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ownership had a mixed impact on the quantity of public interest programming that was broadcast, 56 and a positive impact on market level income
and revenue. 5 7 The empirical case against group ownership in the more
58
In radio,
highly concentrated television industry is not a persuasive one.
anticompetitive behavior resulting from group ownership is even less likely
59
In concluto occur due to the much larger number of operating stations.
sion, the empirical evidence suggests that at current levels group ownership
in television (and by analogy, radio) has not resulted in anticompetitive sta6°
tion behavior.
B.

The Economics of Radio Group Ownership

Entrepreneurs who purchase and operate multiple radio stations would
have an economic incentive to do so if group ownership resulted in economies of scale from reduced costs of purchasing, selling, investing, production,
62
6
and/or management; ' if radio station ownership were highly profitable;
significantly greater market power
or if group ownership in radio provided
63
relative to nongroup-owned stations.
Based on the present levels of radio group ownership, an entrepreneur
64
This is partially due
could expect the economies of scale to be quite small.
to the fact that radio program costs are considerably lower than are televi55. Both P. CHERINGTON, L. HIRSCH, & R. BRANDWEIN, supra note 54, and Wirth & Wollert, The Effects of Market Structure on Television News Pricing (Aug. 1981) (paper presented
at Annual Convention of Association for Educators in Journalism) support this notion.
56. See Boyer & Wirth, supra note 54, at 90; Litman, Public Interest Programmingand the Carroll
Doctrite: A Re-Examination, 23 J. OF BROADCASTING 51, 58 (1979), for evidence suggesting that
group-owned TV stations offer somewhat less public interest programming than do non-group
owned TV stations. Evidence supporting the opposite view can be found in Wirth & Wollert,
Public Interest Programming: Taxation by Regulation, 23 J. OF BROADCASTING 319, 324 (1979);
Wirth & Wollert, Public Interest Programming: FCC Standards and Station Performance, 55 JOURNALISM Q. 554, 560 (1978).
57. Levin, Research Memorandum on the Economic and Programming Efects ofNewspaper Ownership
of Televirion Stations, Supplementary Comments in Docket No. 18110 (May 1974).
58. See Media Concentration. Hearingbefore the Subcomm. on General Oversight and Minority Enterprise of the House Comm. on Small Business, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 426 (1980) (Part 1) (statement of
John F. Lyons) [hereinafter cited as Meda Concentration].
59. Id. at 417.
60. Id. On the other hand, depending on one's political perspective, the evidence that
group ownership has very little effect on station performance could be used to demonstrate that
allowing group ownership does not result in positive social benefits. This could then be used to
argue that because there are no public interest advantages to be derived from group ownership,
there is no reason to allow it. Clearly, the party who has the burden of proof in the above
situation will lose.
61. Id. at 425-26. See also C. FERGUSON & J. GOULD, MICROECONOMIc THEORY 208-09
(1975).
62. See Media Concentration, supra note 58, at 425.
63. Id. at 424. Possession of such market power would allow a group owner to behave
anticompetitively by engaging in a scheme of predatory pricing to drive competitors out of
individual markets. Group ownership would have to result in excess profits, for the group as a
whole, for this to occur. This would allow a group owner to subsidize predatory (intentionally
lower) prices in one market with excess profits from another. Id.
64. It is possible that significant economies could be achieved by owning a larger number
of stations than is presently allowed. With all of the recent movement to expand the number of
national radio networks particularly via satellite distribution, there might be a cost-based incentive for radio networks to expand their ownership of stations if the seven station limit is lifted.
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sion program costs. 6 5 Although no evidence exists in this area, it is arguable
that some economies should occur with respect to sales and investment for
group-owned stations. However, these economies could not be expected to
66
result in much higher returns on investment.
In addition, profitability will not provide much incentive to operate
multiple radio stations since the evidence suggests that radio stations in gen67
In 1979 the average radio
eral are only earning normal economic profits.
station which reported to the FCC earned gross revenues of $424,421, which
resulted in earnings before taxes of only $30,160.68 Consequently, the average radio station had a 1979 pretax profit margin of only 7.1%.69 The FCC's
figures also indicated that approximately forty percent of the radio stations
from which the Commission received financial data were losing money in
1979.
Finally, it does not appear likely that group-owned radio stations in
general possess much market power. 70 No evidence exists which would indicate that radio station groups have ever used market power to engage in
predatory pricing. 7 1 Inasmuch as the average radio station in this country
faces tremendous competition, not only from other radio stations, but also
a market power incentive to
from television stations and daily newspapers,
72
form radio groups does not appear to exist.
C.

The Extent of Radio Group Ownership

Group ownership in radio can be analyzed as an increasing trend, or
conversely, as limited and level growth. Table 1 indicates that both the
number of group-owned radio stations and the percentage of all stations
which are group-owned have increased over time. For example, in 1953
when the Seven Station Rule was promulgated, 423 of the 3,032 licensed
commercial radio stations on the air were group-owned. In 1980, 2,124 of
the 7,839 commercial stations on the air were group-owned. During this
twenty-seven-year period, the percentage of stations that are owned in
groups of three or more rose from 14% to 27. 1%, which is an average annual
65. See Media Concentration, supra note 58, at 438.
66. Id. at 427.
67. B. OwEN, supra note 41, at 122, suggests that radio is the most competitive form of mass
media other than magazines. Radio is considered to be monopolistically competitive. Monopolistically competitive firms do not earn long run economic (excess) profits. See also Martin, Competition in the Broadcasting Indstiy." A Status Report 38-44 (June 1981) (report prepared for
National Association of Broadcasters).
68.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, 1979 Radio Revenue Data.

69. Radio stations had a much better year in 1978 when the average station earned a
pretax profit margin of 11.6%. However, investors looking for high-yield investment opportunities would not be likely to invest in the average commercial radio station. This is not to say that
there are not stations which earn much higher returns than average. It appears, however, that a
profit-based rationale for the formation of radio groups is not very strong.
70. See supra note 67.
71. See Media Concentration, supra note 58, at 424-25.
72. The economics of the radio industry are considerably different from those of the television industry. The costs of owning and operating a radio station are much lower than those of a
television station. This fact coupled with the much larger number of frequencies available in
radio has resulted in extensive competition for radio broadcasters in all but the smallest markets. Id. at 417.
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increase in group-owned radio stations of .49%.73

TABLE

174

RADIO GROUP OWNERSHIP:

Year

Total Total No. of
No. of No. of Group
FMs Owners
AMs

No. of
GroupOwned
Stations

1929-1980

Avg. No. of
Stations
Owned/Group

Percent of
Stations Under
Group
Ownership

1.7
3.3%
600
12
20
1929
14.3%
39
109
2.8
1939
764
4.0
8.9%
2,295
558
63
253
1951
14.0%
423
4.8
,
537
88
1953" 2,495
4.1
18.1%
732
185
765
1960* 3,483
5.7
22.2%
1970* 4,304
2,145
250
1,432
25.4%
3,010
324
1,906
5.9
1978* 4,498
27.1%
3,267
360
2,124
5.9
1980* 4,572
*Only groups which owned three or more radio stations are included for these years because this
is the BROADCASTING YEARBOOK definition of radio group ownership.

Another way to assess the extent of radio group ownership is to identify
the average number of stations controlled per group entity over time. The
data provided in Table 1 reveals a positive trend which has been level since
1970. Specifically, the number of radio stations controlled by the average
group owner in 1953 was 4.8. By 1980 this figure had risen to 5.9 stations. 75
Because the FCC's Seven Station Rule allows for ownership of up to fourteen radio stations, the 1980 figure indicates that the average group owner
controls only 42.1% of the legally permissible number of radio stations.
A final method by which to examine radio group ownership trends is to
identify how many entities control various combinations of AM and FM
stations. Tables 2 through 5 provide insight into the mix of AM-FM group
ownership combinations over time. Only three entities control the maximum number of radio stations allowed under the Seven Station Rule. This
has been true since at least 1970 (Table 3). Forty-six of the 360 group entities in 1980 controlled ten or more stations (Table 5). The larger groups
controlled a total of 531 radio stations or 6.8% of all the commercial radio
76
stations on the air.
73. If the number of radio stations on the air remained fixed at the 1980 level, and group
ownership continued to increase at this pace, it would take 149 years for all of the commercial
radio stations in the United States to come under some form of group control.
74. The sources for Table I are: C. STERLING & T. HAIGHT, THE MASS MEDIA Table
260c (1978); BROADCASTING (various dates); BROADCASTING YEARBOOK (various dates); Media
Concentration." Hearing before the Subcomm. on General Ooerszght and Minority Enterprtse of the House
Comm. on Small Business, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 418 (1980) (Part 1) (statement of John F. Lyons)
[hereinafter cited as Media Concentration Hearing].
75. An increase in the average number of stations controlled by each group is understandable. In 1953 there was not much interest in owning FM stations due to low profitability. Consequently, radio broadcasters interested in making a profit were able to own only seven
potentially profitable AM stations. As more people started listening to FM stations, owners
became more interested in owning FMs. A group owner could then own 14 stations potentially
capable of earning a profit. This fact alone could cause the increase evidenced in Table 1.
76. In 1978, 36 entities owned 10 or more stations. This represented 409 stations or 5.4% of
all the stations in operation. See Media Concentration supra note 58, at 419.
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The data provided relative to radio group ownership suggest that the
radio industry is essentially unconcentrated at the national level. Nearly seventy-three percent of this country's radio stations are individually owned,
thus competition at the national level would appear to be more than
77
adequate.

TABLE 278
ENTITIES WITH CONTROL OF THREE OR MORE
COMMERCIAL RADIO STATIONS IN 1953
Number of AM Stations
0
Number

1

2

3

*CBS

4

5

10
15
29
1
5
5
0
0
4
2
0
0
0
0
2
0 0 0
1
0
0
0 0 0
2
0
0
0 0 0
0
0
0
0
1 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
22
14
40
1 0 0
70
120
88
0 0 0
owned nine AMs and J. Elroy McCaw

0
1
2
of
3
4
FM
5
6
Stations
7
Total
# AM

6

7

Total

# FM

3
1
0
1
1
0
0
0
6
36

2
0
0
1
0
1
1
0
5
38*

59
12
6
4
2
3
2
0
88
352

0
12
12
12
8
15
12
0
71

controlled eight prior to the FCC's

adoption of the Seven Station Rule.
77. The extent of national radio concentration that exists has undoubtedly been influenced
by the FCC's Seven Station Rule. At present, no one entity can own more than .18% of the
operational commercial radio stations. Some upward movement in radio's concentration picture would probably take place if the Commission increased the number of stations that could
be owned by any one entity. Whether such increases in group ownership would result in anticompetitive behavior or the potential for such activity on either the information or the advertising side of the national media market is of course germane to the policy question being
explored in this article.
78. Table 2 was derived from BROADCASTING YEARBOOK (1954). Figures in the main
body of the table represent the number of entities owning that combination of AM and FM
radio stations. For instance, in 1953 there were 29 entities which owned three AMs and zero
FMs. Total rows and columns give the number of entities owning a certain number of AM or
FM stations. In 1953, there were 40 entities which owned three AMs and between zero and
seven FMs. Adding these columns or rows gives the total number of entities owning three or
more radio stations in that year. In 1953 there were 88 such entities. Rows marked AM and
columns marked FM give the number of AM or FM stations owned by those entities. The total
represents the number of multiply-owned stations.
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TABLE 379
ENTITIES WITH CONTROL OF THREE OR MORE
COMMERCIAL RADIO STATIONS IN 1970
Number of AM Stations
0
Number 0
1
2
of
3
FM
4
5
6
Stations
7
Total
# AM

1

3
29
23
18
15
1
0
0
0
86
258

2

15
5 19
1 0
0
0 0
0
0
1 0
1 0
0
0 0
0
3 5 34
0 5 68

4
14
14
10
9
4
1
2
0
54
216

5

6

7

2
4
4
5
4
6
0
0
25
125

6
5
2
6
4
2
3
0
28
168

7
1
2
4
1
2
2
3
15
105

Total
51
62
60
40
14
12
8
3
250
945

# FM
0
62
120
120
56
60
60
21
487

TABLE 480

ENTITIES WITH CONTROL OF THREE OR MORE
COMMERCIAL RADIO STATIONS IN 1978
Number of AM Stations
0
0
1
of
2
3
4
FM
5
Stations 6
7
Total
# AM

1

Number

16
1 4
0
1
2 0
3
0
0
0
6 21
0 21

2

3
4
5
10
4
2
7
2
50
17
25
13
3
28
3
7 30
19
3
15
10
0
4
1
6
0
4
1
0
0
0
1
1
2
86
90
60
32
172 270 240 160

6
1
0
2
2
4
4
6
2
21
156

7 Total
0
17
76
0
89
2
1
67
33
0
0
17
2
16
3
9
8
324
56 1075

79. The source of Table 3 was Media Concentratzon Hearings, supra note 74, at 418.

80. Table 4 was derived from Media Concentration Hearings, supra note 74, at 418.

# FM
0
76
178
201
132
85
96
63
831
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TABLE 581
ENTITIES WITH CONTROL OF THREE OR MORE
COMMERCIAL RADIO STATIONS IN 1980
Number of AM Stations
0

1

2

Number

0
1
of
2
3
FM
4
5
Stations
6
7
Total
# AM
IV.

3
0
2
0
0
5
0

18
4
0
1
1
0
24
26

47
42
14
7
1
0
0
111
222

3

4

5

6

7

Total

# FM

12
18
23
25
6
5
0
1
90
270

4
5
12
18
22
2
0
2
65
260

1
2
3
2
8
7
0
2
25
125

1
1
2
2
5
6
9
5
31
186

0
0
0
0
1
2
3
3
9
63

18
73
100
68
49
26
13
13
360
1152

0
73
200
204
196
130
78
91
972

ARGUMENTS FOR RETENTION OF THE SEVEN STATION RULE

The past position of the FCC regarding the promulgation and retention
of the Seven Station Rule has already been discussed in detail. The arguments posed by other proponents of retention or expansion of the present
rule will be summarized in the remainder of this section.
A.

Position of the United States Supreme Court

82
The Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co.
upheld the Commission's statutory authority to establish the Seven Station
Rule.

Congress sought to create regulation for public protection
with careful provision to assure fair opportunity for open competition in the use of broadcasting facilities. . . . It is but a rule that
announces the Commission's attitude on public protection against
such concentration. . . . The growing complexity of our economy
induced the Congress to place regulation of businesses-like communication in specialized agencies with broad powers. Courts are
slow to interfere with their conclusions when reconcilable with statutory directions. We think the Multiple Ownership Rules, as
adopted, are reconcilable with the Communications Act as a
83
whole.
However, the Court did not attempt to evaluate the merits of the specific
84
station limitations selected by the Commission.
81. The source for Table 5 was BROADCASTING/CABLE YEARBOOK (1981).
82. 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
83. Id. at 203.
84. Typically, the courts do not engage in such evaluation. Instead, the courts review
Commission decisions to determine if they are "reasonable." If such decisions are deemed to be
reasonable, they will be upheld. The party appealing a Commission decision has the burden of
demonstrating the unreasonableness of the decision. In this situation, the courts (particularly
the Supreme Court) normally defer to the expertise of the Commission in deciding what is
reasonable. Se general#5, Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941).
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Positron of Congress

Congress has been fearful of "monopoly" in the communications industry from the industry's inception. 85 Past sentiment appears to have fallen on
the side of tightening the multiple ownership rules rather than liberalizing
8 6

them.

Senator Magnuson, for example, stated he was afraid that if Congress
failed to act or if the FCC did not institute anti-monopoly ownership rules,
the radio industry would become concentrated in a manner similar to the
newspaper industry.
I think it is wise that this Congress do what it can to prevent in the
future any such thing . . . [a]lthough now in most communities

where there are six stations there are probably six owners, as competition continues and some stations get bad, one man will start to
buy them up. There are two or three people in the country starting
to buy up radio stations, and then pretty soon we will get into the
in a geographical area that now exists
same monopolistic situation
87
in the newspaper field.
Nine years later Senator Bricker proposed to abolish the FCC's Seven
Station Rule, not because he was opposed to the principles underlying the
FCC's regulation but because he argued it was desirable to substitute "for
such sterile abstraction, a realistic and workable public interest criterion of
maximum coverage or service to 25% of the country's population."8 8
The argument that the rule should be made more stringent was expressed by Emanuel Celler, Chairman of the Antitrust Subcommittee of the
House Judiciary Committee, who said that the FCC may have sanctioned
excessive concentration in the broadcasting industry.8 9
Multiple ownership of broadcasting stations by a single interest
. . .leads to concentration, militates against the national objective
of diversity of program sources, and lends itself to anticompetitive
abuses. Network affiliation agreements examined by the Antitrust
Subcommittee reveal that multiple-station owners often derive substantial advantages over sole-station owners in compensation and
owners to compete
other terms, making it difficult for sole-station
°
effectively with owners of several stations.9
Ultimately, Congressman Celler's Committee failed to recommend any
85. See supra note 36. See also Warner, Monopoy and Monopolistc Prattcesand the Communications Act of 1934, 6 FED. COMM. B.J. 26, 26-35, 55-60 (1941).
86. The majority of Congressional sentiment that was expressed in hearings during the
1940's and 1950's suggests too much concentration existed in the communications industry
under the Seven Station Rule. The primary Congressional proposal to "make a better mousetrap" was to restrict ownership to coverage of 25% of the U.S. population. See Sen. Bricker's
proposal in S.3859, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 102 CONG. REc. 8210 (1956); Sen. White's proposal in
S. 1333, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 93 CONG. REC. 5586 (1947).
87. Hearings on S 1333 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Interstate and ForeignCommerce,
80th Cong., 1st Sess., 327 (1947) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S 1333].
88. Bricker Lowers the Boom on CBS, NBC "Domination",BROADCASTING Apr. 30,1956 at 29.
Sen. Bricker's bill, S. 3859, supra note 86, never became law.
89. See Celler, Antitrust Problems in the Television Broadcasting Industr, 22 L. & CONTEMP.
PROB. 539, 549 (1957). Celler stated that the Seven Station Rule was contrary to antitrust
principles because it sanctioned excessive concentration in the broadcast industry.
90. Id. at 561.
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changes in the FCC's Multiple Ownership Rules, but the Committee indicated that the Commission should give "antitrust.and other factors emphatic
consideration" in any multiple ownership rule changes. 91 Chairman Celler
Rule should] be rendered
concluded that "if anything, [the Seven Station
92
relaxed."
be
not
should
it
more stringent;
C.

Position of the Justice Department

The United States Department of justice has generally supported retention of the Seven Station Rule. One of its earliest pronouncements concerning the rule was made by Victor Hansen, Chief of the Antitrust Division in
1956. Hansen stated that an eradication of the numerical limitation may
increase the trend toward concentration, which he considered undesirable in
either networks or single individuals.
The Commission deplored the trend toward concentration of
ownership and control of radio stations. The same trend has been
observed with respect to television. Ownership of a large number
of [television] stations by a single interest raises real antitrust
problems. Such owners would be in a position to [capitalize] on
mass purchasing power and by combining their outlets in singlestation markets with their outlets in multiple-station markets. We
have received complaints that these tactics have already been employed by multistation owners who obtain preferences in network
affiliations over single-station owners. . . . [T]he multiple-owner93
ship rule should be, if anything, tightened, not relaxed.
The Antitrust Division's support for the Seven Station Rule is understandable because the rule establishes limits on ownership, thus alleviating
nationwide concerns about "bigness." Donald Baker, formerly with the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice, has indicated
that the antitrust laws "have to be brought to bear on actual market situations" to be effective. 94 Even though the Seven Station Rule could not be
enforced under the antitrust laws, Baker suggests that it is an appropriate
rule because "in special circumstances [it is desirable] to have some other
public policies that are concerned with bigness without regard to proof of
'
economic effect." 95
D. FCC's Network Broadcasting Stud
One of the most controversial reports to come out in the 1950's was the
FCC's study of network broadcasting, 96 which was supervised by Dean Ros91.

See REPORT ON THE TELEVISION BROADCASTING INDUSTRY, ANTITRUST SUBCOMM.

OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 141 (1957).
92. See Celler, supra note 89, at 561.
93. Hearings on Television Before the Antitrust Subcomm. of the House Comm. on theJudiciy, 84th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4122-23 (1956).
94. Baker, Uses and Abuses of Antitrust Principlesin Dealing with Media Concentration Questions,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SYMPOSIUM ON MEDIA CONCENTRATION, 2 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 649, 651 (1978).

95. Id. (emphasis in original).
96. Network Broadcasting, REPORT OF THE NETWORK STUDY STAFF OF THE NETWORK
STUDY COMMITTEE, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (1957).
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coe Barrow, director of the FCC Study Staff. The study's conclusions were
97
not favorable to multiple ownership in television.
The trend in multiple ownership indicates that in the future
there will be substantial problems of undue concentration of control, in the absence of limitations imposed by the Commission...
as multiple ownership increases, single-station ownership decreases.
The single-station owner is at a bargaining disadvantage and may
not be able to compete effectively with multiple owners. . . . It is
possible that the broadcasting industry will become a multiple-unit
industry and the character of a television station as a community
institution will be lost. .... 98
The network study staff argued that strict limits on multiple ownership substantially lessened the opportunity for a multiple-station TV licensee to impose potentially illegal tie-in arrangements. Examples of such arrangements
include a multiple-station licensee who 1) refuses to sell time on one of his
stations to a national spot advertiser unless time is sold for all of his stations;
2) refuses to clear some of his stations for a network program unless the national advertiser purchases times on all of his stations; or 3) refuses to
purchase film from a syndicator for all or several of his stations unless given a
highly favorable pricing arrangement. 99 Obviously, Dean Barrow's position
is that multiple ownership leads to anticompetitive behavior in the television
industry and that it runs counter to the FCC's notions of local station ownership and operation.100 In 1957, when the Report was released, Dean Barrow
argued that the best course for the Commission to take was further limitation, rather than relaxation, of the existing rules. 0 1
The report did not deal specifically with radio group ownership, since
the network study was directed toward television. Dean Barrow's study did
indicate, however, that "[tihe Congress and the Commission have historically placed major dependence upon competition as a regulator of radio
broadcasting, [and] the kind of competition that has developed appears to be
10 2
healthy."'
E.

Position of Small Broadcasters

The position of small radio broadcasters regarding the FCC's Seven
Station Rule is unclear due to lack of available information. The best evidence suggesting that small, independent broadcast licensees favor the Rule
is derived from a National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) inter-office
memo. 10 3 The memo indicated that NAB had not become involved in the
FCC's multiple ownership hearings in Docket 8967 "because of the obvious
conflict in interest between those who are in a position to own a number of
stations and those who are not-in other words, large interests vs. small
97. Id. at 553-99.
98. Id. at 554.

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 565-68.
Id. at 592.
Id. at 584-85.
Id. at 606.
National Association of Broadcasters Inter-Office Memo from Don Petty to Judge

Miller and A. D. Willard (Jan. 19, 1949).
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interests."

04

1

Other evidence suggesting that smaller broadcasters favor some type of
ownership limitation is shown by testimony of Edmund Craney, a small
market broadcaster with stations in Spokane, Washington, Portland, Oregon, and in Butte, Helena, and Bozeman, Montana. 10 5 Craney stated that
although he was against a simplistic numeric limitation on station ownership,10 6 he was in favor of the congressionally suggested twenty-five percent
of population limitation of ownership solution to the concentration problem. 10 7 He testified that his biggest fear was that in the absence of an upper
limit on ownership, all of the broadcasting stations in the country would
eventually come under government control. 108 "It is better to try something
than to sit still and do nothing. I do not have to tell you gentlemen that if
we in the industry remain blind, we will wake up one day facing an irresistible clamor for Government ownership or operation."' 0 9
V.

ARGUMENTS AGAINST RETENTION OF THE SEVEN STATION RULE

The most extensive arguments against retention of the Seven Station
Rule were presented by Storer Broadcasting Company in its court challenge
of the Rule."10 Other parties opposed to the FCC Rule include the national
commercial broadcasting networks, group broadcasters, and minority opinion at the FCC.
A.

Position of Storer Broadcasting

Storer's general rationale for opposing the Seven Station Rule was
based on three grounds: "[T]he Commission failed completely 1) to make
any basic or ultimate factual findings or determinations, 2) to make any
attempt at rational conclusions based upon any factual considerations or
3) to state clearly the basis or reasons for establishment of the numerical
limits." ' 11
Storer contended that because Congress has never enacted any special
antimonopoly legislation applicable to broadcasting, the Seven Station Rule
was invalid. 1 2 Storer also suggested that the Rule violated the antitrust
laws because it "prevents a merger between two entities without regard to
the facts concerning the actual or potential effect of such acquisition on competition.""' 3 Storer argued that the Rule could not be sustained because it
ignored the substantial differences between various broadcasting stations
104. Id.

105. See Hearings on S 1333, supra note 87, at 542.
106. Id.

107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
111. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 6, at 36.
112. Id. at 22-25.
113. Id. at 23-24. Storer contended that the FCC had to evaluate: 1) the purpose of an
acquisition, 2) the existence, number, activity, and strength of competitors in the market effected by the acquisition, and 3) the size and location of the interest proposed to be acquired.

See United States v. Columbia Steel Co. 334 U.S. 495, 527-28 (1948).
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with respect to geographical location, power, frequency, population served,
hours of operation, pattern of coverage, and protection from interference by
other stations. 14 Storer also attacked the Seven Station Rule as being arbitrary and capricious because it precludes consideration of whether a small
increase in nationwide station ownership by a single entity could be in the
public interest.'1 5
The Rule was challenged as bearing no relation to the Commission's
goal of diversification of program and service viewpoints because the rule
applies to stations serving wholly different areas. 1 6 Storer supported its position by pointing out that the Rule can exclude a multiple owner from operating a station in areas where there are more facilities than qualified
applicants, and where a multiple owner could bring an additional
viewpoint. 117
In summary, Storer argued that the Seven Station Rule was promulgated for administrative convenience and expedience," t8 rather than to further the Congressional policy against monopoly or to advance the
Commission's principles of diversification.i 9 The broadcast group indicated that the FCC failed to demonstrate that the numbers chosen bore "any
rational relationship to 'concentration of control' of broadcasting 'contrary
to the public interest, convenience or necessity.' ,,t20 Storer also contended
that the Commission had conducted no studies and had no experience to
support its inflexible numeric standard.' 2 ' Finally, Storer argued that the
right to obtain a hearing to waive the Seven Station Rule is "essentially
nugatory" because the applicant is faced with the nearly impossible task of
stating reasons why the arguably illogical rule does not apply to that multi122
ple owner.
B.

Position of the Networks

Only two national networks filed comments in the FCC proceedings to
establish the Rule--Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) and National
Broadcasting System (NBC). However, some insight into the position of
other national networks is available from the 1947 Hearings on S. 1333.123
It appears that the position taken by CBS during the Commission's pro114. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 6,at 24-25.
115. Id. at 25.
116. Id. at 27.
117. Id. at 28.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 33.
120. Id. Storer also contended that it ishighly doubtful that the FCC could establish rational arbitrary numeric limits on ownership since the Congress, the courts, and those agencies
charged with enforcing the antitrust laws have not found any generally applicable test of what
constitutes undue concentration in any situation. See Supplemental Brief for Respondent at 11,
United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Supplemental Brief].
121. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 6, at 33-34.
122. See Supplemental Brief, supra note 120, at 19. Storer added that to obtain a waiver of
the Seven Station Rule, an applicant would have to assert negative reasons. This would be
difficult, however, because the Commission refused to air its affirmative reasons for promulgating the Rule.
123. See Hearingson S. 1333, supra note 87.
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mulgation of the Rule was one of resignation. Such resignation is apparent
in a letter from CBS President Frank Stanton, in which he requested the
national ownership limit be set at eight AM stations, eight FM stations, and
eight TV stations. 124 Although Stanton also forwarded CBS's opposition to
the proposed rules,' 2 5 CBS must have decided that the FCC was committed
to promulgating an arbitrary numeric limit on station ownership, regardless
of the industry's opposition. Consequently, the letter was a pragmatic, conciliatory approach to attempt to obtain a higher arbitrary standard than the
2 6
one proposed by the Commission.1
NBC on the other hand, argued that no rules were needed. 12 7 NBC
stated that concentration of control questions should be decided on the facts
of each case, and that fixing a limit on ownership without regard to such
facts would be arbitrary. 28 NBC contended the FCC had no evidence that
mere accumulation of station licenses beyond a set figure resulted in a stifling of competition or even a tendency in that direction.12 9 In 1947, NBC's
position was stated succinctly by its President Niles Trammel:
I cannot see any need or justification for a limit on the ownership of broadcast stations, either by Commission action or by statute. The opportunity to serve the public should not be limited by
arbitrary restriction. The present radio law does not establish any
limitation on the ownership of stations beyond the requirements of
the antitrust laws. During all the years since the establishment of
broadcasting there has been no undue concentration of
30
ownership. 1
Two additional networks apparently opposed the Seven Station Rule
even though they failed to file comments during the Commission proceedings. Mark Woods, President of the American Broadcasting Company
(ABC), indicated his company preferred an ad hoc approach to ownership
limits.
Therefore, if it is control of thought that is feared, or control of
political opinion, it cannot be eliminated in my opinion on any
arithmetical basis. My recommendation is that no limit as to the
number of stations be specified in the act and that the Commission
124. Letter of Frank Stanton, President of CBS, in Docket No. 8967 at 6-8 (Sept. 24, 1948).
125. Id.
126. CBS's real position regarding the Seven Station Rule would appear to be very close to
the position it took with respect to S. 1333. Dr. Stanton testified that:
There is no other field . . . that I know of in which the Government has set a fixed
ceiling on the size of an enterprise. Even the Public Utility Holding Company Act,
providing specific antitrust legislation in the utility field, does not set arbitrary limits
in terms of units, size or population. In the newspaper and magazine field there has
been no attempt by Congress or any Government agency to restrict growth by an
arbitrary standard. It is difficult to understand why broadcasting should be singled
out for special legislation of this unique type . . . I think that the normal antitrust
provisions should prevail if there is monopoly.
Hearings on S. 1333, supra note 87, at 327.
127. See Comments of National Broadcasting Company in Docket No. 8967 at 18-25 (Sept.
27, 1948).
128. Id. at 20. NBC suggested there was no reasonable basis for the assertion that the control of 5, 10, or 20 stations would automatically create an undue concentration of control.
129. Id.
130. See Hearings on S. 1333, supra note 87, at 426.
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each application
fix no limit which would prevent it from1 deciding
3
on its own merits in the public interest. '
A different approach was advanced by the Mutual Broadcasting System
to legislatively limit the Commission's power to deal with concentration of
control issues in broadcasting.
Instead of the indefinite provision on multiple-ownership in the
White Bill or the arbitrary standard presently enforced by the
Commission, I should prefer to have Congress confer, in some appropriately limited fashion, the power upon the Commission to
consider the question of the tendency toward monopolization in
connection with applications by multiple-station owners for authorization to erect additional stations or to acquire existing
stations. 132

The national networks appear to have been unanimously opposed to
of the Seven Station Rule.13 3 In addition, the networks
promulgation
the
supported an ad hoc approach for dealing with concentration of ownership
issues in broadcasting, in contrast to the arbitrary Rule approach.
C. Position of Group Broadcasters
The most extensive comments available in the FCC Rule proceedings
were filed by Trans-American Television Corporation, Salt Lake City
Broadcasting Co., Universal Broadcasting Co., and KMMJ, Inc.134 These
broadcasters were opposed to the Seven Station Rule because they argued
that it would cause denial of applications in situations where the evil with
which the Commission was concerned, concentration of control, did not in
fact exist. 135 Consequently, they also favored a case-by-case approach in
dealing with concentration of control issues.1 36 The Rule was challenged as
unnecessary because "the day may not be far removed when there is no
longer a real scarcity of broadcasting facilities."' 1 37 Finally, the four broadcast groups argued that the proposed Rule was arbitrary and capricious beof control factors,
cause it failed to consider many relevant concentration
38
such as geographical location and population served. '
Another broadcaster position was expressed by J.N. Bailey, Executive
39
Director of FM Association:1
[W]e feel that the Commission should promulgate no ironclad rule,
but rather should handle FM station distribution in the manner in
which AM stations are licensed. An occasion might arise whereby
one large corporation operating stations profitably in six metropoli131. Id. at 281.
132. Id. at 358.
133. This position isbased on the contention that CBS's true position was revealed in its
testimony regarding S. 1333 in 1947.
134. See Statement on Proposal to Amend the Multiple Ownership Rules in Docket No.
8967 at 27-45 (Sept. 27, 1948).
135. Id. at 31. It was suggested that such uncalled for denials rendered the Rule unreasonable and an improper exercise of Commission discretion and power.
136. Id. at 34.
137. Id. at 29.
138. Id. at 44.
139. See Hearings on S 1333, supra note 87, at 202-10.
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tan markets, could give service to some smaller unprofitable market
or two, whereas such small markets could not support an independent station. 140
Mr. Bailey's association obviously favored utilization of a case-by-case approach in dealing with multiple ownership in specific market areas.
Finally, growth-oriented group broadcasters opposed the Seven Station
Rule as a limitation of their long-term investment opportunities in the
broadcasting industry.

D.

Minorzt FCCPosztons

Although the majority FCC sentiment at the time the Seven Station
Rule was established favored the Rule, various Commissioners expressed reservations concerning the adoption of arbitrary numeric limits. Commissioner Doerfer indicated that:
I am constrained to record my misgivings about linking a numerical evaluation of stations with "undue concentration of ownership" as an unfailing guide as to what is in the public interest ...
I have grave doubts as to the wisdom of picking a "number"
without more reliable and persuasive evidence that the number
chosen will in all cases mark the upper limits of what will safeguard
the public interest .... 141
Doerfer concluded that there was not much more than "intuition" as the
42
Commission's basis for the present rule.1
Commissioner Jett explained he was philosophically opposed to imposition of arbitrary national ownership limits because no concentration existed,
and regional concentration potentially presented a much worse problem
than did national concentration. In addition, he argued that station power,
dial position, and geography created large audience coverage discrepancies
143
among radio stations.
I am opposed to any restriction which specifies a particular ceiling
for the reasons given above, and in particular, the fact that engineering considerations may make it desirable to permit more staand frequency categories than
tions to be owned in certain power
144
in the lower portion of the band.
Another Commissioner who expressed doubts regarding the Commission's ability to establish a workable "rule of thumb" was Chairman Charles
Denny. He indicated he did not have any form~ula, but did not agree that
the present draft of S. 1333 contained the correct formula. Denny concluded
he did not know whether such a formula could be devised.' 45 As early as
140. Id. at 208.
141. See Report and Order in Docket No. 10822, 43 F.C.C. 2797, 2804 (1954). Commissioner Doerfer actually concurred with the FCC's decision to allow entrepreneurs to own two
additional TV stations (more than the five station limit) as long as both were UHFs. However,
he obviously was less than enthusiastic in that support.
142. Id.
143. &e Harzngs on S1333, supra note 87, at 65.
144. Id. at 66.
145. Id. at 45.
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June 1947, Chairman Denny indicated that the Commission's national ownership rules were open to question.
I do not think we have by any means devised a perfect rule when
we say that one person shall not own more than six FM stations
and shall not own more than five television stations. It is a tentative rule at the moment. Anyone who comes in 'and shows good
46
reasons for changing it, up or down, will be given consideration. 1
Finally, although Commissioner Hennock favored the Seven Station
Rule, she expressed the opinion that regional concentration of ownership
"may often have a more deleterious effect on competition. . . than the ownership in excess of the permitted maximum scattered throughout the United
47
States."1
E.

Recent Conszderatzons

As technology has allowed for an ever increasing number of radio channels, the scarcity premise, on which traditional government regulation has
rested, is becoming less tenable.' 4 Recent FCC actions have been directed
toward an almost total deregulation of the cable industry. 149 In addition,
the FCC has proposed to allow for the development of direct broadcast satellite services' 50 and movement into the low power TV area.15 1 The Commission's actions are aimed at minimizing the "scarcity" of communication
channels receivable in the average American home.
The future of the FCC's Seven Station and Duopoly Rules (limitation
on ownership within a market) in such a changing environment has been
questioned by the NAB.
[The Satellite Television Corp.] asks the Commission to give it
something no other broadcaster is permitted to have-multiple
broadcast channels in every market in the country. [NAB] has
strongly urged that all ownership restrictions be removed from
broadcast television, cable and [satellite] TV. If this is done, then
Satellite] operators should
NAB believes that [Direct Broadcast
52
also be free of such restrictions.
The NAB argues that as long as the Commission applies the multiple ownership rules to current, terrestrial broadcasters, the rules must apply evenhandedly to all broadcasters. The Commission's need for any type of regulation
146.
147.
148.
"scarce

Id. at 70.
Set Report and Order in Docket No. 8967, 18 F.C.C. 288, 299 (1953).
See B. OWEN, supra note 41, at 106-07. Owen suggests that the spectrum is not in
supply" to any greater extent than steel, plastic, or pencils.

149. Seegenerally Order in Docket No. 21284, 67 F.C.C.2d 262 (1978). Additionally, great
expansion in the area of cable radio is likely to occur within the next five to ten years.
150. See Memorandum Opinion and Order in General Docket No. 80-603, 88 F.C.C.2d 1
(1981). See also Notice of Proposed Policy Statement and Rulemaking in General Docket No.
80-603, FCC 81-181, 46 Fed. Reg. 30124 (1981) (to be codified in 47 CFR §§ 2, 23, 94) [hereinafter cited as DBS Noice].
151. See Inquiry Into the Future of Low-Power Television Broadcasting and Television
Translators in the National Telecommunications System, 45 Fed. Reg. 69,178 (1980) (to be
codified in 47 CFR § 73).
152. See National Association of Broadcasters' Petition to Deny, In re Application of Satellite Television Corporation in General Docket No. 80-603 at 64-65 (July 16, 1981).

19821

MUL TIPLE OWNERSHIP RULES

in radio has been greatly decreased by the great expansion of other competi153
tive outlets.
The divergent views that have been expressed concerning the Seven
Station Rule illustrate the need to formulate policy alternatives that should
be considered by the Commission in determining the future of the Rule.
The following section is this author's outline of seven policy alternatives.
The alternatives will then be discussed and analyzed, with the conclusion
that Alternative 3 should be adopted.
VI.

POLICY ALTERNATIVES

The policy alternatives available to the Commission in dealing with the
Seven Station Rule are:
1. Leave the standard as is, limiting national ownership to seven
AM stations and seven FM stations.
2. Modify the standard to allow for the ownership of fourteen radio stations on a nationwide basis without regard to station
type (AM, FM).
3. Modify the standard to allow one entity to own the same percentage of stations nationally in 1982 as they were allowed to
do when the Rule was promulgated in 1953. This would allow
for the owneiship of thirty-six radio stations nationally regard1 54
less of station type.
4. Modify the standard to allow one entity to own the same percentage of radio stations nationally as television stations.
Adoption of this approach would allow for ownership of seventy-two radio stations on a national basis. 5
5. Eliminate all arbitrary standards (Seven Station Rule) with respect to national concentration in the radio broadcast industry.
This would allow an ad hoc determination as to whether an
expanding radio station group's newest purchase is in the public interest.
6. Utilize the merger guidelines provided by the Justice Department to determine when a radio station merger would not be
in the public interest. 156
7. Limit national radio station ownership with a population standard similar to the ones proposed by Senators White and
Bricker that establishes a constraint on a single entity's owner153. Set generally Comments of the National Association of Broadcasters, In the Matter of
Deregulation of Radio in Docket No. 79-219 at 17, 21, 22, 30, 31 (Mar. 25, 1980); Reply Comments of the National Association of Broadcasters, In the Matter of Deregulation of Radio in
Docket No. 79-219 at 28, 56, 57 (June 25, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Reply Comments].
154. In 1953, there were 3,032 licensed radio station in operation. Since one entity could
own 14 of these stations (seven AMs and seven FMs), one entrepreneur could have legally controlled .46% of all commercial radio stations nationally. BROADCASTING, Dec. 1953. Today
(1982) there are 7,937 licensed radio stations in operation. Control of .46% of all commercial
radio stations in operation in 1982 translates into 36 stations nationwide.
155. One entity is allowed to control seven TV stations nationally. Today there are 763
licensed commercial television stations in operation. Consequently, one entrepreneur can own
.917% of the operational commercial TV stations. If radio entrepreneurs were allowed to control .917% of the commercial radio stations in operation, they would be allowed to own 72
stations nationwide.
156. See inf:a note 160.
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ship by the percentage of United States population that the
stations' signals can reach. The upper limit proposed by White
and Bricker was twenty-five percent.

VII.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

This paper has focused on whether the Seven Station Rule still represents a valid approach to regulating the radio industry. In this author's
opinion, the Seven Station Rule as it now stands (Alternative 1) needs to be
modified to minimize unnecessary FCC intrusion into the investment decisions of radio broadcasters. As the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia
indicated in Churchill Tabernacle v. FCC,t 5 7 "the Commission should go no
,"158 The difurther than is reasonably necessary to correct the evil ..
and "un"necessary"
between
the
line
to
draw
where
is
to
determine
lemma
necessary" FCC action. The policy concern behind FCC action is with
national concentration in the radio broadcasting industry, and therefore,
"necessary" FCC action would promote competition. However, the great
increase in the number of operating stations, and therefore competition,
since 1953 when the Seven Station Rule was promulgated, suggests that concerns about "monopoly" and "diversification" in the radio industry must be
considerably less significant today.' 59 The FCC recently recognized these
great changes in the radio industry and instituted some deregulation.
As we stated in the Notice, it is our concern that regulationshould be
kept relevant to technology and an indust that has been characterizedfromits
beginning by rapid and dynamic change. In less than fifty years, broadcast radio has grown from an infancy of 583 stations in 1934 to a
maturity of nearly 9000 [commercial and noncommercial] stations
today. . . . [P]olicies that may have been necessary in the early
days of radio may not be necessary in an environment where
thousands of licensees offer diverse sorts of programming and appeal to all manner of segmented audiences. We believe, therefore, that
the Commission is justifted in reviewing its regulations in the face of such
Jfndamental changes as have occurredsince the dawn of radio regulation in
this county. Indeed, failure to do so could constitute less than adequate performance of our regulatory mission.i60
Evaluation of the FCC's rationale for establishing the Seven Station
Rule in light of changed conditions suggests that the Rule limits national
ownership of radio stations far beyond anything envisioned in the antitrust
laws. 161 The Rule may in fact have resulted in less diversity of viewpoints at
the national level than would have been present under a less restrictive stan157.

160 F.2d 244 (D.C. Cir. 1947).

158. Id. at 248.
159. Ste Loevinger, Media Concenratior MyAth adReality, 24 ANTrrRUST BULL. 479, 484-93
(1979); Media Contenirain,supra note 58, at 417-19, 426; see also supra Tables I through 5.
160. See Deregulation of Radio, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,888 (1981) (to be codified in 47 C.F.R. §§ 0,
73) [hereinafter cited as Deregulation of Radio] (emphasis added).
161. Baker, supra note 94, at 653, indicates that the Seven Station Rule goes further to
promote diversity of control than "antitrust would dictate, or could dictate." The best information regarding the Justice Department's definition of what constitutes an anticompetitive
merger is found in Department of Justice Merger Guidelines 2 TRADE REG. REP.(CCH) 1 4430
(1968).
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dard.16 2 This argument is based on the premise that the economies of scale
that are present in group-ownership situations will allow diversity in radio
station programs. It is economically more feasible for a group owner to offer
less profitable radio programs with smaller audiences than an owner of a
single radio station. Some increase in the present fourteen station limit on
radio ownership would arguably not create a negative impact on competition or diversity in the current radio industry.1 63 However, that increase
must be reasonable. Alternative 3, which retains the same national percentage as existed when the Rule was promulgated, appears to be a reasonable
increase.
The large increase in radio station competitors on a national basis renders most of the other arguments forwarded by the Commission for the Rule
moot. Specifically, it is difficult to understand how one could characterize
AM and FM radio frequencies as particularly "scarce" in today's market
environment.164 Similarly, the media power rationale for regulating radio is
in 1953 due to the substantial
not as strong an argument today as it was
65
increase in the number of radio stations.1
In addition, the argument that the Seven Station Rule (Alternative 1) is
needed to protect small broadcasters from the bargaining advantages possessed by station groups appears to be weak in view of the changes in the
radio industry. This argument is concerned with the fear that ownership of
more than fourteen radio stations nationally will confer an excessive amount
of market power on a group owner.' 66 Ownership of more than fourteen
stations in geographically dispersed markets throughout the United States
could not be expected to confer excessive amounts of market power on a
In a market in which the shares of the four largest firms amount to approximately
75% or more, the Department will ordinarily challenge mergers between firms accounting for, approximately, the following percentages of the market:
Acquired Firm
Acquiring Firm
4%

4% or more

2% or more
10%
1% or more
15% or more
[If the] shares of the four largest firms amount to less than approximately 75%, mergers are challenged along the following lines:
Acquired Firm
Acquiring Firm
5%
10%
15%
20%
25% or more

5% or
4% or
3% or
2% or
1%or

more
more
more
more
more

Id.
162. This is suggested by Parkman, An &conomic Analysir of the FCC'sMulttpe Ownership Rules,
31 AD. L. REv. 205, 217-20 (1979).
163. See Media Concentration, supra note 58, at 417-19, 426; Rosse, supra note 5, at 188. The
primary issues regarding concentration are with respect to national competition. The FCC has
rules in place to deal with regional concentration and with local competition. Additionally,
even if the Commission set its ownership limits too high in this area, the public interest of
preventing monopolies and undue concentration would still be protected by the antitrust laws.
164. See B. OWEN, supra note 41, at 106-07; Loevinger, supra note 159.
165. Set Deregulation of Radio, supra note 160, at 13,893; Media Concentration,supra note 58,
at 417-19, 426.
166. See supra note 67.
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radio station group. 16 7 Inasmuch as the average radio station in this country
faces tremendous competition not only from other radio stations but also
from television stations, daily newspapers, cable television, and radio station
groups that are considerably larger than those presently allowed could not
be expected to either possess or exercise market power in the national media
market. '6
The FCC's final substantive rationale for the Seven Station Rule (Alternative 1), that utilization of an arbitrary upper limit on ownership is a fairer,
more efficient procedure than an ad hoc approach, is arguably the primary
intent behind the Commission's promulgation of the Rule.169 The regulatory efficiency of establishing an arbitrary upper limit on national radio station ownership with which to evaluate prospective licensees cannot be
disputed.' 7 0 On the other hand, the fairness of the procedure depends on
where the limit is set. 17 1 The substantial increase in the number of radio
stations nationally would suggest that conditions have changed such that the
72
present arbitrary limits can be safely liberalized. 1
The rationale provided by other parties in support of some type of fixed
upper limit on national ownership of radio stations does not differ substantially from those provided by the FCC. Congress, the Justice Department,
and Dean Barrow all express the fear that failure to limit the number of
broadcasting stations that can be controlled by one entity nationally will
lead to concentration of control, which runs counter to the public interest,
convenience, and necessity. 173 These concerns are unfounded in light of the
substantial increase and changes in the American commercial radio
industry. t74
The opponents of the Seven Station Rule argue that the Rule is arbitrary because: 1) it ignores all of the facts relevant to determining if ownership of more than fourteen radio stations nationally is in the public
interest, 175 and 2) the Rule was promulgated for administrative convenience
76
and expedience rather than to promote competition and diversification. 1
Both contentions have merit. However, dealing with national concentration
167.

Id See also Media Concentration,supra note 58 at 417, 424-25; supra note 72 and accompa-

nying text.
168. See supra note 72; Loevinger, supra note 159; Reply Comments, supra note 153, at 28, 56,
57. Also note the relatively low profitability experienced by the average radio station in supra
notes 68 and 69 and accompanying text.
169. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 33, at 36-37.
170. Clearly defined limits of this sort save large amounts of time and money for both the
FCC and for broadcasters. Conversely, a case-by-case approach would necessarily involve the
Commission in lengthy hearings whenever this issue is raised.
171. Setting a limit which is too low leads to an unnecessary restriction on entrepreneurs. If
no "evil" would occur under a higher limit, society is being protected from an imaginary negative force. Conversely, if the limit is too liberal, anticompetitive practices might result. The
antitrust laws set the line for the average business in this country with respect to national concentration. See Baker, supra note 94, at 653; Deregulation of Radio, supra note 160.
172. See Deregulation of Radio, supra note 160.
173. See the comments made by these parties, supra notes 86-93.
174. See Network Broadcaxting, supra note 96, at 606; authorities cited supra note 167; and

Martin, supra note 67.
175. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 6, at 23-25.
176. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
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issues on a case-by-case basis could be an expensive and time-consuming process. 177 Setting an upper limit on the number of radio stations that can be
controlled by one entity may be the most efficient method of dealing with
national concentration of ownership. 178 However, the manner in which the
Commission set the upper limit on ownership was totally arbitrary. 179 At a
minimum, the Commission should have been more explicit with respect to
how it arrived at the upper limits selected. 180 Failure to do so has made
obtaining a waiver of the Rule functionally impossible.'" Consequently,
the best approach would be to establish realistic and fair national ownership
limits that can be waived upon proper showing.' 82 Alternative 3 offers a
realistic and fair national ownership limit, while retaining the efficiency of
having a maximum limit on ownership.
Policy alternatives 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7, outlined above, should be rejected
for a variety of reasons. Policy Alternatives 1 and 2 are rejected as being
unnecessarily restrictive with respect to private investment decisions. As previously discussed, failure to make some modification in the Seven Station
Rule based on the extensive changes that have taken place in the radio industry would not be in the public interest.1 83 Policy Alternative 4 is rejected
only because it would allow for too large an increase in national radio station
ownership without prior Commission experience.' 84 After the Commission
has had some experience with expanded national radio station ownership it
will be in a better position to evaluate whether further general expansion
would be consistent with the public interest. 185 Adoption of policy Alternatives 5 and 6, outlined above, would be very desirable. The Commission
could not be accused of abrogating its duty regarding national concentration
issues by taking a traditional antitrust approach to the problem.' 86 However, adoption of this approach would create a high degree of uncertainty
among broadcasters and at the Commission. Such antitrust considerations
should certainly become relevant if, and when, a broadcast group petitions
177. It is difficult to estimate the costs of this type of litigation for both the Commission and
the private parties involved. See Changes in the Entertainment Formats of Broadcast Stations,
37 R.R. 2d 1679, 1686-87 (1976), for the Commission's estimate of the costs involved in the
proceedings of Citizens Committee to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506 F.2d 246 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
178. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 33, at 36-37.
179. Se the exchange between Wayne Coy, then Chairman of the FCC and Paul O'Bryan
in Oral Arguments in Docket No. 8967, 182 (Jan. 17, 1949).
180. See Supplemental Brief, supra note 120, at 11. See also supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
181. The fear expressed by Storer in its Supplemental Brief, supra note 120, at 19, turned
out to be well founded since the Commission has never waived the Seven Station Rule. See
Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making in Docket No. 20548, 63 F.C.C.2d 832, 834 (1977).
182. Set United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 205 (1956).
183. Id See supra notes 67 and 159.
184. The Commission's lack of experience in increased radio ownership is apparent from the
fact that the Seven Station Rule has remained intact since 1953.
185. The slower expansion envisioned in the thirty-six-station approach is more consistent
with the operational definition of "reasonable" provided for in supra note 32, than the seventytwo-station approach.
186. See generally Celler, supra note 89; Mahaffie, Mergers and Diversificationin the Newspaper,
Broadcastingand Information Industries, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 927 (1968); and Barrow, Antitrust and
the Regulated Inusty: Promoting Competition in Broadcasting, 1964 DUKE LJ. 282.
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the FCC to waive its national ownership rule.' 8 7 However, administrative
efficiency considerations weigh heavily against the adoption of a case-by-case
approach, and thus, these alternatives are rejected.188 Finally, limiting national ownership by utilization of the percentage of population approach
suggested in Policy Alternative 7, above, would be very difficult to administer. 18 9 The most bizarre problem that could occur under a population approach is that a station group that was within the population guideline when
it was formed could result in a violation of the rule if extensive growth occurred in the markets covered by the group.
FCC adoption of policy Alternative 3, as outlined above, would represent a realistic and fair solution to the problem at hand. This approach is
compelling for two reasons. First, the radio industry is extremely competitive both nationally and locally. Allowing one entrepreneur to own the same
percentage of the nearly 8,000 operating commercial radio stations as was
allowed in 1953 cannot possibly create unlawful concentration in the national media market. 19° Second, this approach will maintain an efficient
method for dealing with national media concentration issues. 19 1
Additionally, it is recommended that the FCC not view this new standard as unwaivable. 19 2 The selection of any numeric national ownership
standard is necessarily arbitrary.' 93 Failure to waive what is admittedly an
arbitrary standard is the ultimate in administrative inflexibility, particularly
194
in a dynamic marketplace.
In sum, the FCC must reexamine its Seven Station Rule. As the
Supreme Court opinion in Storer Broadcasting noted: "If time and changing
circumstances reveal that the 'public interest' is not served by application of
the Regulations, it must be assumed that the Commission will act in accordance with its statutory obligations."' 95 Circumstances have clearly changed
in the radio industry. Increasing the upper limit on national radio station
ownership from fourteen to thirty-six, as outlined in Alternative 3 above,
would be consistent with the radio deregulation already instituted by the
Commission.

196

The time has finally come for the FCC to modify its "ulti-

19 7
mate multiple ownership regulation."'

187. The guidelines provided in supra note 161, would undoubtedly become relevant to any
petition to waive the Commission's national ownership rule.

188. Seesupra note 177.
189. See the comments of FCC Chairman Denny in Hearngs on S 1333, supra note 87, at 6265, and the comments of Commissioner Jett at 65-66.

190. See supra notes 67-69, and 159.
191. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 33, at 36-37.
192. See Supplemental Brief supra note 120, at 19; United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co.,
351 U.S. 192, 205 (1956).
193. See supra notes 178 and 179 and accompanying text.
194. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
195. 351 U.S. 192, 205 (1956).
196. See Deregulation of Radio, supra note 160.
197. See Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making in Docket No. 20548, 63 F.C.C.2d 832,
834 (1977).

METROMEDIA, INC. V CITY OF SAN DIEGo: A FIRST
AMENDMENT ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENTAL
SUPPRESSION OF SPEECH
INTRODUCTION

On March 14, 1972, the San Diego City Council adopted an ordinance
which substantially prohibited the erection of off-site "outdoor advertising
2
display signs" within the city. 1 In addition to on-site commercial signs the
ordinance permitted government signs, bench signs, commemorative plaques, religious symbols, signs within shopping centers not visible beyond the
premises, real estate signs, public service signs depicting time, temperature or
news, signs on vehicles, and temporary off-premises subdivision directional
signs. 3 The city council later amended the ordinance to exempt "temporary
political campaign signs." 4 The declared purposes of the ordinance included
the intent "to eliminate hazards to pedestrians and motorists brought about
by distracting sign displays" and to "preserve and improve the appearance
of the city." 5
6
In Metromedia, Inc. v. City ofSan Diego, the plaintiffs were engaged in the
outdoor advertising business in San Diego. They challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance and sued to enjoin its enforcement. The trial court
7
granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. The Court of Ap8
peals, Fourth Appellate District, affirmed the trial court. The California
holding that the ordinance did not violate first
Supreme Court reversed,
9
amendment guarantees.
°
The United States Supreme Court reversed' in a decision that was unable to muster a majority in support of a single rationale. The ordinance
was declared unconstitutional on its face due to its impermissible restrictions
on noncommercial speech.
This comment will examine the different approaches the Supreme
Court has developed to assess the constitutionality of governmental suppression of both commercial and noncommercial speech. An analysis of the ways
in which these approaches were applied in Metromedia will follow. The com1. SAN DIEGO, CAL., CODE § 101.0700(B) (1972). Off-site signs are those that do not
identify a use, facility, or service located on the premises or a product that is produced, sold, or
manufactured on the premises. San Diego, Cal., Ordinance 10,795 (Mar. 14, 1972).
2. On-site signs are defined as those "designating the name of the owner or occupant of
the premises upon which signs are placed, or identifying such premises; or signs advertising
goods manufactured or produced or services rendered on the premises upon which such signs
are placed." SAN DIEGO, CAL., CODE § 101.0700 (1972).

Diego, Cal., Ordinance 10,795 (Mar. 14, 1972).
Diego, Cal., Ordinance 12,189 (Oct. 19, 1977).
DIEGO, CAL., CODE § 101.0700(A) (1972).
U.S. 490 (1981).
Id.at 497.
8. Id.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

San
San
SAN
453

9. 26 Cal. 3d 848, 610 P.2d 407, 164 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1980), rev'd, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
10. 453 U.S. at 521.
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ment will conclude with an examination of the inherent difficulties in these
approaches and a look at the way the Court would analyze a case in which a
total prohibition of billboard advertising is presented.
I.

A.

CLASSIFICATIONS OF GOVERNMENTAL SUPPRESSION OF SPEECH

Regulation Based on the Time, Place, or Manner of Speech

The first amendment does not guarantee the right to communicate at
all times, places, or in any manner.I' The Supreme Court has held that the
first amendment allows reasonable regulations of constitutionally protected
speech where necessary to further significant governmental interests.' 2 The
essence of these regulations lies in the recognition that various methods of
speech, regardless of their content, may frustrate legitimate government
goals.' 3 "The crucial question is whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a partic14
ular time."'
The Court established three criteria for reviewing such regulations in
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council.' 5 Restrictions on the time, place, and manner of speech are permissible provided that
the ordinance is content-neutral, serves a significant government interest,
and leaves open adequate alternative channels of communication. 16 In Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission ' I the Court allowed a public
utility company to include inserts discussing controversial issues of public
policy in its monthly bills. The Court reaffirmed its position that a valid
time, place, and manner restriction "may not be based either upon the content or subject matter of the speech."' 8
The most recent application of the time, place, and manner restriction
occurred in Heffon v. InternationalSociety for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. '9 The
Court determined that a state may require a religious organization desiring
to distribute religious literature at a state fair to conduct those activities only
at an assigned location, even though this limited the religious practices of the
organization.
B.

Regulation of Speech Based on Content
A regulation of the time, place, or manner of speech may be imposed so

11. Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981). See
infra text accompanying note 19.
12. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 64 n. 18. See infra text accompanying notes 32-34.
13. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980). See also
Erzonoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975), where the Court stated that in order to
survive a constitutional attack such regulations must be narrowly tailored.
14. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972).
15. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
16. Id. at 771. See also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972), where an antinoise ordinance survived constitutional attack because it was sufficiently tailored and did not
unduly interfere with first amendment rights.
17. 447 U.S. 530-(1980).
18. Id. at 536.
19. 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
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long as it is reasonable. 20 However, when the regulation is based on the
content of speech, the governmental action must be more carefully scrutinized to ensure that communication has not been prohibited "merely because public officials disapprove the speaker's views." ' 21 Governmental
action that regulates speech on the basis of its subject matter "slip[s] from
the neutrality of time, place, and circumstance into a concern about
22
content.,
In Erznozntk v. City ofJacksonville,23 the Court invalidated an ordinance
prohibiting the exhibition of motion pictures displaying nudity at drive-in
theatres with screens visible from a public street because that the ordinance regulated expression on the basis of content.2 4 In Linmark Associates,
Inc. v.Township of Wi'/ingboro,25 the Court struck down an ordinance prohibiting the placement of "for sale" and "sold" signs in front of residential
dwellings. The Court reasoned that the ordinance banned only signs carrying a specific message rather than all signs of a certain size, shape, or location
26
and, therefore, related to the content of speech.
As a general rule "the First Amendment means that government has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content." ' 27 However, government regulations based on subject
matter have been approved in narrow circumstances. In Greet v. Spock 2 3 the
Court upheld the prohibition of partisan political speech on a military base
even though civilian speakers had been allowed to lecture on other subjects. 29 In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights 30 the plurality permitted a city
transit system that rented space in its vehicles for commercial advertising to
refuse to accept partisan political advertising. 3 1 These are narrow exceptions because both cases involved regulation of speech in government-created forums.
C.

Prohibition of a ParticularMedium of Communication

The distinction between regulation and total prohibition of speech was
recognized in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.32 The Court held that a
zoning ordinance banning adult book stores, movies, and bars did not constitute an invalid prior restraint violative of the first amendment or the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 33 The Court noted that the
ordinance was not a flat prohibition on the operation of adult movie theatres
20. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
21. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 282 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
22. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972) (quoting Kalven, The Concept
of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SuP. CT. REV. 29).
23. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
24. Id. at 211-12.
25. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
26. Id. at 93-94.
27. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
28. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
29. Id. at 838.
30. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
31. Id. at 302.
32. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
33. Id. at 60.
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within the city and cautioned that "[t]he situation would be quite different if
the ordinance had the effect of suppressing, or greatly restricting access to,
lawful speech."

'34

In Schneider v. Arizona 35 absolute bans on handbill distribution were held
unconstitutional notwithstanding claims of municipalities that the aim of
the legislation was the prevention of littering. InJamisonv. Texas 36 the Court
declared that "[tihe right to distribute handbills concerning religious subjects on the streets may not be prohibited at all times, at all places, and
under all circumstances." '3 7 In Martin v. City ofStruthers3 8 a flat prohibition of
door-to-door solicitation was held unconstitutional. In Kovacs v. Cooper,39 although no opinion commanded a majority of the Court, three members of
the plurality observed that an "[aibsolute prohibition" on sound trucks was
"probably unconstitutional. '"40 Three others concluded their dissent on
grounds that the statute in fact constituted just such "an absolute and un4
qualified prohibition" of sound trucks. '
Most recently, the total prohibition question was addressed in Schad v.
Borough of Mount Ephraim .42 In striking down a total ban on live entertain-

ment the Court assessed "the substantiality of the governmental interests asserted" and "whether those interests could be served by means that would be
'43
less intrusive on activity protected by the First Amendment.
D.

Regulation of Commercial and NoncommercialSpeech

The Supreme Court first confronted the problem of determining the
44
first amendment status of commercial speech in Valentine v. Chrestensen.
The Court held that the first amendment does not protect purely commercial speech.4 5 Purely commercial advertisement of goods or services remained outside of first amendment protection until Bigelow v. Virginia.46
The Court concluded that an advertisement which contained factual information pertaining to an issue of public concern outweighed a state's interest
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 71 n.35.
308 U.S. 147 (1939).
318 U.S. 413 (1943).
Id. at 416.
319 U.S. 141 (1943).
336 U.S. 77 (1949).

40. Id. at 81-82.
41. Id. at 101 (Black, J., dissenting).
42. 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
43. Id. at 68-70.
44. 316 U.S. 52 (1942). The defendant was convicted of distributing commercial advertising handbills in violation of a local anti-litter ordinance prohibiting commercial leafletting in
the streets. Id. at 53 n.1.
45. The Court determined that the primary purpose of the speech was commercial and
held that addition of a political message on the back of the leaflet would not elevate it to a
constitutionally protected status. Id. at 55. The Court later abandoned the primary purpose
test in favor of a content analysis. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
46. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). The Court reversed the conviction of a Virginia newspaper that
had published an advertisement for a New York abortion referral service in violation of a Virginia statute which prohibited ads that encouraged abortion.
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47
in suppressing speech.

Although the Court recognized that the first amendment protects commercial speech, it was quick to point out that commercial speech does not
merit the same degree of protection as noncommercial speech. Speech which
proposed no more than a commercial transaction was entitled to first
amendment protection in Virginia Pharmacy Board. A Virginia statute prohibiting price advertising by pharmacists was held unconstitutional. The Court
recognized, however, that "common-sense differences" between commercial
and other forms of speech "suggest that a different degree of protection is
necessary to insure that the flow of truthful and legitimate commercial infor48
mation is unimpaired."
In Bates v. State Bar of Arzona 49 the Court relied on the teachings of
Virgina Pharmacy Board to prevent Arizona from prohibiting truthful and
legitimate price advertisements of legal services and again recognized the
"common-sense differences" between commercial and noncommercial
speech. 50 One year later in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 5 1 the Court
upheld the suspension from practice of an attorney for face-to-face solicitation of business for pecuniary gain. 52 Justice Powell, writing for the Court,
stated that commercial speech was afforded "a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First
' 53
Amendment values."
In CentralHudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 54 a New
York State Public Service Commission regulation which prevented electric
utilities from advertising the use of electricity was held invalid. The Court
reaffirmed the conclusion reached in Ohralik,5 5 stating that the Constitution
accords "a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression" and added that "[t]he protection available for
particular commercial expression turns on the nature both of the expression
'56
and of the governmental interests served by its regulation.
The Court then adopted a four-part test for determining the validity of
government restrictions based on the content of commercial speech. 57 The
first amendment protects only commercial speech which concerns lawful activity and is not misleading. A restriction on otherwise protected commercial speech is valid only if it seeks to implement a substantial governmental
interest, directly advances that interest, and reaches no further than necessary to accomplish the given objective. The Commission's regulation was
47. The existence of the New York referral service was considered "not unnewsworthy."
Id. at 822.

425 U.S. at 771 n.24. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
433 U.S. 350 (1977).
Id. at 380-8 1.
436 U.S. 447 (1978).
These activities were referred to as "classic examples of 'ambulance chasing.' " 436
469 (Marshall, J., concurring).
436 U.S. at 456.
447 U.S. 557 (1980).
See supra text accompanying notes 51-53; see also Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech:
Economic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REv. 1 (1979).
56. 447 U.S. at 563.
57. Id. at 563-66.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
U.S. at
53.
54.
55.
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overturned, therefore, because the suppression of speech was more extensive
than necessary to further New York's interest in energy conservation.
Finally, Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego 58 presented the Court with a
situation in which a billboard regulation distinguished between commercial
and noncommercial speech. The ordinance was invalidated because commercial speech was afforded greater protection than noncommercial speech.
II.
A.

METROMEDIA, INC. V CITY OF SAN DIEO

ProceduralHistog

The trial court found the San Diego ordinance to be an unconstitutional exercise of the city's police power and an abridgment of Metromedia's
first amendment rights. 59 The California Court of Appeal affirmed on the
first ground without reaching the first amendment issue. 6°
The California Supreme Court reversed on the ground that a city's interest in either traffic safety or aesthetics justifies exercise of the police
power. 6 1 The ordinance, however, was analyzed only in terms of its effect on
commercial speech. In dismissing the first amendment challenge, the court
relied on the United States Supreme Court's summary dismissals of appeals
62
in three cases upholding billboard regulation ordinances.
The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction to hear
Metromedia's appeal. 63 The Court was thus presented with its first opportunity to provide guidance for assessing the relation between the first amendment interest of billboard advertisements and a city's interest in traffic safety
and aesthetics.
B.

Metromeda's Position

Metromedia argued that the ordinance was invalid on first and fourteenth amendment grounds because it would result in the total ban of outdoor advertising in San Diego.6 Metromedia pointed out that San Diego
agreed that "many businesses, politicians, and other persons rely upon outdoor advertising because other forms of advertising are insufficient, inappropriate and prohibitively expensive."' 65 The ordinance, Metromedia urged,
would effectively eliminate an entire medium of communication.
58. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
59. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 26 Cal. 3d 848, 610 P.2d 407, 164 Cal. Rptr.
510 (1980), rev'd, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).

60. Id.
61. Id.
62. SetNewman Signs, Inc. v. Hielle, 440 U.S. 901 (1979); Suffolk Outdoor Advertising
Co. v. Hulse, 439 U.S. 808 (1978); Markham Advertising Co. v. Washington, 393 U.S. 316
(1969). These cases were dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.
63. 449 U.S. 897 (1980).
64. Brief for Appellants at 18-33, Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490

(1981).
65. Id. at 33-45.
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The Holdzng

Five separate opinions were written. Justice White wrote the plurality
opinion in which Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Powell joined. The plurality applied the four-part test in CentralHudson and found the ordinance to be
valid insofar as it regulated commercial speech. 66 The ordinance, however,
67
was declared unconstitutional under the first and fourteenth amendments.
Stating that noncommercial speech deserves greater protection than commercial speech, the Court held that the ordinance inverts this rule by affording a greater degree of protection to commercial than to noncommercial
speech .68
Justice Brennan, writing a concurring opinion in which Justice Blackmun joined, took the position that the practical effect of the ordinance was
to eliminate billboards as an effective medium of communication in San Diego. 69 By applying the Schad test, Justice Brennan found that the city failed
to establish adequate traffic safety and aesthetic justification for a total prohibition of speech. 70 The concurring justices concluded that a city could
totally ban billboards if it showed the ban would further a "sufficiently sub' 71
stantial governmental interest.
The dissenting justices held that an absolute ban on billboard advertising, whether limited to commercial advertising or extending to all messages,
was within the legitimate authority of local governments. However, each
felt the need to write a separate opinion. Chief Justice Burger, citing Hejion,
argued that nothing in the first amendment prevents such a ban. 72 Justice
Stevens relied on Kovacs to reach the same conclusion. 73 Justice Rehnquist
agreed substantially with the views of the Chief Justice and Justice Stevens, 74 adding that aesthetic justification alone was sufficient to sustain a
75
total billboard ban.
III.

ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S RATIONALE

Metromedia presented the Supreme Court with its first opportunity to
assess the relationship between the first amendment interest in billboard advertising and a municipality's interest in traffic safety and aesthetics. 76 The
case also presented the Court with the opportunity to provide some much
needed clarification of the different first amendment protections afforded to
commercial and noncommercial speech. The plurality focused on the latter
question while the rest of the Court focused on the former. The result was
66. 453 U.S. at 512. See supra text accompanying notes 54-57.
67. Id. at 521.

68. Id.
69. Id. at 525-26 (Brennan, J., concurring).
70. Id. at 528. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 566 (Burger, CJ., dissenting). See supra text accompanying note 19.
73. Id. at. 550-51 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See supra text accompanying notes 39-4 1.
74. Id. at 569 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 570. See also
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
76. See Aronovsky, Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego: Aesthetzs, the Fst Amendment,
and the Realities of Billboard Control, 9 EcoLOGY L. Q. 295-339 (1981).
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that neither issue received consideration by the entire Court. As Justice
Rehnquist concluded, "it is a genuine misfortune to have the Court's treatment of the subject be a virtual Tower of Babel, from which no definite
principles can be clearly drawn. .",77
It was anticipated that the Court in Metromedia would provide guidance
for municipalities contemplating the constitutionality of various billboard
ordinances. Four of the five opinions provided some guidance. Unexpectedly, the case was resolved through an analysis of commercial and noncommercial speech. The precedential holding of Metromedia is that commercial
speech must not be afforded greater first amendment protection than noncommercial speech. This concept is not novel and fits neatly into the line of
commercial speech cases. It is significant, however, that the Court is still
unprepared either to define what speech is "commercial" or "noncommercial" or simply to declare that all truthful speech should be afforded equal
first amendment protection.
The more important aspect of this case is that it presents a good illustration of the difficulties and inconsistencies which have resulted from the
evolution of four different methods of analyzing the single issue of governmental suppression of speech. This discussion examines the way these approaches were applied in Metromedia. While it agrees with the plurality's
analysis and with its determination that the constitutionality of a total ban
on billboards was not presented in this case, it looks at the way in which the
entire Court might analyze such a case if it arises.
A.

Analysis of the Ordinance as a Distinction Between Commercial and
Noncommercial Speech

The plurality noted that the Court has "consistently distinguished between the constitutional protection afforded commercial as opposed to noncommercial speech," 78 and separately considered the impact of the
ordinance on both types of speech. The ordinance was found to be valid
insofar as it regulated commercial speech. However, the ordinance was declared invalid under this analysis because commercial speech was permitted
in situations where noncommercial speech was prohibited.
The CentralHudson test was applied to determine the constitutionality of
the regulation on commercial speech.7 9 The plurality recognized that traffic
safety and the appearance of the city are "substantial governmental goals" 80
and agreed with the "accumulated, common-sense judgments of local
lawmakers and of the many reviewing courts" 8 ' that elimination of bill-.
boards reasonably relates to traffic safety. The ordinance was found to go no
further than necessary to accomplish the city's objectives. The regulation of
commercial speech was thus held to satisfy the requirements of Central
77. 453 U.S. at 569 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
78. 453 U.S. at 504-05.

79. Id. at 507. See supra text accompanying notes 54-57.
80. Id. at 507-08.

81. Id. at 509.
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Hudson .82
The San Diego ordinance permitted an owner of a commercial establishment to erect a billboard only on his own property and only if that billboard advertised goods or services available on that property. The plurality
observed that the effect of this ordinance was to permit commercial speech
while prohibiting noncommercial speech. The plurality recalled the development of the law establishing that while commercial speech deserves first
amendment protection, it does not merit the same degree of protection as
that afforded noncommercial speech. 8 3 The plurality argued that the ordinance results in an inversion of this law by providing greater protection for
commercial speech than for noncommercial speech. 84 The plurality thus determined that the ordinance was unconstitutional, stating "that by allowing
commercial establishments to use billboards to advertise the products and
services they offer, the city necessarily has conceded that some communicative interests, e.g., onsite commercial advertising, are stronger than its com'
peting interests in aesthetics and traffic safety. "85
It appears, therefore, that the plurality would uphold the constitutionality of an ordinance which bans commercial speech while allowing noncommercal speech. Justice Brennan, however, recognized that such an
ordinance will continue to raise significant first amendment problems. An
unacceptable amount of discretion would be left in the hands of city officials
to determine whether a proposed message should be labeled commercial or
noncommercial. Justice Brennan posed the question, "[m]ay the city decide
that a United Automobile Workers billboard with the message 'Be a patriot-do not buy Japanese-manufactured cars' is 'commercial' and there86
fore forbid it? What if the same sign is placed by Chrysler?"
Although Justice Brennan raised good questions, he did not offer any
guidance in distinguishing between commercial and noncommercial speech.
Neither did the plurality, even though it relied upon this distinction to invalidate the ordinance. Metromedia provided an opportunity to clarify the status
of commercial speech within the hierarchy of first amendment values. The
Court, however, avoided this issue. In Central Hudson Justice Rehnquist
stated that "the Court unlocked a Pandora's Box ' 87 when, in Virginia Pharmacy Board, it recognized different degrees of first amendment protection for
commercial and noncommercial speech. Until the Court either defines its
terms or declares all truthful communication, commercial and noncommercial, worthy of equal first amendment protection, "Pandora's Box" will remain open.

B.

Analysts of the Ordinanceas a Content-BasedRegulation
The plurality recognized that the exceptions to the ordinance's general
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 512.
Id. at 504-08.
Id. at 513-14.
Id. at 520.
Id. at 539 (Brennan, J., concurring).
447 U.S. at 598 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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prohibition of billboards distinguishes between permissible and impermissible signs by reference to content.8 8 The plurality, however, avoided performing a content analysis. Perhaps this is because it had already decided
the case under a commercial/noncommercial speech analysis and wanted to
ensure that its holding would not be clouded by a separate analysis. Or
perhaps it was to avoid a discussion concerning whether the exceptions
themselves are constitutional. The plurality did point out, however, that
these content-based exceptions preclude the use of a time, place, and manner
analysis.8 9
Justice Stevens stated that "the plurality focuses its attention on the
exceptions from the total ban and, somewhat ironically, concludes that the
ordinance is an unconstitutional abridgment of speech because it does not
abridge enough speech."0 This is simply an inaccurate account of the plurality's treatment of the case. The plurality did not focus its attention on
these exceptions. It clearly performed an entirely different analysis.
C. Analysis of the Ordinance as a Time, Place, or Manner Regulation
Rather than participate in the plurality's discussion of the distinction
between commercial and noncommercial speech, the remainder of the Court
treated the case as a straightforward competition between the first amendment values of billboard advertising and a municipality's interest in traffic
safety and aesthetics. In assessing this relationship, the justices were divided
over whether the ordinance should be classified as a time, place, or manner
regulation or as a total prohibition of a medium of communication. The
classification is vital because it determines the analysis to be used.
Chief Justice Burger stated that "[iut is not really relevant" 9 ' how the
ordinance is classified. He argued that the Court should not simply select a
classification and apply its corresponding analysis. However, as the plurality
pointed out, "[t]hese 'labels' or 'categories' . . . have played an important
role in this Court's analysis of First Amendment problems in the past. The
standard THE CHIEF JUSTICE himself adopts appears to be based almost
92
exclusively on prior discussions of time, place and manner restrictions."
The Chief Justice addressed the basic question of whether a city may
exercise its police power to eliminate billboards in the interests of traffic
safety and aesthetics. 93 In answering in the affirmative, Chief Justice Burger
relied on the time, place, and manner analysis in Heffon.94 He concluded
that traffic safety and aesthetics are legitimate governmental interests and
that billboards frustrate those interests. 95 The Chief Justice contended that
the exceptions to the general prohibition are content-neutral. He stated that
the city "has not preferred any viewpoint and, aside from these limited ex88. 453 U.S. at 516.
89. Id. at 517.
90. Id. at 540 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 556 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
92. 453 U.S. at 518 n.23.
93. Id. at 557 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 566. See supra text accompanying note 19.

95. Id. at 565.
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ceptions, has not allowed some subjects while forbidding others."
There are two flaws with Chief Justice Burger's choice of the time,
place, and manner analysis. First, while the intent of the legislators may not
have been to favor certain subject matter over others, the result of the exceptions is such a discrimination. For example, certain religious symbols would
be permitted while other symbols, not recognized as "religious" would be
prohibited. The time, place, and manner cases hold that the effect of the
97
The
legislation may determine whether a regulation is content-neutral.
effect of the exception is discrimination based on content. This removes the
ordinance from a time, place, and manner analysis.
The second flaw in the analysis is that it neglects the requirement of
Virginia Pharmacy Board that alternative channels of communication remain
open. As the parties stipulated, however, adequate alternate means of communication do not exist. 98 Whether or not Chief Justice Burger approves of
the concept of these classifications, it is difficult to believe that Heffon may
be legitimately applied in this case.
D. Analysis of the Ordinance as a Total Prohbtition of Speech
Perhaps it is because "every regulation necessarily speaks as a prohibition," 99 or that Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens were simply anxious to express their views on the subject, that they treated the case as
presenting the total ban question. Justice Brennan argued that the exceptions to the ordinance do not alter the nature of the ban, the "practical effect" of which eliminates billboards as an effective medium of
communication. 100 Despite their good intentions of wanting to provide guidance in these matters, it seems that these justices prematurely performed
the total ban analysis. A genuine, as opposed to a practical, total ban situation is likely to arise eventually.
Classification of Metromedia as a total ban question is inappropriate for
two reasons. First, the exceptions to the general ban are significant and substantial. By their very nature these exceptions should remove the ordinance
from this analysis. Second, the justices who applied this analysis mistakenly
equated the total elimination of a particular business with the total elimina10
tion of a particular medium of communication. 1 The fact that the outdoor
advertising business in San Diego is eliminated does not necessarily mean
that billboards are also eliminated. Billboards may exist independently of
the advertising business.
Determining whether an ordinance is a prohibition or merely a regula96. Id. at 564.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 20-22.
98. Joint Stipulation of Facts § 28, Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490

(1981).
99. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962).
100. 453 U.S. at 525-26 (Brennan, J., concurring).
101. "If enforced as written, the ordinance at issue in this case will eliminate the outdoor
advertising business in the City of San Diego. The principal question presented is, therefore,
whether a city may prohibit this medium of communication." Id. at 540 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 60:1

tion is at least as difficult as determining whether an ordinance is contentbased. In Kovacs the question presented was whether an ordinance which
regulated the use of "loud and raucous" sound trucks was, in fact, a regulation or a'total ban. 10 2 Sound trucks are, by their nature, "loud and raucous." In Metromedia Justice Stevens stated that whether the ordinance in
Kovacs was a regulation or a prohibition, it at least permits a city to enforce a
rule that "curtails the effectiveness of a particular means of

communication."

03
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IV.

CONCLUSION

Despite the plurality's determination in Metromedia that traffic safety
and aesthetics are "substantial governmental goals,' 1 4 it cannot be concluded that the plurality justices would allow either of these interests to uphold a total prohibition of billboard advertising. Justice Brennan argued
that under these circumstances Schad is the appropriate test to apply. The
city would have to prove that "a sufficiently substantial governmental interest is directly furthered by the total ban and that any more narrowly drawn
restriction . . .would promote less well the achievement of that goal."' 0 5
This would impose a much more difficult burden of proof on the city than it
faced under the Central Hudson test which was applied only to determine the
validity of restrictions on commercial speech. The "common-sense judgment" of a legislature which satisfied Central Hudson will not satisfy Schad.
If the city's interest in the ordinance is either traffic safety or aesthetics,
Schad would require the city to prove that billboards actually do adversely
affect traffic safety or to demonstrate that its interest in the aesthetics of
industrial areas is sufficiently substantial to justify a total ban. These stan0 6
dards of proof would be extremely difficult to meet.1
If a case arises in which the total ban is unquestionably presefited, there
is little reason to believe that all of the justices will analyze the ordinance
within the Schad framework. Justice Brennan is correct in his belief that the
Schad test should be applied. Kovacs should not apply because it was questionable whether that ordinance constituted a regulation or a prohibition.
The justices clearly pointed out that if the ordinance resulted in an absolute
102. 338 U.S. at 78.
103. 453 U.S. at 550 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "If the First Amendment categorically protected the marketplace of ideas from any quantitative restraint, a municipality could not outlaw
graffiti." Id.
104. 453 U.S. at 507-08.
105. Id. at 528 (Brennan, J., concurring).
106. The considerations of public safety and beauty as proffered by the state as a basis
for prohibiting the speech signified by the [billboards] are mutually inconsistent. The
argument is made that our'residents are entitled to look at the beauty of the countryside, untrammeled by the blight of billboards, in the face of the statement that billboards can be banned because they constitute a distraction to the drivers of
automobiles. Using this reasoning, one could argue the countryside should be covered
with billboards to reduce the temptation to avert one's eyes from the road.
Brief for Appellants at 41, Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (quoting
denied, 446
Oklahoma ex. ret Dep't of Transp. v. Pile, 603 P.2d 337, 342-43 (Okla. 1979), cert.
U.S. 980 (1982)).
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ban they would have reached a different conclusion by applying a more
strict set of requirements.
Even if Justice Stevens does not apply Kovacs he still seems willing to
conclude that a city's interests in traffic safety and aesthetics are legitimate
governmental goals which are sufficient to justify the ban.1 0 7 Justice Rehnquist will uphold the total ban solely on the basis of the city's desire to enhance its own beauty. 10 8 Chief Justice Burger, believing that it makes no
difference how the ordinance is classified, will continue to hold that the city
has the right to impose a total ban. 10 9
The plurality would not indicate whether it would uphold a total
ban." 0 The element of uncertainty in assessing whether the Court would
uphold the prohibition is in determining the approaches which these justices
are likely to take. If three justices follow the Schad test, or any of the other
cases within that total prohibition category, the ordinance would most likely
be invalidated because the city would probably not be able to meet such a
heavy burden of proof. If two justices choose not to be restrained by the
classification and to apply some less strict standard of review such as those
chosen by the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist, the ordinance would
probably be upheld.
Ironically then, the element of uncertainty rests with the same justices
who decided the Supreme Court's first billboard regulation case. 1 ' Metromedia is a good example of "the often unpredictable variety of response
and lack of finality of resolution that the recurring tensions between speech
' 12
and law in a free society are capable of producing." "
Eugene Burton Elliot

107. "[A] wholly impartial total ban on billboards would be permissible...." 453 U.S. at
553 (Stevens, J.,dissenting).
108. "[T]he aesthetic justification alone is sufficient to sustain a total prohibition of billboards within a community .... 453 U.S. at 570 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954)).
109. "San Diego simply is exercising its police power to provide an environment of tranquility, safety, and as much residual beauty as a modern metropolitan area can achieve." 453 U.S.
at 566 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
110. 453 U.S. at 515 n.20. Justice Stewart has since retired from the Court.
11l.At the time of this writing the City of San Diego was in the process of re-evaluating its
billboard regulation. The City was unable at that time to venture a guess as to whether a total
billboard prohibition would be declared valid. Telephone interview with C. Alan Sumption,
Deputy City Attorney for the City of San Diego (Jan. 8, 1982).
112.

F. HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY 480 (1981).

